Hall v. United Ins. Co. of America
| Decision Date | 30 April 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. 03-14527.,03-14527. |
| Citation | 367 F.3d 1255 |
| Parties | Odessa Dee HALL, as personal representative of the estate of Agnes Patterson, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. UNITED INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA, United Insurance Company of America, Employee Benefit or Welfare Plan on behalf of Teledyne Brown Employees, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit |
S. Mitchell Howie, Samuel T. Russell, Sirote & Permutt, P.C., Huntsville, AL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Kevin E. Clark, William H. Brooks, Lightfoot, Franklin & White, LLC, Birmingham, AL, for Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama.
Before BIRCH, MARCUS and BRUNETTI*, Circuit Judges.
The novel issue presented in this appeal involves the interplay between two Federal Rules of Evidence: 901(b)(2), which allows non-expert opinion testimony about the genuineness of handwriting evidence based on sufficient familiarity, and 701, which allows lay opinion testimony that is rationally based on personal perceptions. Plaintiff-appellant, Odessa Dee Hall ("Hall"), filed an affidavit stating that a signature on a document purporting to cancel an insurance policy with defendant-appellee, United Insurance Company of America ("United"), was not authentic. The district court struck the affidavit, citing precedent from our sister circuits, on the ground that, because Hall could not demonstrate sufficient familiarity with the handwriting of the alleged signatory as required under Rule 901(b)(2), her opinion testimony was not rationally based on her own perceptions as required under Rule 701. After striking Hall's affidavit, the district court granted summary judgment to United based on the court's assessment that no genuine issue of material fact remained.
This court has not yet addressed the foundation necessary for lay opinion testimony proffered under Rules 901(b)(2) and 701. We AFFIRM the district court's assessment of the relationship between these two Rules. We also AFFIRM the district court's grant of summary judgment to United, as well as the district court's decision denying Hall's motion to file a second amended complaint.
Bobby Patterson ("Bobby"), who had a life insurance contract with United, was disabled due to mental impairments in 1990, and was placed on disability leave by his employer. United waived the premiums so long as Bobby complied with periodic medical examination requirements.
In 1995, Bobby completed a "Waiver of Premium Questionnaire" that stated: R1-12, Ex. A-4. United sent Bobby two letters requesting that he complete a waiver form if he wanted to terminate his life insurance policy.
A document dated 5 April 1996, and purportedly signed by Bobby, stated: "I, Bobby M. Patterson request that my waiver of premium for my group life insurance policy through my former employer... be discontinued effective immediately." Id. at Ex. A-6. In response to this waiver of benefits, United sent Bobby a letter dated 23 July 1996 informing him that his life insurance policy had been terminated as per his request.
Almost four years later, Bobby died. Bobby's mother, Agnes Patterson ("Agnes"), was designated as the beneficiary under the United life insurance policy. Agnes died approximately one and a half years after Bobby died and never made a claim for benefits under the policy.
About six months after Agnes's death, Hall, as personal representative of Agnes' estate, made a claim for benefits under the policy, alleging two theories: (1) the waiver was not valid because it was not Bobby's signature and (2) Bobby was not mentally competent to have signed any waiver.1
In support of her arguments, Hall submitted two affidavits. The first affidavit was executed by Hall herself and stated:
Over the course of time that I knew Bobby Patterson, [more than thirty years,] I became familiar with his handwriting. I saw him write, received correspondence from him and helped him review documents which he executed in my presence. I have examined the purported signatures of Bobby Patterson, dated August 30, 1995 [Questionnaire] and April 5, 1996 [Waiver] and they do not appear to be his handwriting.
R1-21, Ex. A. The second affidavit was submitted by Rocco Petrella, a "licensed professional counselor," who reviewed medical reports and opined that Bobby was not mentally competent to have signed any documents. Id. at Ex. B. One of the documents reviewed by Petrella contained statements and conclusions reached by Bobby's attending psychiatrist, who concluded that Bobby was competent. In his affidavit, Petrella offered no explanation for his assertions to the contrary.
