Hall v. State

• Decision Date: 28 June 1902
• Parties: HALL v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

32 So. 750

134 Ala. 90

HALL v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Alabama

June 28, 1902

Appeal from circuit court, Marshall county; J. A. Bilbro, Judge.

Beauregard C. Hall was convicted of seduction, and appeals. Reversed.

It is insisted on this appeal that the grand jury which found the bill was illegally organized. The facts relating to the organization of the grand jury are sufficiently stated in the opinion. The defendant moved the court to quash the indictment upon the following grounds: "(1) Because twelve grand jurors did not concur in finding the bill. (2) Because the presiding judge of this court, pending the investigation of this charge before the grand jury, and while the grand jury was sitting as a body, and while it was actually engaged in the investigation of this charge, entered the grand jury room, and then and there charged the grand jury concerning the law of this case. (3) Because the solicitor of this court counseled and advised the grand jury while sitting as a body, and while the investigation of this case was pending before them, to return an indictment against the defendant for seduction. (4) That while the grand jury was engaged in the examination and investigation of this case a ballot was taken by the grand jury as to whether or not they would return a bill; that the grand jury refused to find a bill; that in a few minutes thereafter the solicitor was informed by the grand jury that they refused to find a bill that the solicitor did then and there censure the grand jury for refusing to find a bill; that the solicitor continued thereafter to urge the grand jury to find a bill; and that thereafter the grand jury, acting under these influences, did find the indictment in this case. (5) Because the solicitor for this circuit induced the grand jury to find the bill against the defendant against their wish, by rebuking them because they failed to find a bill. The grand jury voted on the case four times, and refused to find a bill, and each time the question was brought before them by the request of the solicitor for further consideration, and that each time he by words and acts showed his displeasure at their failure to find a bill on the evidence before them, and censured them, by severe rebuke, for their failure to find the bill. And at the solicitor's suggestion the presiding judge of this court was invited by the grand jury before them to discuss the law, and to give his opinion of the law on the facts of this case, and by this method the grand jury was induced to find a bill on the fifth ballot; otherwise they would not have found one at all against the defendant in this case." On the hearing of this motion the defendant introduced two of the grand jurors who were present on the grand jury which preferred the indictment, and they testified: That when the cause against the defendant was before the grand jury, and was being considered by them, on the question as to whether or not they should return an indictment against him for seduction, there was a vote taken and only 10 persons voted in favor of preferring an indictment against the defendant. That the solicitor was not in the grand jury room when this vote was taken. That when he returned to the grand jury room, and was told of the failure to find an indictment, he showed his displeasure, and insisted on their considering the case again. A second vote was subsequently taken on the question, and only 11 of the grand jurors voted for the indictment. This vote was taken while the solicitor was out of the room, and when he returned, and was told of the failure to prefer the indictment, he became very angry, and remonstrated with the grand jury, and insisted that the facts of the case justified the finding of the indictment against the defendant. That upon the request of the grand jury the judge who was then presiding at the circuit court was requested to come before them, and to give them instructions as to the law relating to seduction. That this was done; the judge appearing before them in the grand jury room, and instructing them as to the law relative to seduction. That, upon another vote being taken, 12 of the jurors voted in favor of preferring an indictment against the defendant, and then the indictment was preferred. Upon the hearing of the facts the court overruled the motion to quash the indictment, and the defendant duly excepted. The defendant then filed the following pleas in abatement: "Comes the defendant, and pleads in abatement to the indictment: (1) That while the grand jury was engaged at this term of the court in the examination and investigation of this case the solicitor of this court did while the grand jury was in session and considering the case express to them the opinion that the evidence before them was sufficient to warrant them in finding an indictment, and that their duty required them to find a bill on said evidence, and that he could convict the defendant on the evidence they had before them, and that this influenced the action of the grand jury, and without this influence the grand jury would not have found the bill. (2) That while the grand jury was, at this term of the court, examining and considering this case against the defendant, the judge of this court, at the request of the grand jury, did come before the grand jury while it was in session, and did then and there advise them concerning the law of seduction; the said judge having knowledge at the time that the grand jury was considering this case." To the first of these pleas the state demurred upon the following grounds: "(1) The expression by the solicitor to the grand jury was neither unlawful nor improper. (2) That the opinion of the solicitor, as expressed to the grand jury, as averred in said plea, was not such an act as is unlawful or improper for the solicitor to do before the grand jury. (3) That the opinion of said solicitor, if expressed as averred in said plea, shows no reason why said indictment should be quashed." To the second plea in abatement the state demurred upon the ground that it is neither illegal nor improper for the judge of the said court, at the request of the grand jury, to appear before said grand jury in their room, and there instruct them as to the law of crimes, or as to any particular or alleged offense being considered by them. This demurrer was sustained, and to this ruling the defendant duly excepted. The defendant then filed the following plea of autrefois acquit: "(1) That on February 12, 1901, defendant committed one, and only one, sexual intercourse with the said Pearl Pritchett; that he never at any other time committed an act of sexual intercourse with her; that the single act named was committed in this county; that on April 10, 1901, the grand jury of this county returned an indictment in words and figures as follows: [Then follows an indictment against the defendant for rape on Pearl Pritchett.]" It was then averred in said plea "that on April 22, 1901, defendant was placed on trial under said indictment in the circuit court of Marshall county upon his plea of not guilty, and that on said trial the state offered evidence showing said act of sexual intercourse committed on the occasion above referred to, and that said act was committed with said Pearl Pritchett in this county, and at the time and place above named, and that said act was committed by this defendant forcibly and against the consent of the said Pearl Pritchett, and thereupon the state rested; that defendant then introduced testimony on said trial tending to show that defendant did commit said act of sexual intercourse with said Pearl Pritchett, but that the same was done with her consent; that the trial proceeded until the 24th day of April, 1901, when the jury returned into open court a verdict that the defendant was not guilty of rape, and thereupon it was adjudged by this court that the defendant was not guilty of the charge of rape." There was then set out in said plea the judgment of the court finding the defendant not guilty of the charge of rape, and the plea then continues as follows: "Defendant further avers that he is the same identical Beauregard C. Hall mentioned in the above indictment for rape, and that the Pearl Pritchett mentioned in this indictment is the same identical Pearl Pritchett mentioned in the above indictment for rape, and that the act of sexual intercourse in the above indictment for rape, and for which defendant was tried at the last spring term of this court, is the same identical act of sexual intercourse charged in this indictment; and this plea defendant is ready to verify." To this plea of former acquittal the state demurred upon the following grounds: "(1) That said plea shows on its face that the offense in the former indictment set out in said plea, and the one charged under the present indictment, are not the same. (2) That the indictment for rape, and the trial and acquittal therefor, is not a bar to the trial for seduction. (3) That the plea shows on its face that the defendant could not under the said former indictment have been convicted of the offense of seduction, said offense not being in any way included in said indictment. (4) That said plea shows on its face that the defendant has never been in any way put upon trial for seduction, nor has he in any way been put in jeopardy under the charge for seduction. (5) That the evidence which will sustain an indictment for seduction would not authorize a conviction for rape." This demurrer was sustained, and the defendant duly excepted.

On the trial of the case, Pearl Pritchett, who it was admitted was an unmarried woman, and at the time of the offense committed upon her was 14 or 15 years old, was introduced as a witness and she testified that, at the time of the commission of...