Hall v. United States, 81-40.

• Decision Date: 15 December 1982
• Docket Number: No. 81-40.,81-40.
• Citation: Hall v. United States, 454 A.2d 314 (D.C. 1982)
• Parties: Adrian T. HALL, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

454 A.2d 314

Adrian T. HALL, Appellant, v. UNITED STATES, Appellee.

No. 81-40.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Argued July 9, 1982.

Decided December 15, 1982.

Bruce B. McHale, Washington, D.C., appointed by the court, for appellant.

Richard A. Stanley, Asst. U.S. Atty., Washington, D.C., with whom Charles F.C. Ruff, U.S. Atty., Washington, D.C., at the time the brief was filed, John A. Terry, Asst. U.S. Atty., Washington, D.C., at the time the brief was filed, and John R. Fisher, Asst. U.S. Atty., Washington, D.C., were on the brief, for appellee.

Before NEWMAN, Chief Judge, FERREN, Associate Judge, and GALLAGHER, Associate Judge, Retired.

GALLAGHER, Associate Judge, Retired:

A jury convicted appellant of first-degree murder while armed¹ and carrying a pistol without a license.² The trial court imposed consecutive sentences of twenty years to life on the first count and one to three years on the second count. Appellant contends (1) there was insufficient evidence of premeditation and deliberation to support his first-degree murder conviction, and (2) the trial court erred in limiting appellant's introduction of evidence linking another person to the murder. We affirm.

On July 13, 1979, the partially decomposed body of Jane Marbley, the decedent, was found in an unused room on the second floor of building 160 at the Washington Navy Yard, where she had been employed as a custodial worker. The body was naked except for a tank top pulled down around her waist exposing her breasts. She lay on her back on a thin pad with one or more cushions under her shoulders. At the time of her death, decedent was wearing a considerable amount of jewelry. Next to the body was a pair of woman's sandals, a pair of denim pants, a pair of black panties and a pocketbook containing six dollars. Also found on the floor around the body were six shell casings. One live round was recovered from beneath the decedent's right heel. Other than some trash, a bench, a chair, and the above items, the room was empty.

Dr. Brian Blackbourne, a forensic pathologist and Deputy Chief Medical Examiner for the District of Columbia, testified that decedent's death resulted from multiple gunshot wounds to the chest and abdomen. There were four wounds on the right side of her chest, two wounds on her abdomen, and two wounds through her right forearm. The doctor recovered six bullets from the body and testified that the position of the wounds indicated the gunman stood above and fired down towards the decedent. There was no evidence that a struggle had preceded the killing. Decedent's clothes were neatly ordered and her purse was intact. Her clothes were not bloodstained, and there were no other injuries, bruises or scrapes on her body. The doctor estimated that decedent had been dead anywhere from three to seven days at the time the body was discovered.

While investigating an unrelated bank robbery some two months later, the police recovered a semi-automatic pistol from the apartment of Pamela Ginyard. Ballistics evidence introduced by Detective Voorhees, an expert firearms examiner, showed that this pistol had fired the shots that killed decedent. Ms. Ginyard testified that the weapon had been placed in her apartment by Gregory Hall, appellant's brother.

Detective Voorhees also testified that he had conducted tests with the pistol by loading it to capacity with seven rounds and then attempting to fire all seven shots in succession. He repeated the test four times and on each occasion the gun jammed as he attempted to fire the sixth round. On two occasions, he was able to fire the sixth round after drawing the slide to the rear and manually guiding the last round from the magazine into the gun's barrel. He was then able to fire the seventh round from the magazine, but only if he allowed the slide to go forward slowly. If the slide were allowed to go forward on its own, the seventh round would also jam. On two other occasions, drawing the slide did not clear the weapon. Voorhees had to remove the magazine, shake the weapon to dislodge the jammed round, and then reinsert the magazine into the firearm. Voorhees testified that markings appearing on the live round found beneath decedent's heel indicated it came from a pistol with a mechanism that had jammed during firing.

A Navy Yard custodial supervisor testified that appellant had worked on the same crew with the decedent until June 29, 1979, when appellant's employment was terminated. At trial the government introduced into evidence portions of a written statement given by appellant to a police detective named Brooks about five weeks after decedent's body was found. Appellant told Detective Brooks that he and the decedent had been "lovers" for the preceding four years. When asked if he and the decedent had used building 160 at the Navy Yard for sexual liaisons, and if so what room, appellant told the detective, "[Y]es, we did. It was in the room where Jane [Marbley] was found." Appellant told Detective Brooks that his relationship with the decedent ended during the winter of 1978-79.

