Hall v. State, 73029

Citation541 So.2d 1125,14 Fla. L. Weekly 101
Decision Date09 March 1989
Docket NumberNo. 73029,73029
Parties14 Fla. L. Weekly 101 Freddie Lee HALL, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Florida

Larry Helm Spalding, Capital Collateral Representative, and Billy H. Nolas and Timothy D. Schroeder, Staff Attys., Office of the Capital Collateral Representative, Tallahassee, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen. and Robert J. Landry, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Freddie Lee Hall, a prisoner under sentence of death and death warrant, appeals the denial of his motion to vacate his sentence pursuant to rule 3.850 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. Hall also petitions this Court for a stay of execution. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(1), Fla.Const. After oral argument we stayed Hall's execution, with an opinion to follow. We now reverse the trial court's order, vacate Hall's sentence, and direct the trial court to conduct a new sentencing proceeding before a jury. We also direct that this proceeding be held within ninety days from the filing of this opinion.

Hall and accomplice Mack Ruffin were convicted of the February 1978 abduction and murder of a young woman and sentenced to die in the electric chair. This Court affirmed Hall's conviction and sentence Hall v. State, 403 So.2d 1321 (Fla.1981) (Hall I). In September of 1982 a death warrant was signed, scheduling Hall for execution. This Court affirmed the trial court's denial of Hall's rule 3.850 motion, as well as Hall's petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Hall v. State, 420 So.2d 872 (Fla.1982) (Hall II). The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida granted a stay of execution, but eventually denied relief. Hall v. Wainwright, 565 F.Supp. 1222 (M.D.Fla.1983) (Hall III). The eleventh circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's decision and remanded the case for a new hearing. Hall v. Wainwright, 733 F.2d 766 (11th Cir.1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1107, 105 S.Ct. 2344, 85 L.Ed.2d 858 (1985) (Hall IV). The district court again denied relief and the eleventh circuit affirmed. Hall v. Wainwright, 805 F.2d 945 (11th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 905, 108 S.Ct. 248, 98 L.Ed.2d 206 (1987) (Hall V). Hall then petitioned this Court for a writ of habeas corpus based on allegations that the sentencing proceeding violated the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 107 S.Ct. 1821, 95 L.Ed.2d 347 (1987). We held that any error in the sentencing proceeding was harmless. Hall v. Dugger, 531 So.2d 76 (Fla.1988) (Hall VI).

The governor recently signed Hall's second death warrant, scheduling execution for September 20, 1988. Hall filed this, his second rule 3.850 motion with the trial court, alleging, inter alia, that his sentencing proceeding was fundamentally flawed under the Hitchcock ruling. 1 We do not agree with the trial court's ruling that our denial of relief in Hall VI, constitutes a procedural bar under the law of the case and res judicata. This case involves significant additional non-record facts which were not considered in Hall VI because that was a habeas corpus proceeding with no further development of evidence beyond the record. In this case, however, we are aided by the trial court's findings of fact at the rule 3.850 hearing. Moreover, as we have stated on several occasions, Hitchcock is a significant change in law, permitting defendants to raise a claim under that case in postconviction proceedings. Cooper v. Dugger, 526 So.2d 900 (Fla.1988); Thompson v. Dugger, 515 So.2d 173 (Fla.1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 960, 108 S.Ct. 1224, 99 L.Ed.2d 424 (1988); McCrae v. State, 510 So.2d 874 (Fla.1987); Downs v. Dugger, 514 So.2d 1069 (Fla.1987).

Turning to the merits of Hall's Hitchcock claim, we agree that the trial court limited the jury's and its own consideration to the statutorily enumerated mitigating circumstances. Hall VI. Furthermore, it is clear from the record that the trial court's express orders in Hall's trial and his accomplice's trial effectively precluded Hall's counsel from investigating, developing, and presenting possible nonstatutory mitigating circumstances. Because Hitchcock error has occurred, we must determine whether that error was harmless. Delap v. Dugger, 513 So.2d 659 (Fla.1987).

