Hall v. the State

• Decision Date: 30 March 1880
• Citation: 4 N.W. 1068,48 Wis. 688
• Parties: HALL v. THE STATE
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

4 N.W. 1068

48 Wis. 688

HALL v. THE STATE

Supreme Court of Wisconsin

March 30, 1880

March 11, 1880, Argued

ERROR to the Municipal Court of Milwaukee County.

Hall having been convicted upon a criminal information under sec 4410, R. S., took a writ of error to reverse the judgment.

Affirmed.

Henry L. Buxton, for the plaintiff in error, cited Ford v State, 3 Pin., 449; People v. Murray, 8 Cal., 519; Carpenter v. Nixon, 5 Hill 260; Shay v. People, 22 N.Y. 317.

The Attorney General, for the state, contended that there was no need to allege the kind or value of the goods intended to be stolen. 2 Bishop's Crim. Pro., sec. 142; Hunter v. State, 29 Ind., 80; Larned v. Commonwealth, 12 Met., 240; Comm. v. Williams, 2 Cush., 582; Bell v. State, 20 Wis. 600; Portwood v. State, 29 Tex., 47. Larceny, grand or petit, is a felony at the common law. 3 Chitty Cr. Law, 924; 4 Black. Com., 95. When used in our statutes, the term "felony" is to be construed as meaning an offense for which the offender, on conviction, shall be liable by law to be punished by imprisonment in a state prison. R. S., sec. 4637. The same definition is found in the revision of 1849. This provision defines statute felonies, but does not interfere with those existing at common law untouched by the statute, of which petit larceny is one. Ward v. The People, 30 Hill 395, cited approvingly in Wilson v. State, 1 Wis. 163.

WILLIAM P. LYON, J.

OPINION

LYON, J.

The only question in this case is, whether an information for an offense under section 4410, R. S., p. 1046, is sufficient, the charge therein being that the accused broke and entered a certain dwelling-house in the day-time with intent feloniously to steal, take and carry away therefrom the goods and chattels of the owner. Counsel for plaintiff in error contends that petit larceny is not a felony under the statute definition of a felony (R. S., 1088, sec. 4637), and that the use of the term "or other felony," in section 4410, plainly implies that only such larcenies are intended as are felonies, that is, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison. Hence, the learned counsel ingeniously argues that the information should allege the value of the goods which the accused intended to steal, so that it may appear whether he intended to commit a felony, and that the information is bad if it fails to charge an intent to commit an offense punishable by imprisonment in the state prison.

We are unable to give the statute the construction contended for. The statute must be read as though, instead of the words "or other felony," it had been written "or any other offense for which the offender, on conviction, shall be liable, by law, to be punished by imprisonment in the state prison." Nichols v. The State, 35 Wis. 308. We think the term "or other felony" is not a limitation on what precedes, but is inserted to extend the scope of the section to other offenses not specifically named therein. Thus, an intent to commit arson or mayhem, or to inflict upon some person great bodily harm, and doubtless other offenses, are brought within the section by the use of that term. The intent which the statute makes essential to constitute an offense under it, is, generally, an intent to commit the crime of larceny, and the...