Hall v. Underwood

• Decision Date: 26 February 1953
• Docket Number: 8 Div. 644
• Citation: 258 Ala. 392,63 So.2d 683
• Parties: HALL et al. v. UNDERWOOD, Judge of Probate et al.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 683

63 So.2d 683

258 Ala. 392

HALL et al. v. UNDERWOOD, Judge of Probate et al.

8 Div. 644.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Feb. 26, 1953.

J. Foy Guin and Jas. L. Orman, Russellville, for appellant.

Si Garrett, Atty. Gen., Robt. Straub, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Rankin Fite, Hamilton of counsel, for appellees.

White, Bradley, Arant, All & Rose, Birmingham, for appellee Birmingham Trust Nat. Bank.

LIVINGSTON, Chief Justice.

This is an appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court, in Equity, of Franklin County, Alabama. The proceedings were begun by Archie B. Hall, a resident and taxpayer of Franklin County; James Hovater, E. A. Reid, Ed Mitchell and Joe Peden, as members of the county governing body of Franklin County, Alabama, and in their individual capacity; and Franklin County, Alabama, a body corporate. The bill, as amended, makes Edgar Underwood, as Judge of Probate, and Edgar Underwood, as Chairman of the County Governing Body of Franklin County, the Citizens Bank and Savings Company of Russellville, Alabama, an Alabama Corporation, and as depository of Franklin County, Alabama, in lieu of a county treasury; the First National Bank of Russellville, Alabama, a National Banking Association; the Vina Banking Corporation, an Alabama Corporation; the Bank of Red Bay, an Alabama Corporation; the Birmingham Trust National Bank, a National Banking Association; W. G. Pruett, as Director of the Alabama Highway Department; and Si Garrett, as Attorney General of the State of Alabama, respondents. The bill as last amended was filed for the purpose of testing the constitutional validity of two local acts of the Legislature of Alabama of 1951, and the several sections or provisions thereof. The demurrers of the Birmingham Trust National Bank were sustained to the bill on the theory that as to it, the bill as amended failed to state a justiciable controversy between the complainants and said bank. The other banking institutions filed answers, which in effect admitted the allegations of the bill of complaint.

The two local acts here involved are known as the Todd Act and the Oden Act. The Todd Act appears on page 378 of the Special and Regular Sessions of the Legislature of Alabama of 1951, and the Oden Act appears on page 1288 of the same Acts.

The trial court sustained the validity of both acts with certain exceptions which we will note later, but we may say here that no appeal was taken from the rulings of the trial court declaring certain sections of the acts involved unconstitutional.

The trial court rendered a decree declaring the meaning and effect of the several sections, or provisions, of both acts. It is from this decree that the complainants in the court below prosecuted this appeal.

The Oden Act, in general effect, simply abolishes the court of county revenues of Franklin County, and establishes in lieu thereof a Board of Revenue of Franklin County; provides for who shall be members of said board, and as to how they are to be elected. This act also provides that the board of revenue shall have the same powers and jurisdiction, and shall perform the same duties which are now or may hereafter be conferred or imposed upon boards of revenue, courts of county commissioners, or other like governing bodies, by the general law of the State of Alabama; provided, however, that said board shall have no control, management, or supervision of the county roads and bridges of said county, and shall not have supervision over any road and bridge funds, and that the road and bridge fund monies shall be handled under the provisions of the Todd Act.

The Todd Act, in general effect, transfers from the governing body of Franklin County to the State Highway Department, with certain exceptions, the general powers and jurisdiction of the local governing body of Franklin County in respect to roads, bridges, and ferries, together with certain monies, equipment, etc., to be used in that regard.

All annual revenues which accrue to the benefit of Franklin County are held in three funds, or at least pass through one of such three funds before final allocation for expenditures are made.

First. The Franklin County General Fund. This fund accrues from general sources and is available for general expenses. The motor vehicle license tax, which is here involved, goes into the general fund of Franklin County. The general state law which earmarks a portion of the motor vehicle license tax for distribution to the county does not further earmark any portion of such part as is received by the counties for any particular purpose.

