Hall v. State, No. 875S185

Docket NºNo. 875S185
Citation346 N.E.2d 584, 264 Ind. 448
Case DateMay 10, 1976
CourtSupreme Court of Indiana

Page 584

346 N.E.2d 584
264 Ind. 448
Anthony Wayne HALL, Appellant (Defendant below),
v.
STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff below).
No. 875S185.
Supreme Court of Indiana.
May 10, 1976.
Rehearing Denied Aug. 10, 1976.

Page 585

Larry R. Champion, Indianapolis, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Walter F. Lockhart, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

HUNTER, Justice.

Anthony Wayne Hall was indicted by the Grand Jurors of Marion County and charged with first degree murder in the death of Jean Crouch. Upon appellant's plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, the jury returned a verdict of guilty of second degree murder. He was sentenced to imprisonment for life. Appellant's motions to correct errors were overruled, and he appeals.

[264 Ind. 449] The first issue presented is whether the trial court erred in overruling appellant's motion to suppress oral and written statements obtained in violation of his constitutional rights. The facts surrounding the solicitation of appellant's statements are as follows. On July 20, 1973, a young lady in appellant's neighborhood was seized at gunpoint outside her home and taken to appellant's residence where she was raped. Hall v. State, (1975) Ind.App., 333 N.E.2d 913. On August, 1, 1973, the body of Jean Crouch was discovered in an abandoned garage in the same neighborhood. The next day, Officer Parnell obtained a warrant to search the house where appellant resided with his sister, Mary Grever, for a 'hand gun or evidence of the rape' occurring on July 20. When Officer Parnell went to the residence to execute the search warrant, he was admitted by appellant. The search warrant was read to appellant and he was placed under arrest for the rape and kidnapping of July 20. No Miranda warnings were given, although appellant was advised that he could not be questioned until permission was obtained from his legal guardian. Officers Adams and Swails, who were also present, transported appellant to the police station, leaving Officer Parnell behind to conduct the search. Upon arriving at the police station, appellant was taken to an interrogation room on the fourth floor. To reach the interrogation room, it was necessary for appellant to pass through the homicide office which was furnished with a table at the north end of the room. The victim of the July 20th assault just happened to be sitting on that table. When appellant saw her 'his composure broke down a great deal.' Following up on the momemtum,

Page 586

Officer Adams whisked appellant into the interrogation room and began reading to him from the police department report on the rape and kidnapping. Officer Adams' reading was prematurely halted when appellant broke down and said, 'You don't have to say anything, I did it.'

While the foregoing events were transpiring, Mary Grever was contacted at her place of employment, told of her brother's [264 Ind. 450] arrest, and advised to come to the police station without delay. When she arrived she was informed that her brother had confessed to the rape and kidnapping and that he was a prime suspect in the murder investigation. 1 She was taken into the interrogation room and was present when appellant was read his Miranda rights and advised that he could have one or both parents present. Appellant and his sister (acting as guardian) 2 were asked to execute a waiver and immediately did so. Appellant was questioned about the murder and gave the incriminating statement which was reduced to writing and admitted into evidence over objection at trial.

Appellant maintains that his confession was inadmissible because it was the product of a waiver which was not knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently made. The minimum standards for procuring a valid waiver from a juvenile were set forth in Lewis v. State, (1972) 259 Ind. 431, 288 N.E.2d 138. In Lewis we held:

'(T)hat a juvenile's statement or confession cannot be used against him at a subsequent trial or hearing unless both he and his parents or guardian were informed of his rights to an attorney, and to remain silent. Furthermore, the child must be given an opportunity to consult with his parents, guardian or an attorney representing the juvenile as to whether or not he wishes to waive those rights. After such consultation the child may waive his rights if he so chooses provided of course that there [264 Ind. 451] are no elements of coercion, force or inducement present.'

259 Ind. 431, 439, 288 N.E.2d 138, 142.

The purpose of our holding in Lewis was twofold. First, our holding recognized that the special status accorded juveniles in other areas of the law was fully applicable in the area of criminal procedure. Secondly, to give effect to that status in the context of waiving 'intricate, important and long established fifth and sixth amendment rights,' we required that a juvenile be afforded a meaningful opportunity to consult with his parents or guardian about his predicament prior to the solicitation of any statement.

The Lewis decision was handed down in October of 1972. Appellant was arrested on August 2, 1973. The record demonstrates that the police knew appellant was a juvenile and could not be questioned without a parent or guardian present. Indeed, the waiver form signed by appellant and his sister was specifically drawn to

Page 587

demonstrate compliance with the procedural aspects of Lewis:

'THE INDIANAPOLIS POLICE DEPARTMENT ADVISES AS FOLLOWS:

'1. You have the right to have one or both parents present.

'2. You have the right to remain silent.

'3. Anything you may say can be used against you in court.

'4. You have the right to have a lawyer present now.

'5. If you do not have the money to retain a lawyer, you have the right to have one appointed for you by the court before any question (sic) are asked.'

