Hall v. State, S

• Decision Date: 07 May 1974
• Docket Number: No. S,S
• Citation: 217 N.W.2d 352,63 Wis.2d 304
• Parties: Luther HALL, III, Plaintiff in Error, v. STATE of Wisconsin, Defendant in Error. tate 42.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

Page 352

217 N.W.2d 352

63 Wis.2d 304

Luther HALL, III, Plaintiff in Error, v. STATE of Wisconsin, Defendant in Error.

No. State 42.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

May 7, 1974.

Patrick J. Devitt, Legal Aid Society of Milwaukee, Crim. Appellate Div., Milwaukee, for plaintiff in error.

Robert W. Warren, Atty. Gen., James H. McDermott and Robert D. Martinson, Asst. Attys. Gen., Madison, for defendant in error.

HEFFERNAN, Justice.

The court's acceptance of Hall's guilty plea and its finding of guilt are not contested. The only issue raised is whether Hall was denied effective counsel at sentencing because the same lawyer represented both Hall and Dixon.

The record shows that Hall's attorney made a sentencing plea to the court in which he stated that Dixon should receive the more lenient sentence of the two. He stated that Dixon 'was the less . . . aggressive in the act,' and that he had been 'the victim of circumstances and the people surrounding him.'

It is because at sentencing his counsel made a comparison of the culpability of Dixon and Hall and found Hall the more culpable, warranting a greater sentence, that Hall now claims he was deprived of effective counsel at that critical stage of the proceedings. No contention is made that any conflict arose prior to the sentencing.

Judge O'Connell's conduct of the proceeding, his interrogation of counsel and of the parties in respect to the negotiated plea, the acceptance of the plea, the finding of guilt and the hearing on sentencing constitute a model of judicial thoroughness and full compliance with the standards which this court has set. Reversible error is claimed only because of the conduct of counsel.

At the very outset of the hearing on the pleas of guilty, both the assistant district attorney and defense counsel stated that, in the event the judge was to consider a prison term for both defendants, it was agreed that Dixon be sentenced for the lesser term. Hall stated that he had no objection to proceeding with the taking of the plea under these circumstances. After both defendants were carefully interrogated under the standards of Ernst v. State (1969), 43 Wis.2d 661, 170 N.W.2d 713, the defense counsel for Hall and Dixon was given an opportunity to make a statement on their behalf prior to sentencing. Counsel pointed out that, except for the charges pending before the court, Dixon had no criminal record. Of Dixon, he said, 'He, I believe, was the victim of circumstances and the people surrounding him.' After pointing out that Dixon had been cooperative with the police and with him and after stating that he thought Dixon was unlikely to again commit a crime, he said:

'I believe strongly that Mr. Dixon should be given an opportunity on probation because of the facts surrounding this. Mr. Dixon has intimated to me all along that he was not responsible for any injury to the lady about whom the officer testified. He was the man in the tennis shoes, so-to-speak, who grabbed the purse and ran.'

Judge O'Connell asked defense counsel if he were not aware of the theory underlying the party-to-a-crime statute, under which both defendants were charged and which would make each defendant equally guilty of the substantive crime. In response, defense counsel said that both he and Dixon were aware of it and stated, 'I only want to point this out to the Court for mitigation purposes with regard to Mr. Dixon . . ..' Counsel said he thought Dixon was remorseful and said, 'I know his family and I do believe he would be the more likely choice for probation, if the Court were to so consider it.'

In respect to Hall, counsel merely said:

'Now, on behalf of Mr. Hall, Mr. Hall has one case against him, 6781. He has a very minimal prior criminal record. He was almost gainfully employed until he was picked up on this particular charge. By reason of the fact of his minimal prior record, I think the Court should consider also placing him on probation, although I'm not as familiar with Mr. Hall as I am with Mr. Dixon; and I would strongly urge the Court to consider this disposition with regard to Mr. Hall.'

Thereafter, the assistant district attorney, contrary to the probation recommendation for both defendants made by defense counsel, recommended that Hall and Dixon be sentenced to a term of imprisonment. The trial judge then asked defense counsel why, in view of the fact that Dixon was charged with an additional crime, he was concurring and in fact recommending, that there be a shorter sentence for Dixon than for Hall. In explanation, defense counsel stated:

'If I may, because I was present during these pre-trial negotiations, one, Mr. Dixon was fully cooperative to myself and the police officer investigating other alleged purse snatches by other people in the community; two, Mr. Dixon, it was felt was the less, should I say, aggressive in the act; and, three, it was considered and felt by the officer and myself and the District Attorney that Mr. Dixon was more likely to fulfill the terms and obligations of being a contributing member of the community.'

