Halley v. State

• Court: Montana Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: Patricia O. Cotter
• Citation: Halley v. State, 186 P.3d 859, 2008 MT 193, 344 Mont. 37 (Mont. 2008)
• Decision Date: 03 June 2008
• Docket Number: No. DA 06-0817.,DA 06-0817.
• Parties: William M. HALLEY, Petitioner and Appellant, v. STATE of Montana, Respondent and Appellee.

186 P.3d 859

2008 MT 193

344 Mont. 37

William M. HALLEY, Petitioner and Appellant, v. STATE of Montana, Respondent and Appellee.

No. DA 06-0817.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs February 27, 2008.

Decided June 3, 2008.

For Appellant: William Boggs, Attorney at Law, Missoula, Montana.

For Appellee: Hon. Mike McGrath, Montana Attorney General; John Paulson, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana, Fred R. Van Valkenburg, Missoula County Attorney; Kirsten LaCroix, Deputy County Attorney, Missoula, Montana.

Justice PATRICIA O. COTTER delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 William M. Halley (Halley) appeals the Fourth Judicial District Court's denial of his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. We reverse and remand.

ISSUE

¶ 2 The dispositive issue on appeal is:

¶ 3 Did the District Court err in denying Halley's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief?

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶ 4 During a contentious divorce proceeding, Halley's actions resulted in his arrest on eleven separate criminal charges, including five counts of felony intimidation, two counts of felony stalking, one count of misdemeanor stalking, one count of misdemeanor violation of privacy in communications, one count of misdemeanor unlawful restraint and one count of felony tampering with witnesses. On January 21, 2004, several days after his arrest, a public defender was assigned to his case and arraignment was scheduled for February 10, 2004. The arraignment was subsequently continued at Halley's request to March 9, 2004. Despite having assigned counsel, Halley filed several pro se motions between February 12 and February 20. The District Court issued two orders instructing that Halley's motions be returned "unfiled" on the ground that he was represented by counsel. Subsequently, Halley's hearing was continued until March 18.

¶ 5 Between January 21 and March 17 Halley's attorney claims to have spent 3.3 hours on his case. She spent another hour on March 18 when she represented him in front of a special master at his arraignment and bond reduction hearing during which Halley pled not guilty to all counts and requested bail reduction and release on his own recognizance. Both requests were denied.

¶ 6 On March 25, 2004, Halley sent a letter to Judge Larson, the presiding District Court judge, requesting another bail reduction hearing and claiming ineffective assistance of appointed counsel. He asked the court to appoint a pro bono attorney from outside the public defender's office because his public defender would "not communicate" with him nor would she conduct his defense as he requested. He explained that he believed his rights to effective assistance of counsel, due process of law and reasonable bail were being violated and that he was being dealt "a great injustice" as a result of ineffective counsel. This letter is not recorded in the court's docket nor is there any record of a court response to Halley's letter. Also on March 25, Halley wrote a letter to Judge McLean, another Fourth Judicial District Court judge, complaining of ineffective assistance of counsel and asking for assistance in resolving his situation. Judge McLean acknowledged receipt of the letter and explained that he lacked jurisdiction. He also indicated he had forwarded the letter to Judge Larson.

¶ 7 On May 10, 2004, Halley sent another letter to Judge Larson, now expressing his desire to waive his right to counsel and to represent himself. He explained that his public defender did not answer his letters and that she refused to cooperate with any of his requests pertaining to his case. The District Court responded to Halley's May 10 letter with an order issued on the same day instructing Halley's attorney to confer with Halley and to be prepared to address this issue at a conference scheduled for June 17, 2004.

¶ 8 On May 11, 2004, the State filed its Notice of Intent to Seek Increased Punishment, and on May 13, 2004, the court relieved Halley's appointed attorney of her duties and issued an order permitting Halley to represent himself. There is nothing in the record to indicate that Halley's counsel met with him between May 10 and May 13. On May 18, 2004, the court appointed stand-by counsel for Halley but indicated that Halley could continue pro se if desired. Between May 18 and June 17 Halley filed multiple pro se motions, including a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and one for the State's failure to provide a speedy trial. He also sought, again, to be released on his own recognizance. The court denied some of Halley's motions and reserved others for resolution at the June 17 hearing.

