Hall v. State
| Decision Date | 19 June 1928 |
| Docket Number | 25,397 |
| Citation | 162 N.E. 51,200 Ind. 149 |
| Parties | Hall v. State of Indiana |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
1. CRIMINAL LAW---Evidence---Confession of Co-defendant---Limited by Court.---In a prosecution against two persons for unlawfully transporting intoxicating liquor in an automobile (Acts 1925 p. 144, 7, 2720 Burns 1926), the admission in evidence of a confession made by one of the defendants was not reversible error as to the other where the case was tried by the court and in ruling on the admission of such confession, the court said: "This will go in for what it is worth as to defendant Hinton," especially where appellant's confession covering substantially the same facts was admitted without objection. p. 152.
2. CRIMINAL LAW---Evidence---Conversation with Co-defendant---Harmless Error.---In the trial of two persons jointly charged with feloniously transporting intoxicating liquor in an automobile (Acts 1925 p. 144, 7, 2720 Burns 1926), the admission of the testimony of a deputy sheriff as to a conversation with appellant's codefendant was not reversible error, where the trial was by the court, and, in admitting the testimony, over the objection that appellant was not present at the time the conversation took place, the court said: "I will watch all of that," especially where appellant's confession substantially covering the same facts had been admitted without objection, and the court had limited another confession to the codefendant. p. 152.
3. INTOXICATING LIQUORS---Alcohol Defined.---The word "alcohol," as commonly used means ethyl alcohol, a colorless, volatile, inflammable liquid, which is the intoxicating element or principle of fermented and distilled liquors. p. 153.
4. INTOXICATING LIQUOR---Alcohol---Use as Beverage.---That alcohol is an intoxicating liquor is a fact that every person of common understanding knows, and it may be easily diluted so as to be capable of being used freely as a beverage. p 153.
5. INTOXICATING LIQUORS.---The courts take judicial notice that alcohol is intoxicating liquor. p. 153.
6. INTOXICATING LIQUORS---Alcohol Included in Prohibition Law.---In view of the provisions of 5, 10 and 19 of the Prohibition Law of 1925 (2718, 2726 and 2735 Burns 1926), it was the evident intent of the legislature to include alcohol as an intoxicating liquor in 2 of the act, which defines "intoxicating liquor." p. 154.
7. INTOXICATING LIQUORS---Transportation of Liquor---Indictment---Negativing Defense.---It is not necessary in an indictment or affidavit charging the unlawful transportation of intoxicating liquor (Acts 1925 p. 144, 4 and 7, 2717, 2720 Burns 1926) to allege that the defendant does not come within the class of persons authorized to possess or transport alcohol for a lawful purpose, that being a defense which must be established by the defendant. p. 155.
8. INTOXICATING LIQUORS.---Transportation.---In a prosecution for unlawfully transporting intoxicating liquor in an automobile, the fact that alcohol was in the car in which the defendant rode sustained conviction under Acts 1925, ch. 48, 7, where defendant failed to bring himself within the rule applicable to an innocent, invited person. p 156.
9. INTOXICATING LIQUORS---Transportation---Persons Assisting.---Persons knowingly helping to transport intoxicating liquor in an automobile are equally guilty with the owner of the car, or of the liquor being transported, in a prosecution for unlawful transportation of such liquor under the Prohibition Law of 1925 . p. 156.
From Marion Criminal Court (61,058); James A. Collins, Judge.
Douglass Hall was convicted of unlawfully transporting intoxicating liquor in an automobile, and he appeals.
Affirmed.
John L Reagan and Delbert O. Wilmeth, for appellant.
Arthur L. Gilliom, Attorney-General, and Harry L. Gause, Deputy Attorney-General, for the State.
Appellant was indicted, tried by the court and convicted of unlawfully transporting intoxicating liquor in violation of Acts 1925, ch. 48, § 7, § 2720 Burns 1926.
The error assigned and relied upon here is the overruling of appellant's motion for a new trial, for the alleged reasons that certain evidence admitted was incompetent and that the finding of the court is not sustained by sufficient evidence and is contrary to law.
