Hall v. State

• Decision Date: 27 May 1986
• Docket Number: No. 92S03-8605-CR-515,92S03-8605-CR-515
• Citation: 493 N.E.2d 433
• Parties: Gary HALL and Margaret Hall, Appellants, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

Page 433

493 N.E.2d 433

Gary HALL and Margaret Hall, Appellants, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.

No. 92S03-8605-CR-515.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

May 27, 1986.

John S. Bloom, Bloom, Bloom, & Fleck, Columbia City, for appellants.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

SHEPARD, Justice.

Gary and Margaret Hall appeal their convictions for reckless homicide, a class C felony, Ind.Code Sec. 35-42-1-5 (Burns 1985 Repl.) and neglect of a dependent, a class D felony, Ind. Code Sec. 35-46-1-4 (Burns 1985 Repl.). The trial court sentenced the defendants to concurrent terms of five years for reckless homicide and two years for child neglect.

The Court of Appeals affirmed both convictions. Hall v. State (1985), Ind.App., 482 N.E.2d 1185. A petition for rehearing was denied by a divided vote, Judge Garrard dissenting on the grounds that under existing case law the imposition of two convictions constituted double jeopardy. Hall v. State (1986), Ind.App., 487 N.E.2d 181. We agree, grant transfer, and reverse the convictions for neglect of a dependent. The convictions for reckless homicide are affirmed.

Appellants raised three issues before the Court of Appeals. Two issues which challenged their convictions for neglect of a dependent have been rendered moot by our decision to reverse this conviction on other grounds. ¹ The issues we address are:

1) Whether the convictions for reckless homicide were contrary to law, and

2) Whether the imposition of sentences for two offenses which are based upon the same pattern of omissive conduct constitutes double jeopardy.

The facts are as follows. On February 16, 1984, deputy sheriff Robert Schrader arrived at the defendants' residence at 6:15 a.m. Mr. Hall told Schrader that his son, Joel, had been ill during the preceding five days. Joel's condition had worsened during the last two to three days. The child had been experiencing coughing, restlessness, difficulty in breathing, and a loss of appetite. At 11 p.m. on the 15th, Joel was ashen in color and listless. At 5 a.m. on the 16th, Joel's breathing was very shallow. Joel stopped breathing approximately thirty minutes later.

An autopsy revealed that the cause of death was acute bronchial pneumonia, an inflammation of the lungs which prevented Joel from breathing normally. The county coroner, a physician, opined that there would have been a reasonably good chance of stopping the pneumonia and saving Joel's life if medical care had been obtained during the two days prior to his death.

Pursuant to their religious beliefs, the Halls did not seek medical care. The Halls believed that sickness was the devil in a spiritual battle with God and that prayer would heal the sick. The appellants testified that regardless of the seriousness of Joel's illness, they would not have taken him to a doctor.

I. Conviction Contrary to Law

The appellants' argue essentially that the verdicts were contrary to law because their acts do not constitute a substantial deviation from acceptable standards of conduct and therefore do not meet the definition of recklessness. ² There is no merit to this claim.

A conviction for reckless homicide requires the State to prove that the Halls recklessly killed another human being. Ind.Code Sec. 35-42-1-5 (Burns 1985 Repl.). A person engages in conduct "recklessly" if he engages in the conduct in plain, conscious, and unjustifiable disregard of harm that might result and the disregard involves a substantial deviation from acceptable standards of conduct. Ind.Code Sec. 35-41-2-2 (Burns 1985 Repl.).

The evidence recited above clearly shows that the jury's verdict was not contrary to law. A verdict is contrary to law only when there is an absence of evidence on an essential element of the crime charged or when the evidence is without conflict and leads to but one reasonable conclusion and the trier of fact reached an opposite conclusion. Ballard v. State (1984), Ind., 464 N.E.2d 328; Early v. State (1982), Ind., 442 N.E.2d 1071. Despite the appellants' admitted awareness that their son was ill and that his condition progressively deteriorated, they did not seek medical care for him.

The Halls, arguing by analogy to the child neglect statute, maintain that their "reckless" conduct was brought within the realm of acceptable standards of conduct by their exercise of prayer in lieu of medical care. The child neglect statute does permit a caretaker who deprives a dependent of medical care to be exempted from criminal responsibility if the caretaker "in the legitimate practice of his religious belief, provided treatment by spiritual means through prayer, in lieu of medical care, to his dependent." Ind.Code Sec. 35-46-1-4 (Burns 1985 Repl.). However, reckless homicide does not have a statutory defense excusing responsibility for a death which resulted from what our legal system has defined to be reckless acts, regardless if these acts were conducted pursuant to religious beliefs or otherwise. The legislature has distinguished between child neglect which results in serious bodily injury ³ and neglect which results in the child's death. Prayer is not permitted as a defense when a caretaker engages in omissive conduct which results in the child's death.

II. Double Jeopardy

Two offenses are the same for the purposes of double jeopardy when the same act constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions which do not require proof of an additional fact. Blockburger v. United States (1932), 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306. A double jeopardy analysis does not end with an evaluation and comparison of the statutory provisions.

The factual bases alleged by the State in the information or indictment and upon which the charges are predicated must also be examined. Tawney v. State (1982), Ind., 439 N.E.2d 582. While the applicability of the double jeopardy clause has been the subject of much intellectual struggle in American courts, recent Indiana precedent appears dispositive of the case at bar.

In this case, the neglect charge and the reckless homicide charge were both based upon the parents' failure to provide medical treatment to Joel during his illness, which lasted five days. The indictment for neglect alleged:

Gary Hall and Margaret Hall, on the 16th day of February, ... having the care, custody and control of Joel David Hall, did knowingly deprive [him] ... of necessary support by refusal or failure to provide said child with medical care ...

The reckless homicide indictment was based upon the following factual allegations:

Gary Hall and Margaret Hall, on the 16th day of February, ... did recklessly kill ... Joel David Hall, by refusing to supply or provide said child with necessary medical care ...

It is apparent from an examination of these charges that the parents' pattern of neglect was an act which involved a "substantial deviation from acceptable standards of conduct." Ind.Code Sec. 35-41-2-2 (Burns 1985 Repl.). The same act resulted in or caused the death of their son. Ind.Code Sec. 35-42-1-5 (Burns 1985 Repl.). The State only had to prove this pattern of neglect: "no additional facts...