Hall v. United States
| Decision Date | 10 August 2022 |
| Docket Number | 20-6848 |
| Parties | MARC PIERRE HALL, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit |
Blaec C. Croft, MCGUIREWOODS LLP, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, for Appellant.
Erin K. Reisenweber, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY Martinsburg, West Virginia, for Appellee.
ON BRIEF:
Matthew A. Fitzgerald, MCGUIREWOODS LLP, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant.
William J. Ihlenfeld, II, United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Wheeling, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, RICHARDSON, Circuit Judge, and Rossie D. ALSTON, Jr., United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by designation.
Vacated and remanded by published opinion. Chief Judge Gregory wrote the opinion, in which Judge Alston joined. Judge Richardson concurred in the judgment and wrote a concurring opinion.
Hall is an inmate at United States Penitentiary ("USP") Hazelton who filed a pro se civil action in United States district court alleging violations under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") for denied and delayed medical care of his chronic illnesses. Hall also filed a Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP"). Following the Magistrate Judge's recommendation, the district court denied Hall's IFP motion on the grounds that he did not meet the "imminent danger of serious physical injury" exception. Hall now appeals to this court.
In this case, we clarify the proper standard for considering whether a petitioner meets the "imminent danger" exception in cases, such as here, where a petitioner is alleging denial or delayed medical treatment resulting in worsening medical conditions and serious physical injuries. Furthermore, we clarify that while a litigant bringing a claim under the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") must show a nexus between the claims presented and the "imminent danger" alleged, there is no redressability element required to proceed IFP. Finally, since the district court did not have access to Hall's medical records and, thus, did not have a complete record to determine whether Hall satisfied the "imminent danger" exception based on our clarified standard, we remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Marc Pierre Hall is an inmate at USP Hazelton in Bruceton Mills, West Virginia. J.A. 1. On May 7, 2020, and pursuant to the PLRA, Hall filed a pro se civil action in U.S. district court alleging four separate violations of the FTCA. Hall alleges that USP Hazelton is "actively delaying and denying him the appropriate medical treatment, resulting in an ongoing imminent danger of serious physical injury." Opening Br. 5 (citing J.A. 1-10). Specifically, Hall alleges that USP Hazelton has (1) denied "pulmonary, orthopedic, neurology, rheumatology and physiatry" services; (2) "lumbar surgery and physical therapy"; (3) denied proper standard of care to a prisoner with a history of intubation, asthma, and chronic obstructive pulmonary disease ("COPD"), causing a reduction in lung capacity and lung damage; and (4) erroneously instructed an employee to use the incorrect medical device for transporting Hall for medical care. J.A. 6-9.
Along with his federal complaint, Hall also filed a Motion for Leave to Proceed IFP. J.A. 70. On May 12, 2020, a Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation that Hall's complaint should be dismissed without prejudice and that his IFP motion should also be denied. J.A. 70-73. The Magistrate Judge noted that the PLRA, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), has a "three strikes" provision that precludes a plaintiff from filing a fourth complaint unless the litigant can meet an exception for "imminent danger of serious physical injury." The Magistrate Judge reasoned that because Hall had previously filed three civil complaints that were deemed frivolous, and because Hall failed to establish that he was under "imminent danger of serious physical injury," the PLRA required that the district court dismiss the complaint without prejudice. See J.A. at 70-71. Moreover, the Magistrate Judge reasoned that even if Hall was under imminent danger, relief under the FTCA is limited to money damages, "equitable relief is not available," and, thus, "allowing this case to proceed without prepayment of fees will not remove the plaintiff from 'imminent danger of serious physical injury.'" J.A. 72 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)). On May 19, 2020, Hall objected to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation. J.A. 75-82.
On May 29, 2020, the district court entered an order adopting the Report and Recommendation and dismissing Hall's complaint without prejudice. J.A. 83-88. The district court noted that Hall's complaint lacked "sufficient factual allegations to support a conclusion by the Court that Hall was under imminent danger of physical injury." Opening Br. 8 (citing J.A. 86). On June 9, 2020, Hall filed a timely notice of appeal to this court. J.A. 91.
We have jurisdiction to consider Hall's appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo questions of statutory interpretation. Taylor v. Grubbs, 930 F.3d 611 (4th Cir. 2019); see also Tolbert v. Stevenson, 635 F.3d 646, 649 (4th Cir. 2011) (). We also review de novo a district court's conclusion that a three-strikes litigant has not adequately alleged that he or she is in imminent danger of serious physical injury. See Richey v. Dahne, 807 F.3d 1202, 1206 (9th Cir. 2015).
We begin with the "imminent danger" exception to the "three strikes provision" of the PLRA which states in full:
In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.
28 U.S.C.A. § 1915 (g) (emphasis added). The goal of the PLRA was to address "a concern about the 'endless flood of frivolous litigation' brought by inmates." McLean v. United States, 566 F.3d 391, 397 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting 141 Cong. Rec. S14, 418 (1995)), abrogated on other grounds by Lomax v. Ortiz-Marquez, 140 S.Ct. 1721, 1724-1725 (2020) (). With the PLRA, Congress targeted the "flood of nonmeritorious claims," even if such claims were not in any way abusive, because these claims were "effectively preclud[ing] consideration of' suits more likely to succeed." Jones v. Bock, 127 S.Ct. 910, 914 (2007).
"To accomplish its goal of reducing the number of frivolous lawsuits," Congress imposed on incarcerated persons, among other hurdles, the three-strikes limitation to proceeding IFP. Green v. Young, 454 F.3d 405, 406-07 (4th Cir. 2006). The Supreme Court has clarified that a claim is frivolous if and only if it "lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact." Neitzke v. Williams, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 1833 (1989). We have adopted a similar standard. See Blakely v. Wards, 738 F.3d 607, 613 (4th Cir. 2013), as amended (Oct. 22, 2013) ( that a "summary judgment dismissal stating on its face that the dismissed action was frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim counts as a strike for purposes of the PLRA's three-strikes provision"); Tolbert, 635 F.3d at 651 () (internal quotes omitted).
We have also clarified that "the statutory language dictates a high degree of deference to the discretion of district courts [and, thus, a] claim can be dismissed whenever a district court is satisfied the claim is frivolous." Cochran v. Morris, 73 F.3d 1310, 1316 (4th Cir. 1996) (internal quotes omitted).[1] Though we clarified that "Congress vested in courts the authority to decide whether to grant in forma pauperis status," Blakely, 738 F.3d at 612, we left "for another day the question of what standard should apply in determining how such discretion should be exercised." Id. at n.2. This is the question we answer today.[2]
In the instant matter, it is undisputed that Hall had the requisite three dismissals required by § 1915(g). See J.A. 70-73 Hall v. United States, No. 1:00-cv-987-UNA . The district court held that Hall's complaint lacked sufficient factual allegations to support a conclusion that Hall was under imminent danger of physical injury. J.A. 71-72; 86. Therefore, the question before us is whether Hall showed that he was "in imminent danger of serious physical injury," at the time he filed his complaint, because of alleged denied or delayed medical treatment of his chronic illnesses.
We begin by clarifying what...
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