Hallal v. Hopkins

Decision Date31 March 1995
Docket NumberCivil Action No. 3:92-CV-73WS.
Citation947 F.Supp. 978
PartiesRobert Michael HALLAL, Mary Elizabeth Norwood Hallal, Plaintiffs, v. Jessie HOPKINS, Sheriff of Madison County, Mississippi; Keith Tillman, Administrator of Madison County Detention Center; Larry Williams, Ex-Deputy of Madison County Sheriff's Office; Lois Penn, Deputy-Matron, Madison County Detention Center; Lloyd Jones, Sheriff of Simpson County, Mississippi; Ike Durr, United States Marshal, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi

Robert Michael Hallal, Watsontown, PA, pro se.

Mary Elizabeth Hallal, Utica, MS, pro se.

Rebecca B. Cowan, Montgomery, Smith-Vaniz & McGraw, Jackson, MS, for Jessie Hopkins and Keith Tillman.

ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND HEARING

WINGATE, District Judge.

Before the court is the motion of the defendants Sheriff Jessie Hopkins of Madison County, Mississippi; Keith Tillman, Administrator of Madison County Detention Center, Madison County, Mississippi; and Lois Penn, Deputy Matron of the Madison County Detention Center, for summary judgment under Rule 56(b),1 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the above-styled and numbered cause. The plaintiffs' complaint is filed pursuant to Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983.2 This court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. §§ 1343(a)3 and 28 U.S.C. § 13314 (federal question).

I. BACKGROUND

This case was filed pro se by the prisoner plaintiffs Robert Michael Hallal (hereinafter Robert Hallal) and Mary Elizabeth Norwood Hallal (hereinafter Mary Hallal) who are husband and wife. The complaint asserts several claims against the various defendants. Plaintiff Robert Hallal claims that he was subjected to cruel and unusual punishment and denied due process while incarcerated at the Madison County Detention Center (hereinafter "MCDC") after attempting to escape that facility. According to Robert Hallal, he was placed in lock down after his attempted escape and denied outdoor recreation. He says that this resulted in total sensory deprivation which caused him serious psychological harm.

Both Robert Hallal and Mary Hallal claim that they were denied a "liberty interest" when Larry Williams, a former deputy sheriff at the MCDC illegally confiscated correspondence between them; that defendants Sheriff Jessie Hopkins and Keith Tillman denied them adequate visitation privileges; that Sheriff Jessie Hopkins and Keith Tillman denied them joint access to counsel; and that the defendants Sheriff Jessie Hopkins, Keith Tillman, and Lois Penn interfered with the plaintiffs' mail, would not permit the plaintiffs to keep photographs, and denied the plaintiffs their privacy. Both Robert Hallal and Mary Hallal additionally claim that the defendants Sheriff Jessie Hopkins and Keith Tillman have established a policy of discrimination toward federal detainees at the MCDC. Finally, both Robert Hallal and Mary Hallal claim that the defendants Sheriff Jessie Hopkins and Keith Tillman "skim profits" from the MCDC commissary.

The plaintiff Mary Hallal individually asserts that her constitutional rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution were violated when she was denied legal documents, mail, and pictures of her child and other loved ones while she was incarcerated in the MCDC. Mary Hallal claims that United States Marshal Ike Durr took punitive measures against her when he had her moved from the MCDC to the Simpson County Jail; that the Simpson County Jail was overcrowded with no beds, no ventilation, and open toilets in close quarters; that Sheriff Lloyd Jones of Simpson County, Mississippi, is the party responsible for the severe conditions at Simpson County Jail; and that Mary Hallal was denied access to her attorney by Sheriff Lloyd Jones. Finally, Mary Hallal claims that she was subjected to cruel and inhuman punishment in the form of retaliation firstly, when United States Marshal Ike Durr transferred her from Simpson County Jail to Forrest County Jail and secondly, when United States Marshal Ike Durr transferred her to the federal prison facility in Lexington, Kentucky, from MCDC. According to Mary Hallal, this second transfer interfered with her wedding plans.

Plaintiffs were granted permission to proceed in forma pauperis on November 5, 1993, and summonses were issued for the defendants. Summons for the defendant Larry Williams was returned unexecuted, so service of process on Larry Williams was never obtained. On September 13, 1994, this court entered an order pursuant to Rule 4(m), formerly Rule 4(j), of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which requires dismissal of a complaint without prejudice if service is not accomplished within 120 days after the filing of a complaint.5 See Traina v. United States, 911 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir.1990); Norlock v. City of Garland, 768 F.2d 654, 657 (5th Cir.1985). The court's order eliminated from the instant lawsuit the plaintiffs' claim that Williams illegally confiscated their mail.

