Hall v. Shaw

• Decision Date: 21 May 2020
• Docket Number: Court of Appeals Case No. 19A-CT-2533
• Citation: 147 N.E.3d 394
• Parties: Melvin HALL, Appellant/Cross-Appellee/Plaintiff, v. Bradley SHAW, Giovanni Narducci, and Central Indiana Protection Agency, Inc., Appellees/Cross-Appellants/Defendants.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

147 N.E.3d 394

Melvin HALL, Appellant/Cross-Appellee/Plaintiff,

v.Bradley SHAW, Giovanni Narducci, and Central Indiana Protection Agency, Inc., Appellees/Cross-Appellants/Defendants.

Court of Appeals Case No. 19A-CT-2533

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

FILED May 21, 2020

Attorney for Appellant: William D. Beyers, Buchanan & Bruggenschmidt, P.C., Zionsville, Indiana

Attorney for Appellees: Dane A. Mize, Skiles DeTrude, Indianapolis, Indiana

Friedlander, Senior Judge.

[1] Melvin Hall appeals from the trial court's partial dismissal of his lawsuit against Bradley Shaw, Giovanni Narducci, and Central Indiana Protection Agency, Inc. ("CIPA") (collectively, "Defendants"), in which he alleges defamation, abuse of process, malicious prosecution, and intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED"). Defendants cross-appeal from the trial court's partial denial of their motion to dismiss Hall's lawsuit. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

[2] In August of 2011, Hall began working at CIPA as a security guard, eventually becoming a supervisor. Shaw is an owner, president, and employee of CIPA while Narducci is an owner, vice president, and employee. In June of 2013, Hall formed his own security company, Urban Tactical Response Agency, LLC, and resigned from CIPA to operate it. From June of 2013 to July of 2015, Shaw and Narducci allegedly engaged in a coordinated campaign with others to defame Hall and drive him out of business. According to Hall, Shaw, Narducci, other CIPA employees, and/or others working at Shaw's and/or Narducci's direction made false allegations against Hall to the Attorney General's office, various state licensing boards, Indianapolis television station WRTV, and local law enforcement. The alleged communications were mostly to the effect that Hall had been impersonating a police officer.

[3] At some point, the Marion County Prosecutor's Office charged Hall with multiple counts of impersonating a law enforcement officer, and he was arrested on June 15, 2015. On July 9, 2015, the Indiana Private Investigator and Security Guard Licensing Board revoked Urban Tactical's professional license. On June 23, 2017, Hall's criminal trial began, during which Gerald Alexander and Guillerma Lolla-Martinez testified for the State, allegedly at Defendants' direction. Hall was acquitted of all charges.

[4] On May 22, 2018, Hall filed suit against Defendants, alleging defamation, abuse of process, malicious prosecution, and IIED. On July 11, 2018, Narducci initiated a consumer complaint with the Attorney General's office against Hall and his new security agency, Superior Tactical Response Agency, which was then operating under a probationary license. The consumer complaint was eventually dismissed. On July 31, 2018, Narducci left a voicemail for Hall, in which he allegedly made the following statements:

"Guess what dumb*** you and your f****** probation license is going down the drain! Straight up. You suing me! I don't give a f***! You know why because you engaged us into this bull****! You mother******* are done! For real ... So when you play this f****** tape for your f****** lawyer, you let your lawyer know that this s*** ain't going to be easy! Remember that. ... If you think you mother******* know who I am you better go down to that city-county building and keep checking mother******..."

Appellant's App. Vol. II, p. 51.

[5] On April 12, 2019, Hall amended his complaint, adding defamation and abuse of process claims based on Narducci's July of 2018 consumer complaint, an IIED claim based on Narducci's July of 2018 voicemail, and defamation claims based on Alexander's and Lolla-Martinez's allegedly false testimony and alleged out-of-court statements that they made before and after Hall's criminal trial.

[6] On May 8, 2019, Defendants moved to dismiss Hall's amended complaint on the basis that he had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, arguing that Hall's claims of (1) defamation, abuse of process, and IIED based on events that occurred prior to May 22, 2016, were time-barred; (2) defamation based on Alexander's and Lolla-Martinez's trial testimony were barred by absolute privilege; (3) defamation based on alleged out-of-court statements by Alexander and Lolla-Martinez did not state a claim of civil conspiracy; (4) abuse of process and IIED based on Narducci's alleged July of 2018 consumer complaint with the Attorney General's office and voicemail were insufficient as a matter of law; and (5) malicious prosecution were insufficient because Defendants did not institute or cause to be instituted any legal action against Hall. Defendants also requested attorney's fees.

