Hall v. Rios

• Decision Date: 10 January 2012
• Docket Number: 1:09-cv-01083 LJO MJS HC
• Parties: WAINSWORTH MARCHELLUS HALL, Petitioner, v. H.A. RIOS, Warden, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California

WAINSWORTH MARCHELLUS HALL, Petitioner,

v.H.A. RIOS, Warden, Respondent.

1:09-cv-01083 LJO MJS HC

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

Dated: January 10, 2012

FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION REGARDING RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

(Doc. 47)

Petitioner is a federal prisoner proceeding pro se with a June 19, 2009, petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

Petitioner was convicted in 1994 of three offenses: (1) conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute cocaine, cocaine base, and marijuana, 21 U.S.C. § 846; (2) engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise (CCE), 21 U.S.C. § 848; and (3) conspiracy to launder money, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and 371. Petitioner received a sentence of life in prison.

At the time of filing the instant petition, Petitioner was incarcerated at the United States Penitentiary in Atwater, California. Petitioner subsequently was transferred to the Federal Correctional Complex in Coleman, Florida.¹ Petitioner asserts that his conviction for engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise should be overturned based on intervening Supreme Courtauthority in Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813 (1999).

On September 8, 2010, the Court ordered Respondent to file a response to the petition. On July 12, 2011, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the petition based on the Court's lack of jurisdiction to hear Petitioner's claim.² (Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 47.) On December 9, 2011, Petitioner filed a reply to the motion to dismiss. (Reply, ECF No. 56.)

I. PROCEDURAL GROUNDS FOR MOTION TO DISMISS

Because the petition was filed after April 24, 1996, the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), the AEDPA applies to the petition. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327, 117 S. Ct. 2059, 138 L. Ed. 2d 481 (1997); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1499 (9th Cir. 1997).

The Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts are appropriately applied to proceedings undertaken pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Rule 1(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases allows a district court to dismiss a petition if it "plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court . . . ." Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases. The Ninth Circuit has allowed respondents to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer if the motion attacks the pleadings for failing to exhaust state remedies or being in violation of the state's procedural rules. See, e.g., O'Bremski v. Maass, 915 F.2d 418, 420 (9th Cir. 1990) (using Rule 4 to evaluate motion to dismiss petition for failure to exhaust state remedies); White v. Lewis, 874 F.2d 599, 602-03 (9th Cir. 1989) (using Rule 4 as procedural grounds to review motion to dismiss for state procedural default); Hillery v. Pulley, 533 F.Supp. 1189, 1194 & n.12 (E.D. Cal. 1982) (same). Thus, a respondent can file a motion to dismiss after the Court orders a response, and the Court should use Rule 4 standards to review the motion. See Hillery, 533 F. Supp. at 1194 & n. 12.

II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Petitioner was sentenced to life imprisonment on the continuing criminal enterprise count, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 848, and 240 months for money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(I), by the United States District Court in Norfolk, Virginia. Petitioner appealed the judgment to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals. The appeal was denied. United States v. Hall, 93 F.3d 126 (4th Cir. 1996). Petitioner then filed a motion to vacate his conviction by way of a § 2255 motion in United States v. Hall, 30 F. Supp. 2nd 883 (E.D. VA 1998), which was also denied.

Prior to his appeal of the § 2255 motion, the United States Supreme Court decided Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813 (U.S. 1999). In Richardson, the Supreme Court addressed a split of circuit authority regarding finding a continuing criminal enterprise and specifically reversed the holding of the Fourth Circuit in Petitioner's direct appeal, United States v. Hall, 93 F.3d 126 (4th Cir. 1996). The Supreme Court held:

The question before us arises out of the trial court's instruction about the statute's "series of violations" requirement. The judge rejected Richardson's proposal to instruct the jury that it must "unanimously agree on which three acts constituted [the] series of violations." App. 21. Instead, the judge instructed the jurors that they "must unanimously agree that the defendant committed at least three federal narcotics offenses," while adding, "you do not . . . have to agree as to the particular three or more federal narcotics offenses committed by the defendant." Id. at 37. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit upheld the trial judge's instruction. 130 F.3d 765, 779 (1998). Recognizing a split in the Circuits on the matter, we granted certiorari. Compare United States v. Edmonds, 80 F.3d 810, 822 (3rd Cir. 1996) (en banc) (jury must unanimously agree on which "violations" constitute the series), with United States v. Hall, 93 F.3d 126, 129 (4th Cir. 1996) (unanimity with respect to particular "violations" is not required), and United States v. Anderson, 309 U.S. App. D.C. 54, 39 F.3d 331, 350-351 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (same). We now conclude that unanimity in respect to each individual violation is necessary.

Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813 (U.S. 1999) (emphasis added).

After the Supreme Court decision in Richardson, the Fourth Circuit reviewed the denial of the § 2255 motion. In its denial, the Fourth Circuit addressed how the impact of the holding of Richardson did not change the outcome of Petitioner's appeal. The following is the entirety of the Fourth Circuit's opinion:

Wainsworth Marcellus Hall seeks to appeal the district court's order denying his motion filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West Supp. 1999). We have reviewedthe record and the district court's opinion and find no reversible error. Hall is entitled to no relief under Richardson v. United States, 526 U.S. 813 (1999) (shortened citation). The district court instructed the jury at trial that it must unanimously agree on which acts constituted the continuing series of violations under 21 U.S.C.A. § 848 (West Supp. 1999). SeeUnited States v. Hall, 93 F.3d 126, 129 (4th Cir. 1996). Therefore, we deny Hall's motions to stay the appeal. We deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district court. SeeUnited States v. Hall, Nos. CR-93-162; CA-98-215 (E.D. Va. Dec. 3, 1998). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process. DISMISSED.

United States v. Hall, 187 F.3d 632, 1999 WL 587893, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 18281 (4th Cir. 1999).

On February 6, 2002 and December 26, 2007 respectively, the Fourth Circuit denied separate successive § 2255 motions for failure to show the requisite requirements to bring such a petition. United States v. Hall, 26 Fed. Appx. 335, 336 (4th Cir. 2002); United States v. Hall, 259 Fed. Appx. 572 (4th Cir. 2007). Petitioner now attempts to challenge his conviction by way of a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2244.

II. JURISDICTION

A federal prisoner who wishes to challenge the validity or constitutionality of his conviction or sentence must do so by way of a motion to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Tripati v. Henman, 843 F.2d 1160, 1162 (9th Cir.1988). In such cases, only the sentencing court has jurisdiction. Id. at 1163. A prisoner may not collaterally attack a federal conviction or sentence by way of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 865 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Generally, motions to contest the legality of a sentence must be filed under § 2255 in the sentencing court, while petitions that challenge the manner, location, or conditions of a sentence's execution must be brought pursuant to § 2241 in the custodial court."); Tripati, 843 F.2d at 1162.

In contrast, a federal prisoner challenging the manner, location, or conditions of that sentence's execution must bring a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Hernandez, 204 F.3d at 865. Here, Petitioner is challenging the validity and constitutionality of his conviction. Therefore, the appropriate procedure would be to file a motion pursuant to§ 2255 and not a habeas petition pursuant to § 2241.

The Ninth Circuit has recognized a narrow exception allowing a federal prisoner authorized to seek relief under § 2255 to seek relief under § 2241 if the remedy by motion under § 2255 is "inadequate or ineffective to test the validity of his detention." Alaimalo v. United States, 636 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2011), citing Harrison v. Ollison, 519 F.3d 952, 956 (9th Cir. 2008). "This is called the 'savings clause' or 'escape hatch' of § 2255." Id. Furthermore, § 2255 petitions are rarely found to be inadequate or ineffective. Aronson v. May, 85 S.Ct. 3, 5, 13 L. Ed. 2d 6 (1964) (a court's denial of a prior § 2255 motion is insufficient to render § 2255 inadequate.); Tripati, 843 F.2d at 1162-63 (9th Cir.1988) (a petitioner's fears of bias or unequal treatment do not render a § 2255 petition inadequate); Williams v. Heritage, 250 F.2d 390 (9th Cir.1957); Hildebrandt v. Swope, 229 F.2d 582 (9th Cir.1956). The burden is on the petitioner to show that the remedy is inadequate or ineffective. Redfield v. United States, 315 F.2d 76, 83 (9th Cir. 1963).

The Ninth Circuit has also "held that a § 2241 petition is available under the 'escape hatch' of § 2255 when a petitioner (1) makes a claim of actual innocence, and (2) has not had an 'unobstructed procedural shot' at presenting that claim. Stephens v. Herrera, 464 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2006).

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