Hall v. Prelesnik, Case Number 1:08-CV-14889

• Decision Date: 09 June 2011
• Docket Number: Case Number 1:08-CV-14889
• Parties: DWAYNE HALL, Petitioner, v. JOHN PRELESNIK, Respondent,
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

DWAYNE HALL, Petitioner, v. JOHN PRELESNIK, Respondent,

Case Number 1:08-CV-14889

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN NORTHERN DIVISION

Dated: June 9, 2011

Honorable Thomas L. Ludington

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS,

DECLINING TO ISSUE A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY, AND DENYING

PERMISSION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS ON APPEAL

Petitioner Dwayne Hall ("Petitioner"), confined at the Richard A. Handlon Correctional Facility in Ionia, Michigan, has filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner was convicted following a jury trial in the Wayne Circuit Court of first-degree murder, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.316(1)(a), felon in possession of a firearm, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.224f, and commission of a felony with a firearm, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.227b. Petitioner was sentenced to life in prison for the murder conviction, three-to-twenty years for the felon-in-possession conviction, and a consecutive two years for the felony-firearm conviction.

Petitioner advances fourteen grounds for relief: (1) insufficient evidence was presented to sustain the murder conviction; (2) a defense witness was improperly impeached with a prior conviction; (3) the prosecutor committed misconduct during his rebuttal argument; (4) new evidence undermines the reliability of Petitioner's convictions; (5) hearsay evidence was improperly admitted at trial; (6) the case should have been remanded for another preliminary examination; (7) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call alibi witnesses; (8) trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly investigate the defense; (9) the admission of hearsay violated Petitioner's confrontationrights; (10) the prosecutor suppressed exculpatory evidence, (11) the prosecutor committed misconduct; (12) trial counsel was ineffective; (13) appellate counsel was ineffective; and (14) Petitioner was denied discovery during his state post-conviction proceeding. For the reasons provided herein, the petition will be denied.

I

The relevant facts relied upon by the Michigan Court of Appeals, which are presumed correct on habeas review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) are as follows:

Defendant's convictions arise from the afternoon shooting death of Curtiss Triplett, on a street in Ecorse in February 2003. The incident began when defendant fired his gun into the air. The victim, Triplett, stopped his car and admonished defendant not to play with guns. According to witnesses, defendant then walked over to the car and shot Triplett. Defendant was identified as the shooter by Triplett's girlfriend, who was in the car with Triplett and had known defendant for many years, and by another man who was standing a block away, but who also knew defendant. Defendant was also identified as the shooter by another woman, Leniece Hopkins, who testified at trial that she was a block away from the shooting and knew defendant. Defendant presented alibi witnesses and testimony that a former police officer, Derrick Lyons, was the shooter.

People v. Hall, No. 251050, 2004 Mich. App. LEXIS 3614, *1-2 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 28, 2004); see Wagner v. Smith, 581 F.3d 410, 413 (6th Cir. 2009) .

Following his conviction and sentence, Petitioner filed an appeal of right. Petitioner's appointed appellate counsel filed a brief that raised three claims:

I. The evidence presented at trial was insufficient to convict Petitioner of first degree murder.

II. The trial court abused its discretion in allowing the prosecution to impeach witness Carey McDaniel by his criminal conviction record.

III. Petitioner is entitled to a new trial because the improper remarks made by the Prosecutor during rebuttal argument denied him a fair trial and thus constitutes reversible error.

Petitioner's counsel also filed a supplemental brief, asserting one additional claim:

IV. Petitioner should be granted a new trial based upon the newly discovered evidence of perjured trial testimony.

Petitioner filed his own pro se supplemental brief, raising four more issues:

V. The trial court abused its discretion in the denial of defense counsel objection to suppress the hearsay statements made by witness Walker to Officer Howard, in violation of Michigan Rule of Evidence 803(2).

VI. The trial court abused its discretion in denying defense counsel motion for remand back to the district court for further preliminary examination.

VII. Trial counsel attorney David Cripps provided ineffective assistance of counsel, in his failure to call Petitioner's alibi witnesses Ms. Sandra Hall and Ms. Juiley Mosley, in violation of Petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.

VIII. Trial counsel attorney David Cripps provided ineffective assistance of counsel in his failure to oversee his own investigation, by his investigation staff, thus denying the credibility in the testimony of witness Mr. Michael B. Perry, and the corroborating testimony of Mr. Ricky Scott under Michigan Rule of Evidence 804(B)(3).

The Court of Appeals affirmed Petitioner's conviction in an unpublished opinion. Hall, 2004 Mich. App. LEXIS 3614. Petitioner then filed an application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court, raising all eight claims that were presented to the Court of Appeals. The Michigan Supreme Court denied leave to appeal. People v. Hall, 474 Mich. 854, 702 N.W.2d 580 (2005).

Petitioner then filed a motion for relief from judgment in the trial court. This motion raised five substantive claims:

IX. Petitioner was denied his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation, and his Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair trial when the trial court allowed the admission of testimonial out-of-court hearsay statement, and when the trial court permitted the prosecution to withhold and deny the defense access to those same recorded statements in violation of discovery.

X. Petitioner was denied his Fourteenth United States Constitutional Amendment to due process of law and a fair trial when the prosecution suppressed and failed to disclose potential exculpatory and impeachment evidence.

XI. Petitioner was denied his 5th and 14th United States Constitutional Amendment right to due process of law and a fair trial when the prosecution committed several acts of misconduct.

XII. Petitioner was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of trial counsel as well as his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law.

XIII. Petitioner was denied his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of appellate counsel and his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law.

The trial court denied the motion in an opinion dated June 14, 2007. Petitioner filed an application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Court of Appeals, rasing these same claims and a new claim that the trial court erroneously denied his post-conviction discovery request. The Michigan Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal. People v. Hall, No. 279046 (Mich. Ct. App. filed April 3, 2008). Petitioner appealed this decision to the Michigan Supreme Court, but it denied leave to appeal as well. People v. Hall, 482 Mich. 1031, 769 N.W.2d 191 (2008).

Petitioner has now filed the instant petition, raising all fourteen claims that he presented during his two rounds of appeals in the Michigan courts.

II

Review of this case is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). Pursuant to the AEDPA, Petitioner is not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus unless he can show that the state court's adjudication of his claims on the merits-

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).

A decision of a state court is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if the state courtarrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). An "unreasonable application" occurs when "a state court decision unreasonably applies the law of [the Supreme Court] to the facts of a prisoner's case." Id. at 409. A federal habeas court may not "issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly." Id. at 410-11.

The Supreme Court has explained that "[a] federal court's collateral review of a state-court decision must be consistent with the respect due state courts in our federal system." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). The "AEDPA thus imposes a 'highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,' and 'demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.' "Renico v. Lett, --- U.S. 130 S.Ct. 1855, 1862, 176 L. Ed. 2d 678 (2010)((quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333, n. 7 (1997); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam)). "[A] state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington v. Richter, --- U.S. 131 S. Ct. 770, 786,178 L.Ed.2d 624 (2011)(citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). The Supreme Court has emphasized "that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable." Id. (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). Furthermore, pursuant to § 2254(d), "a habeas court must determine what arguments or theories supported or . . . could have supported, the state court's decision; and then it must ask whether it is...