Hall v. State, 82A04-1107-CR-330
| Decision Date | 14 March 2012 |
| Docket Number | No. 82A04-1107-CR-330,82A04-1107-CR-330 |
| Parties | WILLIAM JAMES HALL, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE OF INDIANA, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision shall not be regarded as precedent or cited before any court except for the purpose of establishing the defense of res judicata, collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
WILLIAM W. GOODEN
GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Attorney General of Indiana
ANGELA N. SANCHEZ
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
APPEAL FROM THE VANDERBURGH CIRCUIT COURT
The Honorable David Kiely, Special Judge
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATIONMATHIAS, Judge William James Hall ("Hall") was convicted in Vanderburgh Circuit Court of Class B felony attempted rape, Class D felony residential entry, and Class D felony criminal confinement. Hall appeals and presents the following two issues for our review:
We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
Hall and A.H. were in a relationship from 2001 until 2004. This relationship produced a son, B.H., but the couple never married. Hall and A.H. had joint legal custody of B.H., but A.H. was the physical custodian. On June 24, 2009, Hall met A.H. and B.H. at a restaurant in Vanderburgh County. There, Hall and A.H. discussed Hall's plans to enlist in the Army and the impact that would have on Hall's child support obligation.
Later that evening, Hall arrived unexpectedly at A.H.'s house and asked if he could spend some extra time with B.H. A.H. agreed, and Hall visited his son at A.H.'s house until approximately nine o'clock that night. After Hall left, A.H. put B.H. to bed and went to bed herself at approximately ten o'clock.
Sometime that night, Hall returned to A.H.'s house, entered through a window in a back room, and came into A.H.'s bedroom. A.H. awoke to find Hall on top of her and repeatedly asking where her phone was. Hall eventually found the phone and threw it onthe floor. Hall held A.H.'s arm and told her to take off her "f**king clothes." Tr. p. 171. A.H. then screamed for her son, which prompted Hall to grab A.H.'s throat and put his hands over her mouth. A.H. resisted Hall by hitting and kicking him, but Hall continued to order her to remove her clothes. He also told A.H. "if he was . . . going to go to jail he was going to go for something a hell [of] a lot better than child support." Tr. p. 172. At some point during the attack, Hall dropped unopened packages of condoms that he had brought with him on the floor next to A.H.'s bed. Eventually, Hall stopped attacking A.H. and ran toward the back room where he had entered. A.H. ran to B.H.'s room and held her son. As she did so, Hall walked by the room and told A.H., "this isn't over." Tr. p. 173. A.H. then called the police and waited in her son's room until they arrived.
On June 25, 2009, the State charged Hall with Class B felony burglary, Class B felony attempted rape, and Class D felony criminal confinement. A jury trial commenced on September 9, 2010. During jury selection, the prosecuting attorney used one of its peremptory challenges to strike potential juror J.H., who was the only African-American on the jury panel.1 Hall objected to the prosecution's peremptory challenge based on Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). The prosecuting attorney then responded by proffering a race-neutral reason for exercising its peremptory strike: "[J.H.] said he would have a problem judging people, [and] he has a recent criminal record that may be pending and I could [have] made an objection for cause but instead took him off peremptory[.]"2 Tr. p. 69. The trial court noted that the record did indicate that J.H. had a misdemeanor charge pending against him and therefore overruled Hall's Batson objection.
The jury ultimately found Hall guilty as charged of Class B felony attempted rape and Class D felony criminal confinement, but found him guilty of the lesser included offense of Class D felony residential entry instead of Class B felony burglary. On June 8, 2011, the trial court sentenced Hall to concurrent terms of eight years on the attempted rape conviction and eighteen months on the residential entry conviction. The trial court "merged" the criminal confinement conviction with the attempted rape conviction and did not impose sentence on that count. The trial court also suspended four years of Hall's aggregate eight-year sentence to home detention with GPS monitoring. Hall now appeals.
I. Use of Peremptory Challenge
Hall first claims that the trial court erred in overruling his Batson challenge to the State's use of a peremptory strike to remove an African-American from the jury panel. Before addressing this argument, we first set forth the legal standards applicable to this claim of error.
Our supreme court recently explained:
Purposeful racial discrimination in selection of the venire violates a defendant's right to equal protection because it denies him the protectionthat a trial by jury is intended to secure. The exclusion of even a sole prospective juror based on race, ethnicity, or gender violates the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.
Addison v. State, 49S05-1105-CR-267, 2012 WL 560081 (Ind. Feb. 22, 2012), slip op. at 6 (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986)); Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 478 (2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
On the same day that our supreme court issued its opinion in Addison, it also issued an opinion in Cartwright v. State, 82S01-1109-CR-564, 2012 WL 560086 (Ind. Feb. 22, 2012), in which the court noted that "[p]ursuant to Batson and its progeny, a trial court must engage in a three-step process in evaluating a claim that a peremptory challenge was based on race." Id., slip op. at 4.
First, "'a defendant must make a prima facie showing that a peremptory challenge has been exercised on the basis of race[.]'" Id. (quoting Snyder, 552 U.S. at 476-77). Using a peremptory strike to remove some African-American jurors does not, by itself, raise an inference of racial discrimination. Addison, slip op. at 6 (citing Kent v. State, 675 N.E.2d 332, 340 (Ind. 1996)). But the removal of the only African-American juror on the panel does raise an inference that the juror was excluded on the basis of race. Id. (citing McCormick v. State, 803 N.E.2d 1108, 1111 (Ind. 2004); McCants v. State, 686 N.E.2d 1281, 1284 (Ind. 1997)).
Second, once the defendant has made a prima facie case, the prosecution must offer a "race-neutral basis for striking the juror in question[.]" Id. (citing Snyder, 552 U.S. at 476-77). An explanation is considered race-neutral if, on its face, it is based on something other than race. Id. (citing Forrest v. State, 757 N.E.2d 1003, 1004 (Ind.2001)). "'Unless a discriminatory intent is inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.'" Addison, slip op. at 7 (quoting Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768). And although the race-neutral reason must be more than a mere denial of improper motive, the reason need not be particularly persuasive, or even plausible. Id.
Lastly, in light of the parties' submissions, the trial court must then determine whether the defendant has shown purposeful discrimination. Id. Although the burden of persuasion on a Batson challenge rests with the party opposing the strike, the third step— determination of discrimination—is the duty of the trial court judge. Id. (citing Jeter, 888 N.E.2d at 1264-65; Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 239). It is for the trial court to evaluate the persuasiveness of the proffered race-neutral justification at the third and step of the analysis. Id. "It is then that 'implausible or fantastic justifications may (and probably will) be found to be pretexts for purposeful discrimination.'" Cartwright, slip op. at 4 (quoting Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768 (1995)). At this final step, the defendant may offer additional evidence to demonstrate that the proffered justification was pretextual. Id.
Upon appellate review, we give great deference to the trial court's decision concerning whether a peremptory challenge is discriminatory, and the trial court's decision will be set aside only if it is clearly erroneous. Cartwright, slip op. at 4 (citing Forrest, 757 N.E.2d at 1004; Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003)).
B. Hall's Argument
Here, the State does not deny that the prosecuting attorney used a peremptory strike to remove J.H., who was the only African-American in the jury pool. Thus, Hallsuccessfully met his initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination. See Addison, slip op. at 6; McCormick, 803 N.E.2d at 1111; McCants, 686 N.E.2d at 1284. The burden then shifted to the prosecuting attorney to offer a race-neutral basis for striking J.H. Id. The prosecuting attorney here stated that J.H. had indicated that he was uncomfortable judging others and that he had a pending criminal charge against him. The trial court then confirmed that J.H. did have a misdemeanor charge pending against him and overruled Hall's Batson objection. Thus, the trial court found that Hall had not established purposeful discrimination.
Giving great deference to the trial court's decision in this matter, we cannot say that the court's conclusion that Hall had not established purposeful discrimination was clearly erroneous. There was nothing "implausible or fantastic" about the State's stated reason for striking J.H. that would indicate it was a pretext for purposeful discrimination. See Addison, slip op. at 6; Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768. Instead, the State gave a valid race-neutral explanation for its use of the peremptory...
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