Haller v. Champlain Coll., 16–332
| Decision Date | 29 September 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 16–332,16–332 |
| Citation | 177 A.3d 497 |
| Parties | Kimberly HALLER v. CHAMPLAIN COLLEGE |
| Court | Vermont Supreme Court |
William B. Skiff, Burlington, for Plaintiff–Appellee.
J. Justin Sluka and Alycia M. Sanders of Ellis Boxer & Blake PLLC, Springfield, for Defendant–Appellant.
PRESENT: Reiber, C.J., Dooley, Skoglund, Robinson and Eaton, JJ.
¶ 1. The question in this workers' compensation case is whether employer Champlain College is obligated to include in claimant Kimberly Haller's average weekly wage calculation the value of tuition-free college credits she earned in accordance with employer's graduate tuition policy. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the Commissioner of the Department of Labor concluded that the tuition benefits provided by employer and used by claimant was an "other advantage" that constituted part of claimant's wages. 21 V.S.A. § 601(13). We agree and affirm.
¶ 2. The relevant facts here are undisputed. At all times relevant to these proceedings claimant was an employee of Champlain College for purposes of Vermont's workers' compensation laws. On March 10, 2014, claimant suffered a work-related injury, which employer has accepted. At the time of her injury, claimant was employed as employer's Recruitment Director.
¶ 3. Since May 2012, claimant had taken numerous courses at Champlain College pursuant to its "Tuition Benefits" policy. That policy allows college employees, their spouses, and eligible dependent children to take undergraduate and graduate courses on a space-available basis, tuition free. In relevant part, § 4.3.1 of employer's Tuition Benefits policy provides1 :
¶ 4. During the twenty-six weeks prior to her work-related injury, claimant completed ten and one half credits of classwork at Champlain College. She paid no money for these course credits. Claimant considered the free tuition policy to be one of the benefits of working for employer as it allowed her to work toward, and earn, a graduate degree without paying any tuition. This free tuition was a substantial financial benefit to claimant and was one of the reasons she chose to work for employer.
¶ 5. The issue presented to the Commissioner on cross-motions for summary judgment was whether the value of these tuition benefits should be included in the calculation of claimant's average weekly wage for the purposes of her permanent partial disability benefit.2 "Wages" are defined to include "bonuses and the market value of board, lodging, fuel, and other advantages which can be estimated in money and which the employee receives from the employer as a part of his or her remuneration." 21 V.S.A. § 601(13). The specific issue in this case is whether claimant's tuition benefits fall within "other advantages which can be estimated in money and which the employee receives from the employer as part of his or her remuneration." Id.
¶ 6. In analyzing this question of first impression, the Commissioner first distinguished this Court's recent decision that the value of employer-provided health insurance benefits should not be included in the calculation of wages. See Lydy v. Trustaff, Inc., 2013 VT 44, 194 Vt. 165, 76 A.3d 150. In determining whether the tuition benefit should be included in the wage calculation, the Commissioner considered three questions gleaned from prior Department decisions: First, is the benefit a "significant part" of the compensation? Second, does the employee derive true value from the offered benefit or is it a benefit that means little to the employee except as an enhancement to an average weekly wage? And third, is the value of the benefit reasonably subject to objective valuation?
¶ 7. Noting the remedial nature of the workers' compensation laws, the Commissioner answered the above questions in the affirmative. The free tuition was a substantial benefit to claimant and was one of the reasons she worked at Champlain College. She derived true value from the program; she had taken advantage of it from 2012 until 2014 and was using it to acquire a master's degree. And, finally, the benefit was subject to simple valuation.3 The Commissioner explained that including the value of the free tuition in claimant's wage calculation would not upset the "delicate balance" struck between employees and employers in the workers' compensation setting and concluded that the free tuition benefit claimant received qualified as an "other advantage" that can be easily estimated and that was paid to her as remuneration for her work.
¶ 8. Employer appealed, and the Commissioner certified for our review the question of whether employer was obligated to include in claimant's average weekly wage calculation the value of tuition-free college credits earned by claimant in accordance with its employee tuition policy.
