Hall v. United States

• Decision Date: 13 September 2021
• Docket Number: 2:19-cv-00323-JHE
• Parties: LAQUEST HALL, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama

LAQUEST HALL, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant.

No. 2:19-cv-00323-JHE

United States District Court, N.D. Alabama, Southern Division

September 13, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION ^[1]

JOHN H. ENGLAND, III UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Through his first amended complaint, Plaintiff LaQuest Hall (“Hall”) brings this action under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) against the United States of America for injuries he sustained while working on behalf of the United States Postal Service (“USPS”). (Doc. 31). The United States has moved to dismiss one count of Hall's complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) and for summary judgment on all of Hall's claims. (Doc. 39). Hall opposes that motion, (doc 43), and the United States has filed a reply in support (doc. 45). In its reply, the United States argues in part that its Rule 12(b)(6) motion should be considered as a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c). (Id. at 3-5). For the reasons discussed more fully below, the motion for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED and the motion for summary judgment is DENIED AS MOOT IN PART and GRANTED IN PART.

I. Standard of Review

A. Summary Judgment Standard

Under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Rule 56 “mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). The moving party bears the initial burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Id. at 323. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who is required to “go beyond the pleadings” to establish there is a “genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 324. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). A dispute about a material fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).

The Court must construe the evidence and all reasonable inferences arising from it in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157, (1970); see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (all justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party's favor). Any factual disputes will be resolved in Plaintiffs favor when sufficient competent evidence supports Plaintiffs version of the disputed facts. See Pace v. Capobianco, 283 F.3d 1275, 1276-78 (11th Cir. 2002) (a court is not required to resolve disputes in the non-moving party's favor when that party's version of the events is supported by insufficient evidence). However, “mere conclusions and unsupported factual allegations are legally insufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion.” Ellis v. England, 432 F.3d 1321, 1326 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (citing Bald Mtn. Park, Ltd. v. Oliver, 836 F.2d 1560, 1563 (11th Cir. 1989)). Moreover, “[a] mere ‘scintilla' of evidence supporting the opposing party's position will not suffice; there must be enough of a showing that the jury could reasonably find for that party.” Walker v. Darby, 911 F.2d 1573, 1577 (11th Cir. 1990) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252).

B. Rule 12(c) Standard^[2]

“After the pleadings are closed-but early enough not to delay trial-a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). “Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate where there are no material facts in dispute and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Perez v. Wells Fargo N.A., 774 F.3d 1329, 1335 (11th Cir. 2014) (quoting Cannon v. City of W. Palm Beach, 250 F.3d 1299, 1301 (11th Cir. 2001)). The court considers only the pleadings-the complaint, answer, and any exhibits thereto. See Horsley v. Feldt, 304 F.3d 1125, 1134 (11th Cir. 2002).

Substantively, the court applies the same principles to a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(c) as it would to a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). See Strategic Income Fund, LLC v. Spear, Leeds & Kellogg Corp., 305 F.3d 1293, 1295 n.8 (11th Cir. 2002) (“Whether the court examine[s] [the complaint] under Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 12(c), the question [is] the same: whether [it] state[s] a claim for relief.”). Rule 12(b)(6) permits dismissal when a complaint is deficient under Rule 8 and fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Under Rule 8(a)(2), a pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” “[T]he pleading standard Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,' but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action” are insufficient. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertions]' devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.'” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). A complaint states a facially plausible claim for relief “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citation omitted). The complaint must establish “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (“Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.”). Ultimately, this inquiry is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

A court assessing whether a party is entitled to judgment on the pleadings accepts as true all material facts alleged in the non-moving party's pleading and views those facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Perez, 774 F.3d at 1335 (citing Hawthorne v. Mac Adjustment, Inc., 140 F.3d 1367, 1370 (11th Cir. 1998)); Grossman v. Nationsbank, N.A., 225 F.3d 1228, 1231 (11th Cir. 2000). This means that, on a “defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings, where no matters outside the pleadings are presented, the fact allegations of the complaint are to be taken as true, but those of the answer are taken as true only where and to the extent that they have not been denied or do not conflict with those of the complaint.” Stanton v. Larsh, 239 F.2d 104, 106 (5th Cir. 1956).^[3] However, legal conclusions unsupported by factual allegations are not entitled to that assumption of truth. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

II. Summary Judgment Facts

Hall worked as a driver for Postal Fleet Services, a company that contracts with the USPS. (Deposition of LaQuest James Hall (doc. 41-1, “Hall Depo.”) at 4-5 (16:4, 18:21-25); Affidavit of LaQuest Hall (doc. 44 at 3-5, “Hall Aff.”) at ¶ 2).^[4] In this capacity, Hall picked up mail from and delivered mail to postal facilities. (Deposition of Brenda Lee, (doc. 44 at 27-32, (“Lee Depo.”) at 29 (5:8-10)).

On May 21, 2017, Hall arrived at the Springville, Alabama Post Office.^[5] (Hall Depo. at 4 (13:8-13)). Because it was a Sunday, no USPS employees were present. (Id.). Although the Springville Post Office sometimes made a pallet jack available for drivers in the post office vestibule, Hall noticed there was no pallet jack in the vestibule on that date. (Hall Depo. at 10 (38:8-12); Hall Aff. at ¶ 2; Deposition of Joanne Jemison, (doc. 44 at 21-26, “Jemison Depo.”) at 23-24 (4:19-7:22)).

Hall loaded “everything [he] could take off without using the pallet jack.” (Hall Depo. at 10 (38:14-15)). Then Hall used two cargo straps to lift crated boxes of magazines, which weighed over 70 pounds. (Id. (38:15-39:1, 40:15-16)). Hall injured his back during this process.^[6] (Id. (39:1-2); Hall Aff. at ¶ 3).^[7]

Asked about this process, Hall testified:

Q: The only real safe method of doing that would be with a pallet jack, wouldn't it?

A: From 2011 to 2019, if you don't have a pallet jack, you use straps to pull it off.

Q: But you realize there was danger in doing that, didn't you?

A: I have a job to do.

Q: I know that.

A: The job consists] of getting that mail off that truck. If not I don't have a job; therefore, I can't take care of my family.

Q: But, I mean, you understood that you could get hurt doing that without a pallet jack. I mean, if they didn't have one.

A: Well, sir, I complained for a year to every power that be.

Q: I understand that. But I mean-

A: Me being the lowest on the totem pole, I had to do what I had to do to get it off the truck. That's what we were instructed to do since 2011. If you don't have a pallet truck, you use a strap to pull it off.

Q: That's what your employers told you to do?

A: Every employer I worked for-even on the post office if there is no pallet jack, they use those-another method to pull it because they especially during high mail call, Christmastime, the post office don't have enough pallet jacks.

(Hall Depo. at 10-11 (40:21-41:24)).

Joanne Jemison, the current Springville Postmaster, testified that at the time of the incident, there was no set procedure at the Springville Post Office for...