Hall v. State

Citation69 Md.App. 37,516 A.2d 204
Decision Date01 September 1986
Docket NumberNo. 99,99
PartiesLloyd Lorenzo HALL v. STATE of Maryland. ,
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland
Isaac S. Kershner, Assigned Public Defender (Alan H. Murrell, Public Defender, on the brief), Baltimore, for appellant

Valerie W. Loftin, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Stephen H. Sachs, Atty. Gen., Baltimore, Andrew L. Sonner, State's Atty. for Montgomery County, and John McCarthy, Asst. State's Atty. for Montgomery County, Rockville, on the brief), for appellee.

Argued before GARRITY, KARWACKI and ROBERT M. BELL, JJ.

KARWACKI, Judge.

At a jury trial in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Lloyd Lorenzo Hall, the appellant, was convicted of burglary, theft, three counts of assault with intent to murder, three counts of assault with intent to prevent lawful apprehension, three counts of use of a handgun in a crime of violence, and one count of carrying a handgun. For these crimes, he was sentenced to a total of 80 years imprisonment. 1

The appellant challenges his convictions on various grounds. The State has cross-appealed from the court's refusal to impose a life sentence without parole upon the appellant, asserting that such sentence is mandatory under Md.Code (1957, 1982 Repl.Vol., 1985 Supp.), Art. 27, § 643B(b).

The events leading to the charges against the appellant began at approximately 3:00 a.m. on July 25, 1984, when Donna L. Haviland was alone at her home in Rockville, asleep in the second story bedroom. She was awakened by a light shining through an air vent in the floor and could see shadows of activity by someone moving about the first floor rooms of the house. Since her husband was not expected to return from the night shift of his employment until 7:00 a.m., Mrs. Haviland was understandably terrified by the presence of an apparent intruder in her home. She arose from bed and quietly walked to the head of the stairway leading to the first floor in an effort to determine who had entered the house. As she stood there, she heard an automobile engine being started in front of her home. Proceeding to the front window of her bedroom, she saw her 1981 Honda automobile backing down the street in front Mrs. Haviland then proceeded downstairs and, after satisfying herself that no one was present, noticed that her car keys had been removed from her purse. She immediately reported the burglary and automobile theft to the Montgomery County Police Department. Officers from that department promptly responded to her home, and a report of the stolen vehicle was broadcast on the police radio.

                of the house.   She was unable to identify the driver or to determine whether there were any passengers in her car
                

Shortly after 3:30 a.m., Officer David Godbold of the Montgomery County Police Department, who heard that broadcast, spotted the stolen Honda near a shopping center in Rockville. A chase ensued in which Officer Godbold, along with Montgomery County Police Officers George Hanville and Scott Wyne, each operating a patrol car, pursued the stolen vehicle, which was being driven by the appellant. After driving into an apartment complex, the appellant, who was alone, abandoned the Honda and ran into a nearby dark wooded area.

Continuing the chase on foot, the three police officers and Officer Godbold's K-9 dog followed the appellant. Officer Godbold released the dog, an 80-pound German shepherd, with a command to catch the fleeing suspect. Shortly thereafter, as the officers reached the edge of the wooded area, they heard a gunshot and saw a muzzle flash. They dove to the ground for cover. A few seconds later the officers heard a second gunshot. Officer Godbold immediately ordered his K-9 dog to retreat. Meanwhile, Detective Roger Thompson of the Montgomery County Police, responding to the broadcast of the pursuit, arrived at the opposite side of the wooded area. Observing the appellant emerge from the woods, Detective Thompson apprehended him and recovered a handgun. The gun, which had a strong odor indicating a recent firing, contained three live shells and two spent shell casings.

The appellant presents these issues:

I. The testimony of a State's witness concerning fingerprints taken from the appellant deprived the II. The evidence was insufficient to sustain the appellant's convictions for assault with intent to murder.

appellant of a fair trial and due process by revealing that the appellant had a prior arrest record.

III. The evidence was insufficient to sustain the appellant's convictions for assault with intent to prevent lawful apprehension.

IV. The convictions for use of a handgun in a crime of violence are invalid due to the insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the purported predicate crimes of violence.

V. The evidence did not support convictions on three counts of assault with intent to murder and three counts of use of a handgun in a crime of violence.

VI. The trial court erred in permitting testimony that the appellant's fingerprint matched a latent print recovered from the scene of the burglary.

VII. The trial court erred in denying the appellant's request for a jury instruction regarding lost evidence.

VIII. The trial court's failure to keep the appellant's counsel informed as to communications with the jury in the course of jury deliberations deprived the appellant of a fair trial and due process.

In its cross-appeal the State questions the trial court's interpretation of Md.Code, supra, Art. 27, § 643B(a).

For purposes of our discussion, the issues will be grouped as follows: the aggravated assaults (appellant's arguments II-V); the fingerprint evidence (appellant's arguments I, VI-VII); the jury communications (appellant's argument VIII); sentencing (State's cross-appeal).

