Hall v. Piedmont Publishing Co.

Citation266 S.E.2d 397,46 N.C.App. 760
Decision Date20 May 1980
Docket NumberNo. 7923SC1003,7923SC1003
Parties, 6 Media L. Rep. 1333 Dr. Locksley S. HALL v. PIEDMONT PUBLISHING COMPANY, a corporation, and David V. Liner.
CourtCourt of Appeal of North Carolina (US)

McElwee, Hall, McElwee & Cannon by John E. Hall, Wilkesboro, for plaintiff-appellant.

Womble, Carlyle, Sandridge & Rice by Charles F. Vance, Jr., and W. Andrew Copenhaver, Winston-Salem, for defendant-appellee, Piedmont Publishing Company.

Roy G. Hall, Jr., and Zachary T. Bynum III, Winston-Salem, for defendant-appellee, David V. Liner.

VAUGHN, Judge.

It was plaintiff's burden to prove defamatory language on the part of defendants of or concerning plaintiff which was published to a third person causing injury to plaintiff's reputation and if the plaintiff was a public official or public figure, plaintiff must prove actual malice on the part of defendants. We hold that a directed verdict was properly granted for defendants because plaintiff was a public official and plaintiff has not shown actual malice on the part of defendants in the publication of any words possibly defamatory to plaintiff.

In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964), the Court held that the First Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibited a public official from recovering damages for defamatory statements relating to his official conduct in the absence of both allegation and proof of actual malice in the making of the statement. The trial court in the case at hand concluded that plaintiff was a public official and that plaintiff failed to offer any evidence of actual malice on the part of defendants.

Under the rule of New York Times, plaintiff was a "public official." "(T) he 'public official' designation applies at the very least to those among the hierarchy of government employees who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibility for or control over the conduct of government affairs." Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85, 86 S.Ct. 669, 676, 15 L.Ed.2d 597, 605 (1966). Plaintiff was a medical examiner in Yadkin County operating under the authority conferred to physicians in judicial commitment proceedings found in former G.S. 122-59, -63 and -65, which were repealed by the legislature effective 1 September 1973 and declared unconstitutional by this Court on 27 June 1973. 1973 N.C. Sess.Laws c. 762, s. 2; In re Confinement of Hayes, 18 N.C.App. 560, 197 S.E.2d 582, cert. den., 283 N.C. 753, 198 S.E.2d 729 (1973). Some courts regard the physician in a mental commitment proceeding as a quasi-judicial officer. See, e.g., Linder v. Foster, 209 Minn. 43, 295 N.W. 299 (1940). Plaintiff was compensated for his services pursuant to G.S. 122-43. Then, as now, the statute referred to physicians as "officers" in the commitment process at least for purposes of compensation. Our courts have not characterized a physician acting in this capacity for purposes of the New York Times rule. A mental commitment proceeding is recognized as a quasi-judicial proceeding in this jurisdiction and the physicians who provide affidavits are given an absolute privilege as to any defaming statement they make about the committed person. This privilege comes not as an officer but as a witness in a quasi-judicial proceeding. The physician has witness immunity and not official immunity from defamation suits. Fowle v. Fowle, 255 N.C. 720, 122 S.E.2d 722 (1961); Bailey v. McGill, 247 N.C. 286, 100 S.E.2d 860 (1957); Jarmon v. Offutt, 239 N.C. 468, 80 S.E.2d 248 (1954). It is not, however, inconsistent with these cases to hold that physicians involved as plaintiff was in this case are public officials for purposes of the New York Times rule.

In upholding the trial court's ruling that plaintiff is a public official for purposes of the New York Times rule, we are consistent with other rulings in this jurisdiction on the subject. For purposes of the New York Times rule, a deputy sheriff and a taxicab inspector have been held to be public officials. Dellinger v. Belk, 34 N.C.App. 488, 238 S.E.2d 788 (1977), cert. den., 294 N.C. 182, 241 S.E.2d 517 (1978); Cline v. Brown, 24 N.C.App. 209, 210 S.E.2d 446 (1974), cert. den., 286 N.C. 412, 211 S.E.2d 793 (1975). While a doctor as medical examiner may not be very high in the hierarchy of government, he holds a position with the potential for great social harm if abused. Thus, independent interest in and comment on the qualifications and performance of a person holding that position is to be encouraged. The appropriate balance between freedom of speech as it relates to comments on the actions of a medical examiner in the performance of his duties and freedom from harassment to the person performing those duties is to declare that he is a public official.

We now turn to whether plaintiff as a public official has demonstrated "actual malice" on the part of defendants in the publication of any possibly defamatory statements. As stated in New York Times,

The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with "actual malice" that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.

376 U.S. at 279-80, 84 S.Ct. at 726, 11 L.Ed.2d at 706; see also Ponder v. Cobb, 257 N.C. 281, 126 S.E.2d 67 (1962). A plaintiff must produce "clear and convincing proof that the defamatory falsehood was made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for truth." Gertz v. Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 342, 94 S.Ct. 2997, 3008, 41 L.Ed.2d 789, 807 (1974); Beckly Newspapers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81, 88 S.Ct. 197, 19 L.Ed.2d 248 (1967). The reasonable prudent man standard is not to be used. St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 88 S.Ct. 1323, 20 L.Ed.2d 262 (1968).

The issue thus on this appeal where a motion for directed verdict was granted at the close of plaintiff's evidence becomes...

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9 cases
  • Renwick v. News and Observer Pub. Co.
    • United States
    • North Carolina Court of Appeals
    • 5. Juli 1983
    ...official or public figure, plaintiff must allege and prove actual malice on the part of defendants. See generally Hall v. Publishing Co., 46 N.C.App. 760, 266 S.E.2d 397 (1980) and Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 558, 580A (1977). With regard to fault, the complaint alleges that the statem......
  • Davis v. Lewis, : 7:16-CV-340-H
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of North Carolina
    • 26. März 2018
    ...Tyson v. L'Eggs Products, Inc., 84 N.C. App. 1, 10-11, 351 S.E.2d 834, 840 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987) (citing Hall v. Publ'g Co., 46 N.C. App. 760, 266 S.E.2d 397 (1980)). Defendants move to dismiss plaintiff's claim for defamation as barred by the statute of limitations, which is one year in Nor......
  • Tyson v. L'Eggs Products, Inc., 8620SC268
    • United States
    • North Carolina Court of Appeals
    • 20. Januar 1987
    ...concerning the plaintiff, which were published to a third person, causing injury to the plaintiff's reputation. Hall v. Publishing Co., 46 N.C.App. 760, 266 S.E.2d 397 (1980). Because we find that the letter signed by the defendants is not defamatory, a fatal weakness exists in the plaintif......
  • Larrowe v. Bank of the Carolinas
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina
    • 24. August 2011
    ...the plaintiff, which were published to a third person, causing injury to plaintiff's reputation. See Hall v. Piedmont Publ'g Co., 46 N.C. App. 760, 762, 266 S.E.2d 397, 399 (1980). The term defamation includes two distinct torts, libel and slander. See Phillips v. Winston-Salem/Forsyth Coun......
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