Hall v. State
| Decision Date | 08 July 2016 |
| Docket Number | CR–15–0273. |
| Citation | 223 So.3d 977 |
| Parties | Kevin Brent HALL v. STATE of Alabama. |
| Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Alabama Supreme Court 1151325.
Kevin Brent Hall, pro se.
Luther Strange, atty. gen., and Cecil G. Brendle, Jr., asst. atty. gen., for appellee.
Kevin Brent Hall appeals the circuit court's summary dismissal of his Rule 32, Ala. R.Crim. P., petition for postconviction relief. We affirm.
In February 1991, Hall was indicted by a Houston County grand jury for unlawful distribution of a controlled substance, see § 13A–12–211, Ala.Code 1975. The indictment alleged that, on December 2, 1990, Hall "did unlawfully sell, furnish, give away, manufacture, deliver, or distribute a controlled substance, to-wit: cocaine." (C. 21.) Thereafter, on March 10, 1992, Hall, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, pleaded guilty to the lesser-included offense of unlawful possession of a controlled substance, see § 13A–12–212, Ala.Code 1975, and, in accordance with that agreement, was sentenced to 10 years' imprisonment.
Over 23 years later, Hall, on April 25, 2015, filed his first Rule 32 petition challenging his guilty-plea conviction and sentence. In that petition, Hall alleged, among other things, that his sentence was "illegal" because, he said, the circuit court failed to impose on him a $1,000 fine under the Demand Reduction Assessment Act, see § 13A–12–281, Ala.Code 1975. The circuit court summarily dismissed Hall's petition, and Hall appealed that decision to this Court. See Hall v. State (No. CR–14–1279, Oct. 9, 2015) 222 So.3d 429 (Ala.Crim.App.2015) (table).
In that appeal, a three-member panel of this Court issued an unpublished memorandum affirming the circuit court's decision1 and finding, in part:
Hall v. State (No. CR–14–1279, Oct. 9, 2015) 222 So.3d 429 (Ala.Crim.App.2015) (table) (emphasis added).
On October 21, 2015, Hall filed his second Rule 32 petition challenging his 1992 guilty-plea conviction and sentence. In that petition, Hall again alleged that his 10–year sentence was "illegal" because, he said, the circuit court failed to impose on him the demand-reduction assessment. Additionally, relying on this Court's critique of his first petition, Hall added to his second petition those facts this Court, in its unpublished memorandum, noted that Hall had failed to plead in his first petition.
Specifically, Hall alleged that the Demand Reduction Assessment Act became effective on April 24, 1990, and that he committed the offense of unlawful distribution of a controlled substance after the effective date of that Act—specifically, on December 2, 1990. (C. 16.) Additionally, Hall alleged that, in February 1991, he was indicted for unlawful distribution of a controlled substance and that, on March 10, 1992, he "was offered a ‘plea deal,’ plead[ed] guilty [and] thereafter adjudge[d] guilty/sentenced to (10) years imprisonment for ‘unlawful possession of a control [sic] substance.’ " (C. 17.) Hall further alleged that, "[b]efore entering the plea of guilt, the trial judge never informed [him] of [and] never imposed the ‘mandatory fine’ of $1,000 required by the ‘demand reduction assessment act.’ " (C. 17.)
On November 2, 2015, the State filed a motion to dismiss Hall's petition, alleging that Hall's claim was precluded under Rule 32.2(a), Ala. R.Crim. P., because it was "either raised at trial or could have been, but [was] not raised at trial" or it was "either raised on appeal or could have been, but [was] not raised on appeal"; that Hall's claim was successive under Rule 32.2(b), Ala. R.Crim. P.; that Hall's claim was insufficiently pleaded; and that Hall "was granted parole in this case in 1996, and thus, there is no relief the Court could grant in this case." (C. 31.)
Thereafter, the circuit court issued an order summarily dismissing Hall's petition, and Hall filed a timely notice of appeal.
When reviewing a circuit court's summary dismissal of a postconviction petition " ‘[t]he standard of review this Court uses ... is whether the [circuit] court abused its discretion.’ " Lee v. State , 44 So.3d 1145, 1149 (Ala.Crim.App.2009) (quoting Hunt v. State , 940 So.2d 1041, 1049 (Ala.Crim.App.2005) ). If, however, the circuit court bases its determination on a " ‘cold trial record,’ " we apply a de novo standard of review. Ex parte Hinton , 172 So.3d 348, 353 (Ala.2012). Moreover, subject to certain exceptions that are not applicable in this case, see, e.g. , Ex parte Clemons , 55 So.3d 348 (Ala.2007), "when reviewing a circuit court's rulings made in a postconviction petition, we may affirm a ruling if it is correct for any reason." Bush v. State , 92 So.3d 121, 134 (Ala.Crim.App.2009).
See also Hannon v. State , 861 So.2d 426, 427 (Ala.Crim.App.2003) ; Cogman v. State , 852 So.2d 191, 193 (Ala.Crim.App.2002) ; Tatum v. State , 607 So.2d 383, 384 (Ala.Crim.App.1992).
On appeal, Hall contends that the circuit court erred when it summarily dismissed his second Rule 32 petition because, he says, "it was shown that the trial court failed to impose a mandatory fine as required by § 13A–12–281, Ala.Code 1975." (Hall's brief, p. 6 (emphasis in original).) According to Hall, the circuit court's failure to impose on him the demand-reduction assessment is a "jurisdictional" claim; is not subject to the grounds of preclusion set forth in Rule 32.2, Ala. R.Crim. P.; and, if true, entitles him to relief.
To support his claim, Hall relies on this Court's recent decision in Siercks v. State , 154 So.3d 1085, 1094 (Ala.Crim.App.2013), in which we explained that —a holding this Court has since applied to an appeal from the summary dismissal of a Rule 32 petition to sua sponte remand a case to a circuit court for that court to impose a demand-reduction assessment, see Hawk v. State , 171 So.3d 96 (Ala.Crim.App.2014). Upon further examination of the holding in Siercks , however, we are convinced that the holding in Siercks —and, in turn, the holding in Hawk —is premised on logic that is in conflict with caselaw from both this Court and the Alabama Supreme Court.
In Siercks , this Court, on direct appeal from Siercks's conviction for unlawful possession of a controlled substance, affirmed Siercks's conviction but sua sponte recognized that, "[a]t the sentencing hearing, and in its sentencing order, the trial court stated that all fines associated with Siercks's conviction were waived on the basis of Siercks's indigency." 154 So.3d at 1094. We concluded that, because the circuit court waived the demand-reduction assessment, Siercks's case had to be remanded to the circuit court for that court to impose the assessment. The following is the totality of our analysis for reaching that conclusion:
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