Hall v. Utah State Dept. of Corrections

• Decision Date: 17 April 2001
• Docket Number: No. 990529.,990529.
• Citation: 2001 UT 34,24 P.3d 958
• Parties: Clifford M. HALL, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Defendant and Appellee.
• Court: Utah Supreme Court

24 P.3d 958

2001 UT 34

Clifford M. HALL, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Defendant and Appellee.

No. 990529.

Supreme Court of Utah.

April 17, 2001.

James E. Bean, South Jordan, for plaintiff.

Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., Nancy L. Kemp, Asst. Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for defendant.

RUSSON, Associate Chief Justice:

¶ 1 Plaintiff Clifford M. Hall appeals the district court's dismissal of his action brought under the Utah Protection of Public Employees Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 67-21-1 to -9 (1996),¹ for failure to state a claim pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). We affirm, but do so on a different ground than that relied on by the trial court.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 On appeal from a motion to dismiss under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), we review the facts only as they are alleged in the complaint. Lowe v. Sorenson Research Co., 779 P.2d 668, 669 (Utah 1989). As a result, we "accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true and consider all reasonable inferences to be drawn from those facts in a light most favorable to the plaintiff." Prows v. State, 822 P.2d 764, 766 (Utah 1991) (citing St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991)).

¶ 3 Clifford Hall ("Hall") worked as an officer for the Utah State Department of Corrections ("Department" or "UDC") from June of 1992 until December of 1995. In 1993, Hall filed a grievance with the Department after he and other officers in his class were demoted in an allegedly unlawful manner from "grade 21" to "grade 20" employees. In 1996, the Department reached a settlement with the affected officers, and Hall received $2489.65 for his claim.

¶ 4 During his tenure at UDC, Hall was working at the Department's Lone Peak facility on the night of April 10, 1995, when an inmate was hazed by other residents at the complex, purportedly with the encouragement and acquiescence of various UDC officers. Hall reported this incident to his superiors, and subsequently spoke out publicly in condemnation of the Department's alleged passive endorsement of this and other hazing episodes.

¶ 5 Later that year, Hall secretly tape-recorded a conversation with a superior officer concerning his disapproval of the UDC. Due to this action, the Department began an investigation into the incident. On December 9, 1995, shortly after the investigation had commenced, Hall resigned from his position with the Department. Approximately four weeks later, on January 3, 1996, the Department mailed Hall a letter advising him that he had resigned pending disciplinary action, that he would not be considered in the future as a potential rehire candidate, and that the Department would provide prospective employers with this information. Since his resignation, Hall has been unable to secure a position in law enforcement, and the Department has allegedly informed inquiring employers that Hall resigned pending disciplinary action.

¶ 6 Following his difficulty in obtaining new employment, Hall filed suit in the Third District Court for Salt Lake County on October 11, 1996, claiming "at least $100,000" in damages under the Utah Protection of Public Employees Act ("Whistleblower Act"), Utah Code Ann. §§ 67-21-1 to -9. The complaint alleged:

As a result of Hall's good faith communication of information relating to hazings at UDC facilities . . ., Hall has been subjected to adverse action by UDC and its employees, including . . . constructive discharge, verbal threats, and discrimination with respect to Hall's compensation, the terms, conditions and location of his employment, his promotions, immunities and privileges.

The complaint further alleged that following his resignation from the Department, UDC supplied and "continu[es] to supply negative information regarding Hall to prospective employers."

¶ 7 On February 9, 1998, the trial court issued a ruling dismissing the majority of Hall's claims as time-barred under the Whistleblower Act's 180-day statute of limitations. According to the ruling, the only claims remaining were "any continuing supply of negative information to prospective employers, and any continuing verbal threats, which have taken place since the 180-days prior to October 11, 1996, and which are directly related to the plaintiff's whistle blowing."

¶ 8 Subsequently, on March 25, 1998, UDC moved to dismiss Hall's remaining claims pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). In its motion, the Department asserted that it was protected against suit under the Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30-1 to -38 (1997),² and that any information it had provided to prospective employers concerning Hall was privileged pursuant to sections 34-32-1, 45-2-3, and 76-9-506 of the Utah Code. Hall responded that the motion to dismiss should be denied because the court had previously ruled on the issue and because governmental immunity did not apply. On May 20, 1998, the district court denied UDC's motion, finding, among other things, that the issue had already been addressed by the court earlier in the suit's proceedings.