We believe it is necessary at this point to delineate the nonstatutory mitigating evidence proffered by Hall at the rule 3.850 hearing below. Affidavits presented by Hall's counsel from experts and nonexperts tend to prove numerous nonstatutory mitigating factors. 2 First, Dr. George Barnard the expert appointed to determine Hall's sanity and competency to stand trial, stated that although he found Hall to be competent to proceed with the trial, he was not consulted as to whether Hall's condition met the criteria for the finding of a nonstatutory mitigating circumstance. 3 He further stated that there existed substantial evidence of Hall's long history of drug and alcohol abuse, child abuse amounting to torture, organic brain damage possibly resulting from severe, repeated head trauma suffered as a child and adolescent, and a very low intellectual level.

Dr. Jethro Toomer, a psychologist, professor, and diplomate of the American Board of Professional Psychology examined Hall extensively and concluded that Hall suffered from extreme mental and emotional disturbance, compounded significantly by substance abuse throughout his life and at the time of the offense. Dr. Toomer determined that Hall suffered from organic brain dysfunction, including severe impairment of cognitive functions, caused possibly by repeated head trauma. Neuropsychological testing revealed serious brain impairment with moderately abnormal neurometric EEG results, while psychoeducational testing showed Hall to be an illiterate adult.

Dr. Dorothy Lewis, a psychiatrist and professor of Psychiatry at the New York University School of Medicine, evaluated Hall and concluded that he is chronically psychotic, brain damaged, and has severe learning disabilities which are compounded by Hall's use of drugs and alcohol. Dr. Lewis further stated that violent child abuse, organic brain damage, paranoia, and continued substance abuse all contributed to Hall's conduct at the time of the murder. Finally, psychologist Marilyn Feldman examined Hall in conjunction with Dr. Lewis and stated that the results of her testing were consistent with a schizophrenic disorder. Ms. Feldman found that Hall suffers from limited intelligence, organic brain damage, extreme impairment of personality integration, psychotic disorganization, and possible schizophrenia. All of this expert evidence could weigh very heavily in Hall's favor at a properly conducted sentencing hearing.

Just as compelling is the nonexpert evidence of nonstatutory mitigating circumstances. Affidavits from some of Hall's sixteen brothers and sisters paint a stark portrait of a childhood filled with abject poverty, constant violence, and unbearable brutality. Born the sixteenth of seventeen children to a mother and father who fought ceaselessly with shotguns, knives, or whatever weapons were available, Hall's childhood was marked by an existence which can only be described as pitiful. Teachers and siblings alike immediately recognized him to be significantly mentally retarded. This retardation did not garner any sympathy from his mother, but rather caused much scorn to befall him. Constantly beaten because he was "slow" or because he made simple mistakes, Hall felt the wrath of his father, his mother and his neighbors, who had his mother's permission to beat Hall whenever they deemed it proper. Hall's mother would strap him to his bed at night, with a rope thrown over a rafter. In the morning, she would awaken Hall by hoisting him up and whipping him with a belt, rope, or chord.

Violence of this sort was a regular part of Hall's life as a child. Two of his siblings were murdered while Hall was young, while another brother was tied to a tree with a fire set underneath him.

Hall and his brothers and sisters were required by their mother to work in the fields from the time they could walk. During harvesting seasons, Hall would be kept out of school to work. When his school grades suffered as a result of this, he was further beaten severely.

Furthermore, there is substantial evidence that Hall's mother may have been insane, always believing that a famine was imminent requiring the rationing of their food supplies. As a result, Hall and his brothers and sisters would work fourteen hours a day in the fields and come home to empty dinner plates. In addition to this delusion, there is evidence that Hall's mother was extremely superstitious, believing and encouraging Hall when he reported to her that he saw spirits and ghosts, hallucinations that have continued to plague Hall throughout his life. These observations and assessments of Hall's family background are corroborated and supported by documents and observations of professionals who dealt with him.

All of this expert and lay evidence proves or tends to prove a host of nonstatutory mitigating circumstances. We cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that the three aggravating circumstances found at Hall's original sentencing proceeding would have outweighed all of this. Therefore, the Hitchcock error cannot be considered harmless. It is of no significance that the trial judge stated that he would have imposed the death penalty in any event. The proper standard is whether a jury recommending life imprisonment would have a reasonable basis for that recommendation. If so, the trial judge could not override the jury's recommendation and sentence Hall to death. Tedder v. State, 322 So.2d 908 (Fla.1975). Here, there is clearly such a basis. In light of the substantial mitigating evidence, it would be a remarkable exercise in speculation to conclude that the three...

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