Hall v. SGT
| Decision Date | 06 March 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 1:17-cv-02945-SEB-MPB,1:17-cv-02945-SEB-MPB |
| Parties | MELVIN HALL, Plaintiff, v. LUNSFORD Sgt., STRANGER Officer, DUSHAN ZATECKY Superintendent, HAMMOND Officer, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana |
Plaintiff Melvin Hall ("Hall"), a prisoner in the Indiana prison system, sued Defendants Dushan Zatecky ("Zatecky"), Boyd Lunsford ("Lunsford"), Eric Hammond ("Hammond"), and Amanda Stranger ("Stranger")—all employees of the Indiana Department of Correction (DOC)—for violations of the Eighth Amendment to the Constitution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state-law torts.
Now before the Court are Defendants' partial motion to dismiss the state-law claims, Dkt. 70, and motion for summary judgment on all claims. Dkt. 73. For the reasons given below, the motion for summary judgment is granted. Though that is sufficient to dispose of the case, we also grant in part and deny in part the partial motion to dismiss to clarify the relief to which Defendants are entitled.
The operative complaint, Dkt. 65, alleges the following. Hall is an epileptic. On April 13, 2017, Hall had a seizure in the prison dormitory; three prison guards—Lunsford, Hammond, and Stranger—were summoned in response. Hall was handcuffed and placed on a spinal backboard for transportation to the prison infirmary. En route, Hammond shot Hall with a taser as Lunsford and Stranger watched. "In an effort to hide his own misconduct," Hammond falsely reported to his superiors that Hall had told him he had earlier taken drugs, though a later drug test showed none in his system. Compl. ¶ 29. As a result of Hammond's false report, Hall was assigned a less favorable or more restrictive status in the prison's prisoner-classification system.
Zatecky, the complaint alleges further, is the prison warden. Zatecky failed to train the prison guards on how to recognize and respond to seizing inmates. Further, Zatecky failed to provide notice of Hall's epilepsy "on the unit" (Hall's meaning here is somewhat unclear) and otherwise failed to make the prison guards aware of Hall's epilepsy. Id. ¶ 42.
As to what Hall did to complain of this incident before coming to court, the parties' evidentiary designations reveal the following. On April 13, 2017, a few hours after tasering Hall, Lunsford, Stranger, and Hammond reported to their superiors that Hall had "attempted to grab [Stranger's] fingers," Dkt. 78, at 5, or "grabbed [Stranger's] hand attempting to cause harm." Id. at 6. We infer that these reports resulted in a finding by the prison that Hall had committed assault or battery on Stranger, though how, when, or by whom that finding was made does not appear in the record.
On May 5, 2017, Hall filled out an "Offender Complaint—Informal Process Level," State Form 52897, in accordance with the prison's grievance policy. See Dkt. 60 Ex. 1, at 8-9. His grievance is here reproduced in its entirety:
I have a problem with me being found guilty for assault, something I have no control over. I was having 3 seizures when a officer said I grab they hand doing the incident. When I have seizures I blackout and can't control anything that's happening. I think its unfair for me to be disiplined for a illness I have which is in my medical file. With my conditions I think I deserve my visits and so forth.
Dkt. 60 Ex. 1, at 36 (sic passim).
Hall's grievance was received by the prison's administration on May 8, 2017. The same day, Hall received a "Return of Grievance," State Form 45475, signed by "Robert Stafford, Grievance Specialist." Id. at 35. Also Stafford Decl. (Dkt. 75 Ex. 1) ¶¶ 21-22. The return stated, "The attached grievance has been rejected and is being returned to you because it does not comply in one or more ways with . . . the adult offender grievance procedure." Dkt. 60 Ex. 1, at 35. As reasons for the rejection, the return stated, Id. And further: "Other: DHB Matter." Id. ()
As instructed, Hall pursued the disciplinary appeals process, though any submissions he may have made to the prison in this connection are not now in the record. It does appear from the record that Hall's appeal was successful. On June 6, 2017, an assistant superintendent at the prison "grant[ed] [Hall's] appeal" and set aside the discipline the prison had imposed on Hall for having been "found guilty" of "[a]ssault/battery upon another person . . . ." Dkt. 80 Ex. 2, at 1.
No other grievance filed by Hall with the prison appears in the record. But, on May 29, 2017, a week before Hall won relief through the disciplinary appeals process, Hall wrote an e-mail to the DOC ombudsman. The e-mail is here reproduced in its entirety, capitalization regularized:
I have a small issue about a write up that was unfair. I was at the OSD Level One facility and got wrote up for having a seizure. Iwas on the phone when I first had one then had two more on my way to the infirmary. The writeup was for assault which I had no control over because I was having a seizure. Then they tazed twice which made me have another seizure that I could of died from. They thirty days from me and my commissary/phone restriction as well. I put in a appeal and still haved heard nothing and I'm trying to fix this whole situation. These types of seizures are known to every facility I been to and thats why I take medication to prevent these type of things from happening. So is there any thing you can do to help me because I feel like I shouldn't of got disciplined for having a seizure bad enough they made it worst by tazing me. I haven't heard nothing and really don't known how to go about this so is there aunything you can do to help me please.
Dkt. 80 Ex. 3, at 2 (sic passim). One June 9, 2017, the ombudsman replied by letter, advising Hall that he should first exhaust the prison's internal appeals process. Dkt. 80 Ex. 4. The ombudsman further advised Hall that, having done so, if he "still fe[lt] that a violation of DOC policy and procedure ha[d] occurred," Hall should reapply to the ombudsman for relief. Id. at 1. No further communications by Hall on the events of April 13, 2017, appear in the record.
This lawsuit was filed by Hall pro se on August 25, 2017. Dkt. 1. Hall obtained counsel shortly thereafter. Dkt. 9. On November 6, 2017, Hall by counsel mailed a "Notice of Tort Claim" to the commissioner of DOC, the governor, the Indiana Department of Insurance, and the attorney general, outlining Hall's state-law tort claims. Dkt. 75 Ex. 5-A, at 1. The notice was supplemented by further letter on November 11, 2017. Dkt. 75 Ex. 5-B, at 1.
The complaint alleges the state-law torts of battery, defamation, failure to protect, and negligence. Compl. ¶¶ 64-69. The instant partial motion to dismiss contends that all Defendants are immune to those claims under the individual-immunity provision of the Indiana Tort Claims Act (ITCA), which generally bars suits against individual state employees for acts within the scope of their employment. Ind. Code § 34-13-3-5(b). Hall concedes he has failed to state a claim against Zatecky under the doctrine of respondeat superior but contends his remaining claims fall outside the immunity under Indiana Code § 34-13-3-5(c).
In addition to the state-law claims, the complaint also alleges use of excessive force in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Compl. ¶¶ 61-63. The instant motion for summary judgment contends that no claims alleged in the complaint can be maintained for failure to exhaust administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)—codified in relevant part at 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a)— and state law. The motion contends further that Hall failed to give notice of his state-law tort claims before filing suit as required by the notice provision of the ITCA. Those claims are therefore barred as well. See Ind. Code §§ 34-13-3-6, 13. (The ITCA cannot operate to bar federal claims raised under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Defendants do not contend otherwise. See SKS & Assocs., Inc. v. Dart, 619 F.3d 674, 682 (7th Cir. 2010) (discussing Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988)). Hall responds, as to exhaustion, that there was no available and effective remedy for him to exhaust, and, as to notice, that his May 29, 2017, e-mail to the DOC ombudsman satisfies the requirement.
We first take up Defendants' motion for summary judgment. We conclude that Defendants are entitled to dismissal without prejudice of Hall's federal claims. Finding relinquishment of jurisdiction of the state-law claims to be inappropriate, we conclude next that Defendants are entitled to dismissal without prejudice of those claims as well. The sole remaining question then is whether Defendants' partial motion to dismiss entitles them to dismissal with prejudice of Hall's state-law claims. Excepting Zatecky, we conclude that the remaining Defendants are not entitled to that relief. We thus dismiss the action in its entirety without prejudice.
I. Motion for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine disputes as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The application of this standard varies with the burden of proof. This is a fundamental point that appears to have escaped Defendants, who have not articulated the standard correctly.
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