When Judge O'Connell said he could not see much to 'differentiate the two defendants,' defense counsel said, 'We just felt, Your Honor, that Mr. Dixon was more of a victim of circumstances.' Judge O'Connell then pointed out that Dixon acted alone on the first crime with which he was charged. Judge O'Connell ended the discussion by commenting:

'Well, under the circumstances, I respectfully differ with your defense counsel's evaluation. By my experience, this is not the way I analyze it.'

The trial judge then proceeded to sentencing. In accordance with McCleary v. State (1971), 49 Wis.2d 263, 182 N.W.2d 512, he carefully explicated his reasons for the sentences imposed. On the charge of strong armed robbery, he sentenced Hall to an indeterminate term of seven years and Dixon to an indeterminate term of five years. On the second charge of strong armed robbery, he sentenced Dixon to an indeterminate term of two years to run consecutively to the five year term.

The record irrefutably shows that Hall was denied effective counsel at sentencing, because his attorney, in speaking on behalf of Dixon, made statements not supported by the record that tended to show greater culpability on the part of Hall.

Defense counsel said that Dixon was the victim of circumstances and of the people around him. From the record, that person was Hall. Defense counsel also stated that it was his belief that Dixon was not responsible for the injury to one of the victims and thus inferred that Hall was the responsible person. The record did not show which of the two criminals had caused the injury. Counsel also stated that Dixon had cooperated with him and with the police. The implication was that Hall had not cooperated. Additionally, he stated that Dixon was the less aggressive of the two. There was no evidence to support this appraisal of comparative aggressiveness.

Hall's alleged greater culpability, none of which was supported by the record, was used for the purpose of securing a more lenient disposition of Dixon's case at the expense of Hall.

Defense counsel's colloquy with the sentencing judge reveals an actual conflict of interest, which prevented Hall from having effective counsel at this stage of the proceedings.

In the case of People v. Chacon (1968), 69 Cal.2d 765, 73 Cal.Rptr. 10, 447 P.2d 106, Chief Justice Traynor, speaking for the court, pointed out the conflict which exists at sentencing when the argument of comparative culpability is used to influence the sentencing authority when two or more defendants have the same counsel. He said at page 775, 73 Cal.Rptr. at page 16, 447 P.2d at page 112:

'Conflicts of interest necessarily exist when the jury must fix the penalty for more than one defendant. Often the strongest argument that separate counsel can make on the issue of penalty is that his client was less culpable than the others and that he, at least, should not be executed. In addition, he must be free to stress particular mitigating elements in his client's background or other individual mitigating factors that may not apply to a condefendant. Counsel representing more than one defendant is necessarily inhibited in making such arguments and in presenting evidence to support them. He cannot simultaneously argue with any semblance of effectiveness that each defendant is most deserving of the lesser penalty.'

Under the standards adopted by this court, once it is established by clear and convincing evidence that an actual conflict of interest exists, a defendant must be granted a vacation of his sentence and a new hearing. State v. Reppin (1967), 35 Wis.2d 377, 387--389, 151 N.W.2d 9; Curry v. State (1967), 36 Wis.2d 225, 234, 152 N.W.2d 906.

The instant case is unlike the situation in Kaczmarek v. State (1968), 38 Wis.2d 71, 155 N.W.2d 813, relied upon by the state, where we sustained a sentence when counsel's plea tended to exculpate one defendant and inculpate another; but in that case the facts were different, because the complaining defendant had been sentenced at an earlier hearing and, accordingly, inculpatory remarks in respect to him at the other defendant's hearing could not affect the representation he had been afforded earlier. The court in Kaczmarek recognized that a different question would have been presented had the defendants been sentenced in a single hearing.

The state does not really argue that there was not a conflict of interest. Rather, it asserts that there are other factors which accounted for the disparity of the sentences--that the trial judge rejected assertions of defense counsel and that there was nothing to show that the defendant was prejudiced because of his counsel's conflict of interest.

Under Reppin, however, this court has indicated that a conflict of interest at sentencing per se renders counsel ineffective, and it is not required that actual prejudice be shown. All that need be...