Hall v. State of Florida, 74-526-Civ-J-S.
| Decision Date | 02 June 1975 |
| Docket Number | No. 74-526-Civ-J-S.,74-526-Civ-J-S. |
| Citation | 395 F. Supp. 1044 |
| Parties | Herman Lamar HALL, Petitioner, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Herman Lamar Hall, pro se.
Wallace E. Allbritton, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, Fla., for respondent.
Petitioner, an inmate at Florida State Prison, Starke, Florida, seeks federal habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S. C. § 2254.
In 1969, petitioner, along with two others, was tried in the Circuit Court of Duval County, Florida, for the slaying of Sidney Parnell. Parnell's death occurred during the 1968 robbery of the Ribault Grocery Store in Duval County, Florida. After trial by jury, petitioner was convicted of first degree murder on the theory of felony murder. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. His conviction was affirmed by the District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District, on June 10, 1971. Hall v. State, 249 So.2d 59 (Fla.App.1971). Petitioner now alleges six defects in the trial court proceedings which he claims denied him due process of law. After review of the entire record of the state court proceedings, this Court finds petitioner's allegations to be without merit. In rejecting the petition without an evidentiary hearing, this Court is not unmindful of its responsibilities under Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 83 S. Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770 (1963). The nature of the allegations and the completeness of the record, however, obviate the necessity of a hearing in this case. Jennings v. Wainwright, 486 F.2d 1041 (5th Cir. 1973). Petitioner's individual allegations and this Court's reasons for rejecting them are set forth below.
Three of petitioner's allegations arise from a single occasion. This occasion was a coroner's inquest held to inquire into the death of Sidney Parnell. The events preceding the inquest are simply stated. The robbery of the store and Parnell's death occurred on September 25, 1968. There were several eye-witnesses. Within a few days, petitioner was arrested in Tallahassee, Florida. A coroner's inquest was held October 7, 1968. Petitioner appeared at the inquest with his co-defendants. He was handcuffed and was not represented by counsel. At the outset of the proceedings petitioner was advised as follows:
The inquest then proceeded. The prosecuting attorney presented evidence detailing Parnell's death, including eyewitness testimony. At the close of the inquest, the jury returned a verdict of guilty as charged. Thereafter, petitioner was retained in custody. He was indicted on October 18, 1968, and tried on November 3, 1969.
Petitioner now alleges that the coroner's inquest was illegally held and that as a consequence of it he was: (1) denied his right to effective counsel; (2) subjected to double jeopardy; and (3) exposed to the state's witnesses under circumstances so suggestive as to taint the witnesses' later in-court identification.
As to the legality of the inquest, the question of whether it was proper for the state to hold an inquest when there were witnesses to the death; and the question of whether this particular inquest was properly conducted, are not before this Court. In the absence of any prejudice to petitioner's federally protected rights, the legality vel non of the inquest is a matter of state law only. Cf. Cappetta v. Wainwright, 433 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir. 1970). In this case petitioner was not prejudiced by the inquest itself. He was afforded all the pre-indictment safeguards he was entitled to. He therefore cannot complain. Pugh v. Gerstein, 420 U.S. 103, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975).
A coroner's inquest is not an adversary proceeding. Rather, it is an inquiry into the method of death (i. e., by felony, mischance or accident) and into the instrumentality of death. On October 7, 1968, no adversary proceedings were yet pending against petitioner. He was, therefore, not entitled to the appointment of an attorney for the inquest. Pugh v. Gerstein, supra; Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 92 S.Ct. 1877, 32 L.Ed.2d 411 (1972). Furthermore, petitioner was not twice put in jeopardy. The form of the coroner's jury verdict was guilty as charged. This did not, however, constitute a conviction. The only consequence of the verdict was that petitioner was bound over for indictment. He was not in jeopardy until his trial in November 1969. At this trial, the coroner's jury verdict was of no consequence. It was never mentioned. Furthermore, if it could be said that the inquest constituted jeopardy, petitioner was found guilty. He cannot, then, claim prejudice by the November trial. His double jeopardy claim is without merit.
Petitioner's remaining inquest-related claim is more substantive. The inquest was a pre-trial confrontation between petitioner and the state's witnesses. As such it must be scrutinized for suggestiveness spawning possible in-court misidentification. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 87 S.Ct. 1926, 18 L.Ed.2d 1149 (1967). Petitioner's claim relevant to this confrontation is that he was exposed to the state's witnesses under suggestive circumstances. These circumstances were petitioner's appearing at the inquest handcuffed and in the posture of a defendant. Petitioner alleges this exposure suggested his guilt to the witnesses and tainted their minds against him. This taint in turn produced a likelihood of misidentification at trial. The Supreme Court of Florida rejected this claim in Paschal v. State, 251 So.2d 257 (Fla.1971). A review of the record fully credits the Florida Court's finding.
The test applicable to this claim is comparable to that applied in photographic display and line-up cases. The test is two-pronged. It must be determined: (1) whether the pre-trial confrontation was so impermissively suggestive as to, (2) produce a substantial likelihood of misidentification. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 88 S.Ct. 967, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968); United States v. Kimbrough, 481 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1973). The primary concern, however, is with the likelihood of misidentification. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972). In this case, assuming for the sake of argument that the confrontation was suggestive, the question then narrows to whether there was a substantial likelihood of misidentification. The relevant factors in making this decision are enunciated in Neil v. Biggers, supra, 409 U.S. at page 199, 93 S.Ct. at page 383:
We turn, then, to the central question, whether under the "totality of the circumstances" the identification was reliable even though the confrontation procedure was suggestive. As indicated by our cases, the factors to be considered in evaluating the likelihood of misidentification include the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness' degree of attention, the accuracy of the witness' prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the confrontation.
Applying these factors, this Court sees small likelihood that petitioner was misidentified. The witnesses had ample opportunity to view the culprits at the time of the crime. The grocery store was well lighted. The robbers entered the store twice. They were unmasked. The victims conversed with the robbers; were able to describe their clothing and appearance; and were able to identify the robbers from photographs. The inquest took place within two weeks of the incident. All the witnesses made positive identifications of petitioner at both the inquest and the trial. Under these circumstances, this Court finds it unlikely that the inquest was the source of misidentification. Rather, the robbery encounter itself provided the most reliable source of the in-court identification. Ward v. Wainwright, 450 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1971).
Petitioner's next claim is that he was denied the effective...
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