¶ 9 Regardless, on April 20, 1999, the district court reversed itself and granted UDC's motion to dismiss Hall's remaining negative reference and verbal threat claims. The court wrote in its ruling:

After careful consideration, this Court finds that the State of Utah is immune from [suit] under the circumstances of this case. The State is granted immunity from suit in cases of "abuse of process, libel, slander deceit [and] infliction of mental anguish." Plaintiff's claim of "supplying negative information" is clearly covered under the statute, and therefore fails.

(Citation omitted and second modification in original.)

¶ 10 On appeal, Hall challenges only the district court's April 20, 1999, dismissal of his remaining negative information and verbal threat causes of action. Specifically, Hall contends that governmental immunity does not apply to the claims at issue because the Whistleblower Act creates an exception to the state's otherwise broad protection against suit. Hall further argues that the district court erred when it reversed its May 20, 1998, denial of the Department's motion to dismiss, and that his "negative information" claims may continue because governmental immunity is waived in regard to contractual relationships. In response, UDC asserts that Hall's "remaining claims are too attenuated from his whistleblowing activities to warrant the [Whistleblower] Act's protection"; that even if the statute does apply, the Governmental Immunity Act still precludes liability against the state; that all employment references the Department made concerning Hall are privileged;³ and that it was properly within the trial court's discretion to reverse its earlier ruling by granting UDC's motion to dismiss.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 11 A trial court's decision to dismiss a case based on governmental immunity is a determination of law that we afford no deference. Petersen v. Bd. of Educ., 855 P.2d 241, 242 (Utah 1993) (per curiam). As we have noted, "Because the propriety of a 12(b)(6) dismissal is a question of law, we give the trial court's ruling no deference and review it under a correctness standard." St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's Hosp., 811 P.2d 194, 196 (Utah 1991).⁴

ANALYSIS

I. REVERSAL OF THE INITIAL DENIAL OF UDC'S MOTION TO DISMISS

¶ 12 A threshold issue raised by both parties is whether the district court erred in the ruling now before us by reversing its initial decision denying UDC's motion to dismiss. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) specifically provides:

[A]ny order or other form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties . . . is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties.

Indeed, "[i]t is settled law that a trial court is free to reassess its decision at any point prior to entry of a final order or judgment." Ron Shepherd Ins., Inc. v. Shields, 882 P.2d 650, 654 (Utah 1994). In this case, it is entirely clear that the trial court's initial rejection of UDC's motion to dismiss was not a final adjudication of any sort. On the contrary, the court's denial of the motion preserved Hall's claims, allowing their maintenance in court for nearly another year. Accordingly, we hold that to the extent the district court's dismissal of Hall's claims was correct as a matter of law, the district court did not err by reversing its initial decision to deny the motion.

II. GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY

¶ 13 An examination of plaintiff's complaint reveals that the district court's dismissal of Hall's remaining negative information and verbal threat claims was correct as a matter of law, but not for the reasons cited by the court. In its ruling dismissing Hall's remaining causes of action, the district court noted that Hall had failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted because the Department was protected from suit by the Governmental Immunity Act. Specifically, the court stated, "[T]he State of Utah is immune from [suit] under the circumstances of this case. . . . Plaintiff's claim of `supplying negative information' is clearly covered under [section 63-30-10(2) of the Utah Code], and therefore fails."

¶ 14 We have held that the Governmental Immunity Act must be strictly applied. See Holt v. Utah State Rd. Comm'n, 30 Utah 2d 4, 6, 511 P.2d 1286, 1288 (1973), overruled in part on other grounds by Colman v. Utah State Land Bd., 795 P.2d 622, 632 (Utah 1990); see also Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3. As we explained in Epting v. State, the codification of sovereign immunity mandates stringent enforcement, since it is through the Governmental Immunity Act that the "legislature has recognized the necessity of immunity as essential to the protection of the state in rendering the...