THE AGGRAVATED ASSAULTS

The appellant questions the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his convictions of assaulting Officers Godbold, Hanville

                and Wyne with intent to murder them and assaulting those officers with intent to prevent lawful apprehension.   We first determine whether the elements of the assaults were established, since only if the evidence supports those charges need we address the special intent aspects of the appellant's alleged aggravated conduct
                
A. The Assaults

Assault is a common law offense that has been the subject of many definitions, frequently quoted and interpreted in the case law addressing the offense. Dixon v. State, 302 Md. 447, 456-59, 488 A.2d 962 (1985). As the Court of Appeals there observed, the crime of assault is defined to cover two types of circumstances: (1) attempts to commit battery, and (2) conduct tending to cause a reasonable apprehension of immediate bodily harm. 2 The case sub judice implicates the second type, for it is a case "where intimidation or putting in fear is the gravamen of the action." Dixon v. State, supra, 302 Md. at 459, 488 A.2d 962.

In Dixon the Court reviewed a conviction of assault with intent to rob arising from the attempted hold-up of a self-service filling station. The cashier at the filling station testified that Dixon had approached her while she was sitting inside a glass booth containing the station's cash register and safe. Dixon was carrying a newspaper folded underneath his arm as he approached the booth. In the drawer normally used for customer payments he placed a note stating "I want all your money and hurry." Based on the content of the note and the "cold, hard look" in Dixon's eyes, the cashier was convinced that Dixon had a weapon inside the newspaper. When the cashier dropped to the floor and pushed an alarm button, however, Dixon ran off.

In upholding Dixon's conviction for assault with intent to rob, the Court of Appeals adopted this Court's definition of assault from Lyles v. State, 10 Md.App. 265, 269 A.2d 178 (1970), where Judge Orth wrote:

[A]ny attempt to apply the least force to the person of another constitutes an assault. The attempt is made whenever there is any action or conduct reasonably tending to create the apprehension in another that the person engaged therein is about to apply such force to him. It is sufficient that there is an apparent intention to inflict a battery and an apparent ability to carry out such intention.

Id. at 267, 269 A.2d 178, quoted in Dixon v. State, supra, 302 Md. at 458-59, 488 A.2d 962. See also Williams v. State, 4 Md.App. 643, 647, 244 A.2d 619 (1968), cert. denied, 252 Md. 734 (1969). Applying that definition to the facts in Dixon, the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial judge's finding of an assault was not clearly erroneous since the service station attendant had reasonable grounds to feel apprehensive about her safety based on the permissible inferences that she drew from Dixon's conduct under the circumstances there present. Dixon v. State, supra, 302 Md. at 463-64, 488 A.2d 962.

The evidence before us in the present case indicates that the three police officers who pursued the appellant were placed in fear of bodily harm when the appellant fired two shots. It seems entirely reasonable that the firing of those shots from a dark wooded area, at close enough range that the officers could see a muzzle flash, would cause the officers to believe that their safety was being threatened by the appellant. It matters not what the appellant's specific intention was in firing the gun since assault is a general intent crime. We hold that the appellant's conduct under these circumstances placed the officers in reasonable apprehension of immediate bodily harm and rendered him guilty of assaulting them.

B. Intent to Murder

The specific intent element of assault with intent to murder was recently explored in Glenn v. State, 68 Md.App. 379, 511 A.2d 1110 (1986), where Judge Moylan, speaking for this Court, explained:

Assault with intent to murder is, by its very wording, a specific intent crime. The obvious question is, "The specific intent to do what?" The obvious answer is, "The...

To continue reading

Request your trial
26 cases
  • Albrecht v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • September 1, 1992
    ...... The essence of appellant's argument is that where one criminal incident . Page 63 . results in multiple victims, it is necessarily but one offense. This contention is without merit. .         63 Md.App. at 157, 492 A.2d 346. .         In Hall v. State, 69 Md.App. 37, 516 A.2d 204 (1986) cert. denied, 308 Md. 382, 519 A.2d 1283 (1987), Judge Karwacki, dealing with three aggravated assaults with intent to prevent lawful apprehension, rejected a similar defense claim that the crime should not be multiplied by the number of assault victims. ......
  • Lamb v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • September 1, 1991
    ...... Bryant v. State, 4 Md.App. 572, 575-579, 244 A.2d 446 (1968). Assaults with intent to murder may easily involve "mere assaults" (as where the bullet misses), Woodard and Demby v. State, 13 Md.App. 114, 123, 282 A.2d 9 (1971); cf. Hall v. State, 69 Md.App. 37, 46-47, 516 A.2d 204 (1986), or just as easily actual batteries (wherein the victim survives the attack). Bremer v. State, 18 Md.App. 291, 307 A.2d 503 (1973). In either event, they constitute assaults with intent to murder. Assaults [613 A.2d 406] with intent to rape ......
  • Richmond v. State, 138
    • United States
    • Court of Appeals of Maryland
    • September 1, 1991
    ......Perkins & Ronald N. Boyce, Criminal Law, 60 (3rd Ed.1982). .         By enacting § 386, the Legislature, proscribed various actions done with intent either to maim, disfigure or disable or to prevent lawful apprehension or detainer. See State v. Elborn, 27 Md. 483 (1867); Hall v. State, 69 Md.App. 37, 49-50, 516 A.2d 204, 209-10 (1986). Not all of the proscribed actions require, expressly or explicitly, proof of malice. While the attempt to discharge any kind of loaded arm and the stabbing, cutting or wounding of a person specifically requires that in addition to the ......
  • Thompson v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • August 31, 2016
    ...of perception is an apparent present ability from the viewpoint of the threatened victim .” Id. (emphasis added) (citing Hall v. State , 69 Md.App. 37, 45, 516 A.2d 204 (1986) ). Whether the State proved, therefore, that the shotgun was loaded or operable is inconsequential to the sufficien......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT