Hall v. Wheeler

Decision Date25 June 1959
Docket NumberCiv. No. 5-189.
Citation174 F. Supp. 418
PartiesFlorence G. HALL, Executrix of the Estate of Frederick A. Hall v. Whitney L. WHEELER, Director of Internal Revenue.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Maine

Irving Isaacson, Lewiston, Me., for plaintiff.

Rufus E. Stetson, Jr., Tax Division, Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., Peter Mills, U. S. Atty., Elmer E. Runyon, Asst. U. S. Atty., Portland, Me., for defendant.

GIGNOUX, District Judge.

This is an action brought under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(a)(1) to recover the sum of $1,367.10 of Federal estate tax, with interest, alleged to have been erroneously assessed and collected from plaintiff. By agreement of the parties the matter has been submitted to the Court for decision and judgment upon the pleadings and a stipulation of facts.

The only question presented is whether or not the proceeds of a certain life insurance policy were properly included in the gross estate of plaintiff's decedent for Federal estate tax purposes pursuant to the provisions of Section 811(g)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, 26 U.S.C.A. (I.R.C.1939) § 811(g)(2), as amended by Section 404(a) of the Revenue Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 944 (1942).

The insurance policy which is the subject of the present litigation was issued on June 5, 1940 on the application of Frederick A. Hall, plaintiff's decedent. It insured the life of the decedent in the amount of $5,000. The named beneficiary of the policy was Hall & Knight Hardware Company (hereinafter called the "Company"), a Maine corporation, of which the decedent was president. The policy reserved to the decedent the right to change the beneficiary, to assign the policy, to surrender or cancel the policy, to pledge the policy for a loan and to withdraw its cash surrender value.

From the date of issuance of the policy until the decedent's death on June 29, 1954, the Company retained physical possession of the policy; carried the policy on its books as a corporate asset; paid the premiums due on the policy and never credited such payments to the decedent in any way on its books. At the death of the decedent the proceeds of the policy, which amounted to $5,028.10, were paid to the Company.

Defendant subsequently determined that the proceeds of the policy should be included in the estate of the decedent and assessed additional Federal estate tax in the amount of $1,367.10 on decedent's estate, which was paid by plaintiff. Upon disallowance of her claim for refund, plaintiff instituted this action.

It is the position of defendant that the proceeds of the policy are includable in the decedent's gross estate for Federal estate tax purposes because he reserved the right to change the beneficiary and therefore possessed at his death one of the "incidents of ownership, exercisable either alone or in conjunction with any other person" within the meaning of Section 811(g)(2)(B) of the 1939 Code.

Section 811 of the 1939 Code reads in pertinent part as follows:

"§ 811. Gross Estate.
"The value of the gross estate of the decedent shall be determined by including the value at the time of his death of all property * * *
* * * * * *
"(g) Proceeds of life insurance
* * * * * *
"(2) Receivable by other beneficiaries. To the extent of the amount receivable by all other beneficiaries as insurance under policies upon the life of the decedent * * * (B) with respect to which the decedent possessed at his death any of the incidents of ownership, exercisable either alone or in conjunction with any other person * * *"

Section 81.27 (as amended by T.D. 5239, 1943 Cum.Bull. 1081, and T.D. 5699, 1949-1 Cum.Bull. 181) of Treasury Regulation 105, promulgated under the 1939 Code, provides in part as follows:

"Sec. 81.27. Insurance Receivable by Other Beneficiaries.
"(a) In case of decedent dying after December 31, 1947. — The regulations prescribed under this paragraph (except as otherwise indicated in this section) are applicable only in the case of decedents who died after December 31, 1947. In such cases, the amount of the aggregate proceeds of all insurance on the life of the decedent not receivable by or for the benefit of his estate must also be included in his gross estate, as follows:
* * * * * *
"(2) Such insurance with respect to which the decedent possessed at his death any of the incidents of ownership, exercisable either alone or in conjunction with any person.
* * * * * *
"For the purposes of this section, the term incidents of ownership is not confined to ownership in the technical legal sense. * * * For examples of incidents of ownership see paragraph (c) of this section.
* * * * * *
"(c) * * *
* * * * * *
"Incidents of ownership in the policy include, for example, the right of the insured or his estate to its economic benefits, the power to change the beneficiary, to surrender or cancel the policy, to assign it, to revoke an assignment, to pledge it for a loan, or to obtain from the insurer a loan against the surrender value of the policy, etc. The insured possesses an incident of ownership if his death is necessary to terminate his interest in the insurance, as, for example, if the proceeds would become payable to his estate, or payable as he might direct, should the beneficiary predecease him."

The language of this regulation is almost identical with that of the Committee Reports on the Revenue Act of 1942, which added Section 811(g) (2) (B) to the Code. See H.Rep. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 162-163; S.Rep. No. 1631, 77th Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 234-235 (1942).

The statute and the regulation apply directly to the facts of the instant case. The policy in terms expressly reserved to the decedent the right to change the beneficiary. Such a right is conceded to be an "incident of ownership" within the meaning of Section 811(g)(2)(B). See Farwell v. United States, 7 Cir., 1957, 243 F.2d 373, 377-388; Singer v. Shaughnessy, 2 Cir., 1952, 198 F.2d 178, 181; Fried v. Granger, D.C.W.D.Pa.1952, 105 F.Supp. 564, 567-568, affirmed per curiam, 3 Cir., 1953, 202 F.2d 150. Since the decedent at no time...

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9 cases
  • Landorf v. United States
    • United States
    • U.S. Claims Court
    • 14 Marzo 1969
    ...United States, 122 F.Supp. 677, 129 Ct.Cl. 264 (1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 942, 75 S.Ct. 363, 99 L.Ed. 737 (1955); Hall v. Wheeler, 174 F.Supp. 418 (S.D.Maine, 1959). It is, of course, possible for the assignee and the assignor to agree to revoke the assignment. If, however, this possibi......
  • Piggott's Estate v. CIR
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit
    • 4 Febrero 1965
    ...denied, 305 U.S. 674, 59 S.Ct. 242; Fried v. Granger, 105 F.Supp. 564, 567, W.D.Pa., affirmed, 202 F.2d 150, C.A. 3rd; Hall v. Wheeler, 174 F.Supp. 418, 421, S.D. Maine; Farwell v. United States, 243 F.2d 373, 377-378, C.A. 7th; Singer v. Shaughnessy, 198 F.2d 178, 181, C.A. 2nd; Estate of ......
  • Nat'l Bank Detroit v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue (In re Estate of Fruehauf)
    • United States
    • U.S. Tax Court
    • 24 Septiembre 1968
    ...the terms of the policies. See also United States v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co., supra; Liebmann v. Hassett, 148 F.2d 247; Hall v. Wheeler, 174 F.Supp. 418; and Fried v. Granger, 105 F.Supp. 564, affirmed per curiam 202 F.2d 150. It is petitioners' main contention that the term ‘incide......
  • United States v. Rhode Island Hospital Trust Company, 6618.
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit
    • 11 Enero 1966
    ...6 Cir., 1965, 340 F.2d 829; Fried v. Granger, W.D.Pa., 1952, 105 F.Supp. 564, affirmed, 3 Cir., 1953, 202 F.2d 150; Hall v. Wheeler, D.Me., 1959, 174 F.Supp. 418; Estate of Collino v. Commissioner, 1956, 25 T.C. 1026. But where all of the evidentiary facts appear, we are faced with a questi......
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