In addition to the waiver, the state relies upon the undisputed testimony of the officers that appellant was not questioned about the murder until after his sister arrived and the waiver was executed. The inquiry under Lewis does not cease when the mere presence of a parent or guardian has been established. The record must affirmatively demonstrate that the juvenile and his parent or guardian were afforded a meaningful opportunity to counsel [264 Ind. 452] together. Bridges v. State, (1973) 260 Ind. 651, 299 N.E.2d 616.

The record herein fails to meet the standard. The evidence conflicts as to whether the appellant was allowed to consult with his sister prior to the execution of the waiver and the solicitation of his confession. While a meaningful consultation can only occur in the absence of the neutralizing pressures which result from police presence, the record is unclear whether appellant and his sister were ever left alone prior to the execution of the waiver. The record is silent in regard to the time provided for consultation, and thus it cannot be determined whether the opportunity to consult was meaningful in relation to the seriousness of the offense under investigation. Where the record reveals nothing more than conflicting evidence, however, we are bound by the trial court's determination as to the admissibility of a confession. Cooper v. State, (1974) 261 Ind. 659, 309 N.E.2d 807. In addition to the foregoing evidence, however, this record demonstrates without conflict that appellant was arrested, taken to the police station, but not advised of any rights other than to have a parent or guardian present prior to questioning, immediately upon arrival was subjected to an illegal identification procedure, after which he lost his composure, and then confronted by a policeman reading from the rape and kidnapping report, all before his guardian was present. In Lewis we stated:

'If the police are placed in a quandary when confronting a juvenile accused, the juvenile is perhaps in the most serious predicament of his short life. In most cases he is aware that he is in trouble. If not under formal arrest he is usually being questioned in a police-dominated atmosphere and finds...

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38 practice notes
  • D.M. v. State , No. 49S02–1101–JV–11.
    • United States
    • June 22, 2011
    ...for meaningful consultation with a parent. The mere presence of a parent, standing alone, does not satisfy the statute. Hall v. State, 264 Ind. 448, 451, 346 N.E.2d 584, 587 (1976). Rather, the consultation requirement is satisfied “when the State demonstrates ‘actual consultation of a mean......
  • Commonwealth v. Pacheco, No. 13–P–1821.
    • United States
    • Appeals Court of Massachusetts
    • April 17, 2015
    ...about the exercise of his Miranda rights, the police were obliged to afford them the ability to confer in private. See Hall v. State, 264 Ind. 448, 452, 346 N.E.2d 584 (1976) (“a meaningful consultation can occur only in the absence of the neutralizing pressures which result from police pre......
  • Smith v. State, No. 2-878A264
    • United States
    • Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • February 21, 1980
    ...elements of coercion, force or inducement present. Id. at 142. Accord, Bluitt v. State (1978), Ind., 381 N.E.2d 458; Hall v. State (1976), 264 Ind. 448, 346 N.E.2d 584. See also Lockridge v. State (1975), 263 Ind. 678, 338 N.E.2d In Bridges v. State (1973), 260 Ind. 651, 299 N.E.2d 616, the......
  • Chandler v. State, No. 980S377
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court of Indiana
    • April 20, 1981
    ...course that there are no elements of coercion, force or inducement present." Id. at 439, 288 N.E.2d at 142. Accord, Hall v. State, (1976) 264 Ind. 448, 346 N.E.2d Contrary to defendant's contentions, Officer Mahank testified that he read to defendant and his mother his constitutional rights......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
38 cases
  • D.M. v. State , No. 49S02–1101–JV–11.
    • United States
    • June 22, 2011
    ...for meaningful consultation with a parent. The mere presence of a parent, standing alone, does not satisfy the statute. Hall v. State, 264 Ind. 448, 451, 346 N.E.2d 584, 587 (1976). Rather, the consultation requirement is satisfied “when the State demonstrates ‘actual consultation of a mean......
  • Commonwealth v. Pacheco, No. 13–P–1821.
    • United States
    • Appeals Court of Massachusetts
    • April 17, 2015
    ...about the exercise of his Miranda rights, the police were obliged to afford them the ability to confer in private. See Hall v. State, 264 Ind. 448, 452, 346 N.E.2d 584 (1976) (“a meaningful consultation can occur only in the absence of the neutralizing pressures which result from police pre......
  • Smith v. State, No. 2-878A264
    • United States
    • Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana
    • February 21, 1980
    ...elements of coercion, force or inducement present. Id. at 142. Accord, Bluitt v. State (1978), Ind., 381 N.E.2d 458; Hall v. State (1976), 264 Ind. 448, 346 N.E.2d 584. See also Lockridge v. State (1975), 263 Ind. 678, 338 N.E.2d In Bridges v. State (1973), 260 Ind. 651, 299 N.E.2d 616, the......
  • Chandler v. State, No. 980S377
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court of Indiana
    • April 20, 1981
    ...course that there are no elements of coercion, force or inducement present." Id. at 439, 288 N.E.2d at 142. Accord, Hall v. State, (1976) 264 Ind. 448, 346 N.E.2d Contrary to defendant's contentions, Officer Mahank testified that he read to defendant and his mother his constitutional rights......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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