Sheila Britten, a close friend of the decedent, testified that decedent and appellant had an "intimate" relationship. During the latter part of 1978, Britten accompanied them to a club. Britten testified that during the evening, decedent and appellant were "just like bread and butter . . . when she got up to move, he [was] right behind her and vice-versa . . . it was just like I wasn't there."

In the spring of 1979 some four months before her death, decedent became involved romantically with another co-worker at the Navy Yard named Joseph Williams. Britten testified that she saw Williams and decedent together on a number of occasions. One day after work in early June, decedent and Williams met at Britten's house. The three of them talked together for a while; thereafter, Britten left decedent and Williams alone in the kitchen. When she returned she saw Williams kissing decedent.

Williams testified that he met the decedent in the fall of 1978. Williams twice had sexual intercourse with decedent. He spoke with her on the telephone three or four times a week for the four months preceding and up until her death. On the Friday before the Monday decedent was reported missing, decedent, Williams, and another friend spent the evening at Williams' house; they sat and talked, and had a few drinks together. Williams stated that he was "very fond" of decedent, and had a "warm relationship" with her.

During the trial, appellant twice moved for judgment of acquittal contending that the evidence established only the offense of second-degree murder. The court denied these motions ruling that the government had introduced sufficient evidence of deliberation and premeditation to support the first-degree murder count. Appellant also asked the court to permit him to introduce evidence showing that prior to her death decedent was involved in a "special relationship" with another employee at the Navy Yard. The court refused appellant's request ruling that appellant had been unable to establish a sufficient connection between the other employee and the crime to make the evidence relevant. Appellant challenges these rulings here.

I

Appellant does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence necessary to convict him of criminal homicide. Rather, he more narrowly attacks as deficient the evidence of first-degree, as opposed to second-degree murder. This court will review claims of insufficient evidence in a light most favorable to the government, giving full play to the right of the jury to determine credibility, weigh the evidence and draw justifiable inferences of fact. Byrd v. United States, D.C.App., 388 A.2d 1225, 1229 (1978); Johnson v. United States, D.C.App., 293 A.2d 269, 271 (1972). In applying this standard, the reviewing court does not legally differentiate between circumstantial and direct evidence. Frendak v. United States, D.C. App., 408 A.2d 364, 371 (1979); Byrd v. United States, supra.

Premeditation and deliberation distinguish first and second-degree murder. "[F]irst-degree murder, with its requirement of premeditation and deliberation, covers calculated and planned killings, while homicides that are unplanned or impulsive, even though they are intentional and with malice aforethought, are murder in the second degree." Harris v. United States, D.C.App., 375 A.2d 505, 507 (1977), quoting Austin v. United States, 127 U.S. App.D.C. 180, 188, 382 F.2d 129, 137 (1967). We have explained the key concepts of premeditation and deliberation as follows:

To prove premeditation, the government must show that a defendant gave "thought before acting to the idea of taking a human life and (reached) a definite decision to kill." Deliberation is proved by demonstrating that the accused acted with "consideration and reflection upon the preconceived design to kill; turning it over in the mind, giving it second thought." Although no specific amount of time is necessary to demonstrate premeditation and deliberation, the evidence must demonstrate that the accused did not kill compulsively, in the heat of passion, or in an orgy of frenzied activity. [Frendak v. United States, supra (citations omitted).]

Premeditation and deliberation may be inferred from sufficiently probative facts and circumstances. Harris v. United States, supra, 375 A.2d at 508.

Three legally significant reasons emerge from these facts and circumstances to sustain the trial court's finding of sufficient evidence to submit the issue of premeditation and deliberation to the jury.

First, the government introduced evidence of motive. The presence of a motive suggests a purposeful or reasoned killing. See United States v. Sutton, 138 U.S.App. D.C. 208, 219, 426 F.2d 1202, 1213 (1969). Cf. Austin v. United States, supra, 127 U.S. App.D.C. at 190, 382 F.2d at 139. For four years, decedent and appellant shared an intimate, sexual and romantic relationship. In...