The evidence for the state (no evidence was introduced by appellant) showed that appellant, William Hinton and Marshall Rowe, at 3 a. m. August 23, 1926, drove through Augusta at a high rate of speed on their way from Chicago to Indianapolis in a Buick roadster automobile, under the rear deck of which they were transporting ninety-two gallons of alcohol, contained in five-gallon cans. Three deputy sheriffs of Marion County, in a Hudson touring car, turned on their red search-light and gave chase at a speed of sixty-three miles per hour. The occupants of the roadster, who had an army Spring-field rifle and two revolvers, opened fire, which was returned by the deputy sheriffs, many shots being exchanged. The roadster was overtaken at Northwestern Avenue and 29th Street, in the city of Indianapolis, where the roadster turned, first east and then north, finally stopping at Crown Hill Cemetery. Rowe and appellant, who alighted from the roadster sometime after it turned and before it stopped, escaped. Appellant was arrested August 25, 1926, but Rowe was not apprehended.
A deputy sheriff, without objection by appellant, related a conversation he had with appellant after his arrest, which was in part as follows: "He told us he was up in Chicago and Marshall Rowe and William Hinton came there and met him and told him they were going to crash a joint, an alcohol cache, and for him to wait for them until they came back; that they went into Chicago to what is known as Bum Town and broke into an alcohol storage plant and got their load of alcohol and started back and picked Hall up and started to Indianapolis.
Appellant's objection to the admission in evidence of state's Exhibit 1, which was a confession signed by the codefendant Hinton, who was tried at the same time, was on the grounds that it was obtained under duress, was the confession of a confederate subsequent to the commission of a crime, was not made in Hall's presence and was hearsay. The record, however, shows that the court did not admit and consider this evidence as against this appellant. The court, in ruling upon the admissibility of this evidence said, "This will go in for what it is worth as to defendant Hinton." Hinton's confession did not contain anything with reference to Hall that is not in Hall's confession referred to above, except that Hall was to pay Hinton $ 50 for each load of liquor hauled, and that Hall lived at 1519 Dawson Street with Claude Adams to whom the liquor was to be delivered.
Appellant also objected to testimony by a deputy sheriff of his conversation with Hinton covering some of the same facts, viz: that Hinton had been to Chicago in company with Hall, that they had obtained alcohol there and were returning to Claude Adams' house in Indianapolis. Objections at the time were made separately by the several attorneys representing Hinton, Hall and Adams, the objection of the latter two being that their clients were not present at the time the conversation took place. The court admitted the evidence saying "I will watch all of that." It is reasonable to assume from this statement of the court, and in view of the statement made with reference to Exhibit 1, that the court did not consider this conversation as against Hall. But even if this evidence had been admitted erroneously, it would constitute only harmless error, since the confession of Hall covered the same essential facts and is alone sufficient to sustain the finding of the court.
The appellant contends that the finding of the court is not sustained by sufficient evidence and is contrary to law because no proof was made that the alcohol being transported by appellant was intoxicating liquor. He maintains that alcohol: (a) Is not intoxicating liquor as defined in § 2, ch. 48, Acts 1925, § 2715 Burns 1926; (b) is not a spirituous liquor, although admittedly it is the basis of all spirituous liquors; and (c) is not a beverage, being neither potable, wholesome or drinkable, but is a violent irritant. [1]
The word alcohol, as commonly used, and as used in our statute means ethyl alcohol, a colorless, volatile, inflammable liquid, which is the intoxicating element or principle of fermented and distilled liquors. It is produced by various processes of fermentation, brewing and distillation from fruits, grains and vegetables containing sugar or starch and, in addition to its use as an intoxicant, it is used extensively in the arts, for mechanical, manufacturing and scientific purposes, especially in medicine and pharmacy as a solvent. [2] That alcohol is an intoxicating liquor is a fact that every person of common understanding knows and it may be easily diluted so as to be capable of being used freely as a beverage. Snider v. State (1888), 81 Ga. 753, 7 S.E. 631, 12 Am. St. 350; State v....
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