Hall v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth.
| Decision Date | 02 October 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 19-1800 (BAH) |
| Parties | TRACY HALL, Plaintiff, v. WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Tracy Hall brings this employment discrimination lawsuit against her former employer, Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority ("WMATA"), to challenge WMATA's termination of her employment, failure to hire her as a Bus Scheduling System Specialist, and hostile work environment, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 66-112, ECF No. 13, as well as its failure to ensure that she received notice of her options for continuation coverage under its group health plan upon termination, id. ¶¶ 2, 113-19. These claims are based on plaintiff's allegations that she was terminated, not hired, and subject to a hostile work environment both because she had a disability of chronic migraines and in retaliation for protected activity she undertook in relation to that disability. See id. ¶¶ 1, 66-112. Her claims center on the alleged discriminatory animus of her direct supervisor, Rosalind Dewey ("Dewey"), who allegedly harassed her, and ultimately orchestrated her non-hiring and termination, out of bias against individuals with disabilities and in retaliation for plaintiff's reporting to Human Resources about her supervisor's bias and plaintiff's use of intermittent leave as a disability accommodation. See id. ¶¶ 24-56; Pl.'s Mem. Supp. Cross Mot. Partial Summ. J. & Opp'n Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. ("Pl.'s Mem.") at 6-14, ECF No. 17.
Defendant attributes plaintiff's termination and non-hiring solely to her poor job performance, and denies that plaintiff was subject to harassment that rose to the level of a hostile work environment. Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. ("Def.'s Mot.") at 1-2, ECF No. 15. Further contending that Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity bars plaintiff's statutory notice claim, defendant moves for summary judgment as to Count VII on this ground. Id. at 2. Plaintiff cross-moves for partial summary judgment, arguing, first, that she is entitled to judgment that she had a disability as a matter of law and that defendant had notice of that disability and, second, that judgment should be entered in her favor as to her statutory notice claim because no dispute of material fact exists and sovereign immunity does not apply. See Pl.'s Cross-Mot. Partial Summ. J. ("Pl.'s Mot.") at 1, ECF No. 16; Pl.'s Mem. at 5-15. She otherwise asserts that genuine issues of material fact preclude summary judgment in defendant's favor. See Pl.'s Mem. at 2, 6-14. For the reasons set forth below, both parties' motions are granted in part and denied in part.
Plaintiff was employed in defendant's IT Department for over a decade, from August 6, 2007 until November 28, 2018. Pl.'s SMF ¶ 1, at 9 ¶ 47, ECF No. 17-1; Def.'s SMF ¶¶ 1, 23, ECF No. 15-1; Pl.'s Resp. SMF at 10, ECF No. 17-1.1 As a WMATA employee, plaintiff was represented in labor matters by Office and Professional Employees International Union Local No. 2, AFL-CIO ("Local 2"). Def.'s SMF ¶ 2; Pl.'s Resp. SMF at 10. Plaintiff suffers from chronic migraines, which impact her daily functioning and therefore constitute a disability. Pl.'s SMF ¶¶ 2, 3; Def.'s SMF ¶ 3; Pl.'s Mem., Ex. 7, Dep. of Tracy Hall ("Hall Dep.") 9:16-10:2,ECF No. 17-8; Def.'s Mot., Ex. 1, Dep. of Tracy Hall ("Def.'s Hall Dep.") 9:16-10:2, ECF No. 15-2. On July 27, 2012, defendant granted plaintiff several reasonable work accommodations for her disability, including "modification of her working hours on days when she had afternoon medical appointments and an enclosed workspace in a fragrance-free environment with special [lighting]." Def.'s SMF ¶ 4 (citing Def.'s Hall Dep. 10:3-12:10); see also Pl.'s Resp. SMF at 10; Def.'s Mot., Ex. 2, Letter from Amy-Celeste Quillen, WMATA Dep't of Hum. Res., to Tracy Hall (July 27, 2012) ("Accommodation Letter") at 1-3, ECF No. 15-3. At some point before 2017, plaintiff applied for, and was granted, intermittent leave pursuant to the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6, as a disability accommodation.2
On April 1, 2017, Dewey became plaintiff's direct supervisor. Def.'s SMF ¶ 6; Pl.'s Resp. SMF at 10. Plaintiff testified that Dewey repeatedly said that she "didn't want handicapped people working for her," Hall Dep. 18:13-14, and on multiple occasions told plaintiff that she "needed to decide if [she] wanted to be sick or if [she] wanted to have a job," id. 19:3-4. According to plaintiff, Dewey first made this comment soon after she became plaintiff's supervisor, in a one-on-one meeting at which plaintiff informed Dewey of an upcoming day on which plaintiff would need to utilize her medical leave. Id. 19:9-20:5. Plaintiff claims that she reported Dewey's comment to WMATA's Employee Assistance Program, Office of HumanResources ("Human Resources"), and Office of Civil Rights, and to Local 2. Id. 20:10-14, 20:18, 21:2, 21:17-22:15. Nonetheless, plaintiff says, Dewey repeated similar remarks in May or June 2017, around the same time plaintiff's absences first drew Dewey's attention. Id. 24:17-19, 27:11-17. At least twice, Dewey allegedly made derogatory remarks about plaintiff's disability within earshot of others, including a negative statement about plaintiff being "sick" made in front of plaintiff and a Local 2 official, id. 29:3-13, and the comment "I don't want handicapped people working around me," which was directed at plaintiff during a one-on-one conversation and was overheard by one of plaintiff's coworkers, id. 31:19-32:18. On the latter occasion, plaintiff "came out of [Dewey's] office crying." Id. 32:5. According to plaintiff, Dewey made such statements so frequently in her one-on-one encounters with plaintiff that plaintiff "can't account for every instance." Id. 33:15-16.