¶ 9. On appeal, employer argues first and foremost that this Court's recent ruling that employer–provided health insurance benefits are not "other advantages" included within the definition of wages dictates the outcome of this case. See Lydy, 2013 VT 44, 194 Vt. 165, 76 A.3d 150. Employer further argues that the benefit in question did not amount to "remuneration," 21 V.S.A. § 601(13), that the Commissioner's determination that the tuition benefit was capable of simple valuation was based on a mistake of fact, and that the Commissioner's decision will upset the "delicate balancing" between an injured worker's right to compensation and an employer's right to limited and determinate liability. Lydy, 2013 VT 44, ¶ 19, 194 Vt. 165, 76 A.3d 150.
¶ 10. In construing a statute, "[o]ur paramount goal ... is to give effect to the Legislature's intent." State v. Deyo, 2006 VT 120, ¶ 14, 181 Vt. 89, 915 A.2d 249. In interpreting the workers' compensation statute, "we will defer to the Commissioner's construction of the Workers' Compensation Act, absent a compelling indication of error." Lydy, 2013 VT 44, ¶ 4, 194 Vt. 165, 76 A.3d 150 (quotation omitted). Our deference is not unlimited, however, and "we will not affirm an interpretation that is unjust or unreasonable." Clodgo v. Rentavision, Inc., 166 Vt. 548, 550, 701 A.2d 1044, 1045 (1997). Moreover, in reviewing the Commissioner's determination, we must be mindful that our workers' compensation laws are "remedial in nature and must be liberally construed to provide injured employees with benefits unless the law is clear to the contrary." St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Surdam, 156 Vt. 585, 590, 595 A.2d 264, 266 (1991).
¶ 11. We conclude there was no compelling indication of error in the Commissioner's determination for several reasons. First, this case is different from Lydy in several notable and significant ways. While our analysis in Lydy may shed some light on the applicable standards, Lydy is in no way controlling in this case. Second, the Commissioner's analysis gives effect to the language of the workers' compensation statute and is consistent with that law's purposes. Third, the Commissioner's decision is consistent with the Department's own caselaw on the subject.
¶ 12. This Court's decision in Lydy does not control the outcome of this case. In Lydy, the Court, in a 3–2 decision, concluded that employer-provided health insurance benefits were not an "other advantage" received as part of the employee's remuneration. 2013 VT 44, ¶ 19, 194 Vt. 165, 76 A.3d 150. Several considerations that do not apply here weighed heavily in the Court's analysis in that case.
¶ 13. In Lydy, the Commissioner ruled that the health insurance benefit was not an "other advantage" for the purposes of the wage calculation. Id. ¶ 1. The deference we afford to the Commissioner's construction of the workers' compensation laws, absent a compelling indication of error, supported exclusion of health insurance benefits from the definition of wages in Lydy, but supports inclusion of the free tuition benefit in this case. Id. ¶ 4. Moreover, the Commissioner's determination that health insurance was not an "other advantage" was consistent with twenty years of established, and unappealed, departmental case law. Id. ¶18; see also Pelissier v. Hannaford Bros., No. 26–11WC (Sept. 11, 2009), http://labor.vermont.gov/ wordpress/wp-content/uploads//PelissierDecision.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q4RW-BQEL] (citing a series of decisions dating back to 1990 in which the Commissioner rejected argument that value of health insurance should be included in wage calculation). A decision to the contrary would have upset long-settled expectations and actuarial calculations with potentially a substantial impact on the workers' compensation system. Lydy, 2013 VT 44, ¶ 18, 194 Vt. 165, 76 A.3d 150.
¶ 14. Plus, the prevalence of health insurance as an employment benefit across sectors and through most of the labor market lent particular support to the notion that if the Legislature had intended to include this widely provided benefit as part of wages, it would not have relied on the...
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...of a statute, "our paramount goal is to give effect to the Legislature's intent." Haller v. Champlain Coll., 2017 VT 86, ¶ 10, ___ Vt. ___, 177 A.3d 497 (quotation and alterations omitted). That said, within the context of workers' compensation, "absent a compelling indication of error," we......
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Ruminations
...288 (1988). [96] In re Conservation Law Foundation, Inc., 207 Vt. 309, 188 A.3d 667 (2018). [97] Haller v. Champlain College, 206 Vt. 86, 177 A.3d 497 (2017). [98] Grenafege v. Department of Employment Security, 134 Vt. 288, 357 A.2d 118 (1976). [99] Derosia v. Book Press, Inc., 148 Vt. 217......