The district court struck both affidavits. As for the counselor's affidavit, the district court determined that the counselor was not a medical expert and therefore his testimony was inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.
As for Hall's affidavit, the district court struck all relevant portions because Hall had not demonstrated with sufficient reliability how she was familiar with Bobby's signature.
After striking both affidavits, the district court concluded that no genuine issues of material fact remained and granted summary judgment to United. The district court also denied Hall's motion to file a second amended complaint-with new claims related to those filed in the first amended complaint-on the ground that the second amended complaint would be "futile" because it contained "no potentially meritorious claims." R1-27 at 3.
Hall appeals the district court's decisions striking both affidavits and granting summary judgment to United. In addition on the ground that the district court's grant of summary judgment was inappropriate, Hall appeals the court's denial of her motion to file a second amended complaint.2 We address each argument in turn, beginning with the applicable standard of review.
We review evidentiary rulings made by the district court for abuse of discretion and will reverse the district court's decision only in cases where substantial prejudice exists. Brochu v. City of Riviera Beach, 304 F.3d 1144, 1155 (11th Cir.2002). In this case, we cannot say that the district court's decision to strike either affidavit was an abuse of discretion.
Hall's affidavit stated that she was familiar with Bobby's handwriting and that the signature on the waiver did not appear to be his. The district court, under Rule 901(b)(2), struck Hall's affidavit because it provided no foundation detailing how Hall had become familiar with Bobby's handwriting. And because Hall could not demonstrate sufficient familiarity, the district court held that the affidavit did not satisfy Rule 701 because her opinion testimony "would not be rationally based on her own perceptions." R1-28 at 6. In reaching this conclusion, the district court relied on decisions by our sister circuits because this court has not ruled on the proper foundation required for testimony admitted under Rules 701 and 901(b)(2). We do so now, beginning with a general discussion of the two Rules and then considering persuasive authority from our sister circuits.
Rule 701 governs lay witness opinion testimony generally and dictates that such testimony must meet three requirements, one of which is relevant here: the testimony must be "rationally based on the perception of the witness." Fed.R.Evid. 701(a). Rule 901(b)(2) is a more specific rule, governing lay witness opinion testimony as it relates to the identification of handwriting. This rule requires that "[n]on-expert opinion [testimony] as to the genuineness of handwriting [must be] based upon familiarity not acquired for purposes of the litigation." Fed.R.Evid. 901(b)(2) (emphasis added). Thus, testimony purporting to satisfy the specific requirements of Rule 901(b)(2) must also satisfy the general requirements in Rule 701. If either Rule is not satisfied, the testimony is inadmissible.
We have not previously had occasion to detail the necessary foundation a lay person must establish under Rules 901(b)(2) and 701 in order to testify concerning handwriting. United States v. Barker, 735 F.2d 1280 (11th Cir.1984), is the only published opinion by this court discussing these two Rules. In that case, we held that lay witness opinion testimony by two co-workers of the defendant-signatory, who was charged with stealing bank checks, was properly admitted under Rules 901(b)(2) and 701. Id. at 1283. We noted that "[b]oth witnesses testified they were familiar with the defendant's handwriting and stated that in their opinions it matched or was similar to the handwriting on the checks." Id. We did not, however, provide guidance detailing how a witness could demonstrate his or her familiarity with disputed handwriting. For direction, we consider the decisions of our sister circuits, as did the district court.
In United States v. Binzel, relied upon by the district court, the Seventh Circuit concluded that "there must be a minimal factual basis from which knowledge of, and a familiarity with, another's handwriting might reasonably have been acquired, in the absence of which the opinion evidence may be properly excluded." 907 F.2d 746, 749 (7th Cir.1990). In the affidavit at issue in that case, Binzel purported to testify that the signature of the guarantor on the guarantee agreement was forged. Binzel asserted "that he acquired his `familiarity' with [the guarantor's] signature" by observing the guarantor execute documents and viewing documents that were purportedly executed by the guarantor. Id. The district court struck the affidavit and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the proper foundation for familiarity was not established:
Binzel does not identify the nature of...
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