Second. The gasoline tax fund, which has always been held and treated as a road building and road repair fund.

The third major county fund is that derived from Section 215 of the Constitution of 1901, from the county levy of one-fourth of one per centum per annum 'for the erection of necessary public buildings, bridges, or roads'. By express constitutional requirement, this fund 'shall be applied exclusively to the purposes for which the same were so levied and collected.'

The argument is made, first, that to uphold the two local acts now in question is to, in effect, destroy Franklin County as a legal entity; that to take away from the local governing authorities all of the power and jurisdiction over roads, bridges and ferries, and transfer the same to a state agency, the State Highway Department, is tantamount to the abolition of Franklin County. The argument recognizes our line of cases justifying the legislative reconstruction of county governments, but insists that such reconstruction should be within the framework of local self-government, and that the Legislature is not authorized to transfer matters of purely local concern to state agencies located outside the county. In our opinion, this argument is fully answered by our cases. In the case of Yeilding v. State ex rel. Wilkinson, 232 Ala. 292, 167 So. 580, 583, the late Mr. Justice Knight quoted with approval Judge Dillon in his treatise on Municipal Corporations, 5th Edition, Section 98, page 154, as follows:

"Independently of any constitutional guarantee an inherent right of local self-government which is beyond legislative control has been asserted to defeat legislation depriving or tending to deprive the corporation of the control of some part of its affairs. The occasion for the assertion of the right has usually been the enactment of a statute depriving a city or other public corporation of the power to appoint an officer or board exercising local functions, and conferring the power of appointment on the executive, or mandatory legislation for a local improvement, for the incurring of debt, the issue of bonds, or the payment of a claim, or a statutory enactment prescribing the terms and conditions of contracts by the municipality. Such legislation has frequently caused the courts to consider the abstract question whether a municipality has any inherent right of local self-government which is beyond legislative interference, and much has been said in support of or against the existence of the right, which should be construed as having reference only to the question before the court on the facts of the particular case, although couched in language so sweeping as to give it general application. It must now be conceded that the great weight of authority denies in toto the existence, in the absence of special constitutional provisions, of any inherent right of local self-government which is beyond legislative control. The Supreme Court of United States has declared that a municipal corporation in the exercise of all its duties, including those most strictly local or internal, is but a department of the State. The legislature may give it all the powers such a being is capable of receiving, making it a miniature State within its locality; or it may strip it of every power, leaving it a corporation in name only; and it may create and recreate these changes as often as it chooses, or it may itself exercise directly within the locality any or all the powers usually committed to a municipality."

Justice Knight said further:

'In 19 R.C.L., p. 730, § 35, we find the following statement of the rule under consideration: 'The power to create a municipal corporation, which is vested in the legislature, implies the power to create it with such limitations as the legislature may see fit to impose, and to impose such limitations at any stage of its existence.'

'(4) We are in full accord with the statement of Judge Dillon in his statement of the law as above set out, * * *.'

In the case of Johnson v. Robinson, 238 Ala. 568, 192 So. 412, 416, this Court said:

'It is a matter of common knowledge that the enterprise of road building has become one of Alabama's major problems; that large sums of money are gathered and appropriated to this enterprise, more now than ever before in the history of the State; that competent, governmental administrative bodies and agencies are essential to the due and economical administration of these funds, it would seem, is not open to question. What agencies shall be provided, however, is a matter of policy committed to the Legislature, and with which the courts are not concerned. State ex rel. Day v. Bowles, 217 Ala. 458, 116 So. 662; Morgan County v. N. Edmondson, supra [238 Ala. 522, 192 So. 274].

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"It is also a maxim of republican government that local concerns shall be managed in the local districts, which shall choose their own administrative and public officers, and establish for themselves police regulations. But this maxim is subject to such exceptions as the legislative power of the State shall see fit to make, and when made it must be presumed that the public interest, convenience and protection are subserved thereby. The State may interfere to establish new regulations against the will of the local constituency, and if it shall think proper in any case to assume to itself those powers of local police which...