Halladay v. Weeks

Decision Date02 July 1901
Citation86 N.W. 799,127 Mich. 363
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
PartiesHALLADAY v. WEEKS.

Error to circuit court, Jackson county; Erastus Peck, Judge.

Action by Edgar A. Halladay, administrator of Julia Oatman, against William C. Weeks. Judgment for defendant. Plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.

James J. Noon, for appellant.

William K. Sagendorph, for appellee.

GRANT J.

On June 22, 1870, defendant executed to plaintiff's intestate a promissory note for $300, due one year from date. On September 4, 1875, he executed another note for $125, due one year from date. These notes were, long before this suit was instituted, dead in the law, and could only be revived by a written acknowledgment or promise, required by the statute of limitations (section 9740, Comp. Laws), which requires such acknowledgment or promise to be in writing, and signed by the party to be charged thereby. On April 4, 1899, after his appointment as administrator, plaintiff wrote to defendant. The letter was not produced, and Mr. Halladay did not testify to its contents, but it may be a reasonable inference that he asked him about these notes. To this, on April 4, 1899 defendant replied: 'It will be impossible for me to do anything on that account this spring. I will pay something on it as soon as I can, but cannot say just when.' This is clearly a conditional promise. The letter contains no absolute promise of payment, but only a promise to pay 'as soon as I can.' This means when he is able. The question, therefore, is, does a conditional promise comply with the statute? A similar question was discussed in the early case of Ten Eyck v. Wing, 1 Mich. 40, 47. It was there said, following the best-considered cases in this country, that, when a promise is set up to avoid the statute, it must be proved in a clear and explicit manner. Following the rule laid down by Mr. Justice Story, the court there held that the acknowledgment or promise is deemed a new contract, springing out of and supported by the original consideration, and that it is the new promise, not the original one, which imparts vitality to and revives the old debt. This court there said: 'The new terms, if qualified or conditional, restrain the rights of the party to its own terms, and, if he cannot recover by those terms, he cannot recover at all.' An original note, 'payable when able,' does not mature until the maker has become able and his ability to pay must be shown by the holder. Veasey v. Reeves, 6 Ind. 406. There is an irreconcilable conflict in the decisions as to what language is sufficient to renew an obligation barred by the statute. Chief Justice Shaw, in Sigourney v. Drury, 14 Pick 387, said that it was quite impossible wholly to reconcile them. We think, however, that the weight of authority is against the proposition that a conditional promise like this satisfies the...

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