Plaintiff testified that she again reported Dewey's comments and conduct to Human Resources in October 2017. Id. 36:6-37:8. She believes that Human Resources "contacted" Dewey to discuss plaintiff's complaint, id. 37:6, after which Dewey "stopped saying handicapped and she started saying leave or sick" when commenting on plaintiff's use of her accommodations and her disability, id. 36:4-5.3 Defendant, and Dewey herself, deny that Dewey made any such statements about "handicapped" persons. Def.'s Reply to Pl.'s Cross-Mot. Partial Summ. J. & Opp'n to Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. ("Def's Reply") at 2, ECF No. 18 (citing Pl.'s Mem., Ex. 1, Dep. of Rosalind Dewey ("Dewey Dep.") 83:13-21, ECF No. 17-2). Dewey's derogatory comments allegedly continued undeterred. In a specific November 2017 incident described byplaintiff, Dewey came into plaintiff's office and began yelling at plaintiff about work-related matters until plaintiff began to cry. Hall Dep. 70:10-71:17; Def.'s Mot., Ex. 18, Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s Interrog. ( ) No. 8, ECF No. 15-19. According to plaintiff, such interactions, involving Dewey "yelling" at plaintiff about her "being out or work things," Hall Dep. 72:8, 72:10-11, so harshly that plaintiff would sometimes be left in tears, see, e.g., id. 71, were routine. Dewey's berating made plaintiff "so nervous when coming into the office that [she] would throw up and would have to go to the bathroom often." Interrog. Resp. No. 8.
Beyond Dewey's alleged comments, plaintiff claims that Dewey took several adverse actions against plaintiff in 2018 because of her disability and use of intermittent leave as an accommodation. First, according to plaintiff, Dewey "prevented [her] from attending a required [off-site] work training" on time entry "because of [her] disability related absences." Pl.'s Mem. at 3 (citing Pl.'s SMF at 6 ¶ 23); see also Hall Dep. 46:3-48:21; Interrog. Resp. No. 7.
Second, Dewey allegedly deprived plaintiff of the ability to participate in voluntary workplace opportunities. Specifically, according to plaintiff, Dewey removed plaintiff from the Family Assistance Team (described by defendant as "a voluntary team [of WMATA employees] that assisted passengers during a catastrophic emergency," Def.'s Mem. P. & A. Supp. Mot. Summ. J. ("Def.'s Mem.") at 6, ECF No. 15), Hall Dep. 49:3-50:15, denied her request to volunteer to assist passengers as part of WMATA's Metro Information Program ("MIP"), id. 50:17-51:10, and did not allow plaintiff to take a sign language class, id. 52:2-53:7, all because plaintiff "had too many FMLA days"—that is, disability-related absences, id. 50:12, 53:8-13, 54:2-11. Defendant does not contest that Dewey rejected these requests by plaintiff, but notes that her ability to participate in these programs "was at her manager's discretion," Def.'s Mem. at 6, and that these opportunities were "not part of her job duties," id. at 7.
Finally, plaintiff claims that Dewey denied her permission to telework as a disability accommodation, although other employees in the IT department were allowed to telework, "on the grounds that employees who had taken more than six consecutive days of FMLA [leave] were not permitted to telework." Pl.'s Mem. at 3 (citing Pl.'s SMF at 3 ¶ 3); see also Hall Dep. 42:12-44:17. Plaintiff testified that her coworkers referred to this policy as "the Tracy Rule," because it applied only to plaintiff. Id. 42:15-17. When asked for the source of this rule, Dewey allegedly told plaintiff that it was "at [Dewey's] discretion." Id. 43:22-44:1. Dewey herself testified that plaintiff did not approach her about teleworking, Dewey Dep. 16:9-13, but that, at the time, WMATA left to "the supervisor's discretion [the decision] to allow [or prohibit] teleworking because at the time they didn't have a policy in place," id. 16:16-18.
In the meantime, according to plaintiff, Dewey's derogatory remarks about "handicapped" or "sick" people continued. On November 21, 2017, six months after her initial complaints to Human Resources, plai...
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