[7] On June 26, 2019, the trial court (1) granted Defendants' motion as to all claims against Shaw and CIPA; (2) denied Defendants' motion as to defamation and abuse of process claims against Narducci based on his July of 2018 consumer complaint and the IIED claim based on his voicemail; and (3) denied Defendants' request for attorney's fees. Defendants contend that the trial court erred in denying their motion to dismiss in one respect, while Hall contends that the trial court erred in several respects in granting Defendants' motion.

[8] Both sides appeal from the trial court's ruling on Defendants' motion to dismiss, which was granted in part, denied in part, and issued pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6), which allows dismissal for "[f]ailure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]" Further,

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim tests the legal sufficiency of the claim, not the facts supporting it. Magic Circle Corp. v. Crowe Horwath, LLP , 72 N.E.3d 919, 922 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017). Our review of a trial court's grant or denial of a motion based on Indiana Trial Rule 12(B)(6) is de novo. Id. When reviewing a motion to dismiss, we view the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, with every reasonable inference construed in the nonmovant's favor. Id. Motions to dismiss are properly granted only "when the allegations present no possible set of facts upon which the complainant can recover." Id. at 922-23 (quotations omitted).

CRIT Corp. v. Wilkinson , 92 N.E.3d 662, 666 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (footnote omitted).

[9] The principles of notice pleadings are utilized in Indiana. Ind.

Trial Rule 8(A) merely requires "(1) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief, and (2) a demand for the relief to which the pleader deems entitled...." Also, Ind. Trial Rule 8(F) provides that "all pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice, lead to disposition on the merits, and avoid litigation of procedural points." Notice pleading is designed to discourage battles over mere form of statement and to sweep away needless controversies that have occurred either to delay trial on the merits or to prevent a party from having a trial because of mistakes in statement.

Under Indiana's notice pleading system, a pleading need not adopt a specific legal theory of recovery to be adhered to throughout the case. Indiana's notice pleading rules do not require the complaint to state all elements of a cause of action. Notice pleading merely requires pleading the operative facts so as to place the defendant on notice as to the evidence to be presented at trial. Therefore, under notice pleading the issue of whether a complaint sufficiently pleads a certain claim turns on whether the opposing party has been sufficiently notified concerning the claim so as to be able to prepare to meet it. A complaint's allegations are sufficient if they put a reasonable person on notice as to why a plaintiff sues.

Shields v. Taylor , 976 N.E.2d 1237, 1244-45 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citations and some quotation marks omitted).

Cross-Appeal Issue

1. Narducci's July of 2018 Consumer Complaint

[10] Defendants cross-appeal, contending that Narducci's July of 2018 consumer complaint cannot be the basis of any defamation¹ or abuse of process²

claims because it is protected by absolute privilege.³ "Indiana law has long recognized an absolute privilege that protects all relevant statements made in the course of a judicial proceeding, regardless of the truth or motive behind the statements." Hartman v. Keri , 883 N.E.2d 774, 777 (Ind. 2008) (citing Wilkins v. Hyde , 142 Ind. 260, 261, 41 N.E. 536 (1895) ; Van Eaton v. Fink , 697 N.E.2d 490, 494 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) ). " ‘The reason upon which the rule is founded is the necessity of preserving the due administration of justice,’ Wilkins , 142 Ind. at 261, 41 N.E. at 536, by providing actors in judicial proceedings with the freedom to participate without fear of future defamation claims." Hartman , 883 N.E.2d at 777 (citing Van Eaton , 697 N.E.2d at 494 ). "For the same reason, an absolute privilege has been extended to communications made in the course of proceedings, which may be characterized as quasi-judicial, including certain administrative proceedings." Hartman , 883 N.E.2d at 779 (citing W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts § 114, at 818-19 (5th ed. 1984)) (Rucker, J., concurring in result). Because Hall does not dispute that the evaluation of a consumer complaint with the Attorney General's office qualifies as a quasi-judicial proceeding, we consequently agree with Defendants that Hall may not pursue defamation or abuse of process claims against Narducci based on his July of 2018 consumer complaint.

Direct Appeal Issues

2. Whether the Trial Court Properly Dismissed Most of Hall's Defamation Claims as Untimely

[11] Hall contends that the trial court erred in concluding that all of his claims of defamation against Shaw and CIPA are time-barred and that most of those claims against Narducci are. Indiana Code section 34-11-2-4 (2013) provides, in part, that "[a]n action for [...] injury to person or character [...] must be commenced within two (2) years after the cause of action accrues." Section 34-11-2-4 applies...