On November 23, 1993, the plaintiffs filed a motion to dismiss their complaint against the defendant Sheriff Lloyd S. Jones with prejudice. This motion was granted on December 13, 1993, thereby eliminating from this lawsuit the claims of Mary Hallal pertaining to conditions in the Simpson County Jail.

A motion to dismiss or alternatively for summary judgment was submitted on behalf of United States Marshal Ike Durr on May 19, 1994. The plaintiffs moved on June 27, 1994, for time to respond to this motion. This court entered an order granting plaintiffs until July 18, 1994, to respond; however, no response was made. On July 28, 1994, this court directed plaintiffs to show cause not later than August 18, 1994, why summary judgment should not be granted. Plaintiffs did not respond. This court, acting pursuant to its inherent power to govern its docket and expeditiously dispose of pending cases, granted summary judgment in favor of United States Marshal Ike Durr on September 13, 1994. See Link v. Wabash Railroad Company, 370 U.S. 626, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962); McNeal v. Papasan, 842 F.2d 787, 789-90 (5th Cir.1988).

Therefore, all of the plaintiffs' claims against former deputy Larry Williams, Sheriff Lloyd S. Jones, and United States Marshal Ike Durr have been dismissed from this lawsuit, only leaving before this court the plaintiffs' claims against Sheriff Jessie Hopkins, Keith Tillman, and Lois Penn.

On January 10, 1994, the defendants Sheriff Jessie Hopkins, Keith Tillman, and Lois Penn moved for summary judgment. The certificate of service attached to that motion shows that the summary judgment documents were mailed to the plaintiff Robert Hallal at P.O. Box 888, Sandstone, Minnesota 55072. The certificate also shows that the address of the plaintiff Mary Hallal was unknown to these defendants. Robert Hallal did not respond to the motion for summary judgment.

On March 18, 1994, Robert Hallal submitted a motion seeking this court's disqualification in the instant case and in Civil Action No. 3:94-cv-94WS. This was immediately followed by the motion of the defendants Sheriff Jessie Hopkins, Keith Tillman, and Lois Penn to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims for failure to prosecute pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on March 24, 1994. Additionally, on March 28, 1994, the defendants Sheriff Jessie Hopkins, Keith Tillman, and Lois Penn objected to Robert Hallal's motion seeking this court's disqualification. A response to the defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to prosecute was submitted on behalf of Robert Hallal and Mary Hallal on April 11, 1994.

Finding that Mary Hallal had not been served with the motion of the defendants Sheriff Jessie Hopkins, Keith Tillman, and Lois Penn for summary judgment, on September 14, 1994, this court directed these defendants to serve their motion once again to both plaintiffs. In the interim, this court had examined the court file and found that the last known address of Mary Hallal was and continues to be 412 Southview, Utica, Mississippi 39175. Plaintiffs were directed to respond in accordance with Uniform Local Rule 8(d) which provides in pertinent part that "[c]ounsel for respondent shall submit the original and one copy of a memorandum of authorities in reply, and shall do so within ten (10) days after service of the movant's memorandum." The plaintiffs submitted their response on October 24, 1994.

II. THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF DEFENDANTS SHERIFF JESSIE HOPKINS, KEITH TILLMAN AND LOIS PENN

The Supreme Court expressed the standard for summary judgment in the case of Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986), as follows:

In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment after adequate time for discovery and upon a motion against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be no genuine issue as to any material fact, since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the non-moving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.

Id., 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. at 2552.

Rule 56(c),6 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, requires the district court to enter summary judgment if evidence favoring the non-moving party is not sufficient for the jury to enter a verdict in his favor. Washington v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 839 F.2d 1121, 1122-1123 (5th Cir.1988), citing Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, and Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-52, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). When the moving party has carried the Rule 56(c) burden, the opposing party must present more than a metaphysical...

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2 cases
  • White v. Pazin
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
    • 19 Octubre 2016
    ...was "an exaggerated and overbroad response to security concerns under the factual circumstance of this case." Hallal v. Hopkins, 947 F. Supp. 978, 997 (S.D. Miss.). That court discussed some precedent stating that an "inmate's desire to touch and hold family members ... is a natural human d......
  • Guillory v. Hodge
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi
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    ...Cir. 1993); Jordan v. Johnston, Civil Action No. 2:09cvKS-MTP, 2011 WL 3924825, at *6 (S.D. Miss. Aug. 18, 2011); Hallal v. Hopkins, 947 F. Supp. 978, 998 (S.D. Miss. 1995). Plaintiff has not alleged that his incoming mail was censored, only that it was opened and read. Such an allegation d......

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