¶ 9 On June 17 Halley and stand-by counsel appeared before a special master in the District Court. Halley was not asked about the circumstances surrounding the waiver of his right to counsel, nor was he asked whether he was aware of the disadvantages of proceeding without counsel or if his waiver was voluntary. On August 26, 2004, Halley entered into a plea agreement under which he pled guilty to all counts. At the hearing conducted immediately after entering into the plea agreement, Halley told the court that he was completely comfortable with his appointed stand-by counsel, opining that "[s]he's been excellent."

¶ 10 After almost one year in jail, on January 10, 2005, the District Court sentenced Halley to forty years in the Montana State Prison, all suspended. Halley did not appeal but on March 9, 2006, he filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief claiming ineffective assistance of counsel and requesting an evidentiary hearing. In October 2006 the District Court denied Halley's Petition concluding that Halley voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel on May 10, 2004, and therefore could no longer claim that he was deprived of his right to counsel based on ineffective assistance. Halley filed a timely appeal.

STANDARDS OF REVIEW

¶ 11 We review a district court's denial of a petition for post-conviction relief to determine whether the district court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous and whether its conclusions of law are correct. Jordan v. State, 2007 MT 165, ¶ 5, 338 Mont. 113, ¶ 5, 162 P.3d 863, ¶ 5. Additionally, we review a district court's denial of a motion for substitution of counsel for an abuse of discretion. State v. Gallagher, 2001 MT 39, ¶ 4, 304 Mont. 215, ¶ 4, 19 P.3d 817, ¶ 4 (Gallagher II).

DISCUSSION

¶ 12 Did the District Court err in denying Halley's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief?

¶ 13 Halley argues that the District Court erroneously failed to conduct a Gallagher inquiry pursuant to his written request for substitute counsel and that the District Court failed to hold a hearing before releasing appointed counsel and ordering Halley to represent himself. Halley asserts that these errors in turn led the court to its erroneous denial of his request for post-conviction relief.

¶ 14 The State counters that the District Court correctly found and concluded that these alleged "errors" became moot at the time Halley "unequivocally, voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently" waived his right to counsel and exercised his right of self-representation.

¶ 15 A defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel is guaranteed by Article II, Section 24 of the Montana Constitution and by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. State v. Gallagher, 1998 MT 70, ¶ 14, 288 Mont. 180, ¶ 14, 955 P.2d 1371, ¶ 14 (Gallagher I). In cases where a criminal defendant cannot afford to hire an attorney, counsel is appointed to represent him at public expense. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963); State v. Craig, 274 Mont. 140, 148, 906 P.2d 683, 688 (1995). As noted above, Halley was provided with appointed counsel soon after his arrest. Shortly thereafter, however, Halley became dissatisfied with appointed counsel and requested substitute counsel.

¶ 16 When a criminal defendant makes a pretrial request for appointment of substitute counsel in conjunction with allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, we require the district court to make an adequate initial inquiry into the nature of a defendant's complaint to determine if those complaints are "seemingly substantial." Gallagher I, ¶ 15. If a defendant's complaint about his relationship with counsel rises to the level of "seemingly substantial" and he requests that the court appoint substitute counsel, the court should conduct a hearing to address the merits of the defendant's claims. Gallagher I, ¶ 14.

¶ 17 We stated in Gallagher I that such an initial inquiry is adequate when the district court considers the "defendant's factual complaints together with counsel's specific explanations addressing the complaints." Gallagher I, ¶ 15. Conversely, we also said that a district court's initial inquiry is inadequate when there is not even a "cursory inquiry" into the defendant's complaint. Gallagher I, ¶ 15. More recently, in State v. Hendershot, 2007 MT 49, ¶ 23, 336 Mont. 164, ¶ 23, 153 P.3d 619, ¶ 23, we clearly reiterated that the district court "must determine if the complaints are substantial by making an adequate initial inquiry into the nature of the complaints." (Emphasis added.)

¶ 18 In the case before us, the District Court conducted no inquiry whatsoever into Halley's written allegations of ineffective assistance submitted on March 25. Such failure was an abuse of the District Court's discretion and constitutes reversible error unless the error was cured by Halley's subsequent request to represent himself.

¶ 19 As indicated above, on May 10 Halley submitted a letter to the District Court. In this letter, rather than requesting appointment of substitute counsel as he had previously done without success, Halley asked to be allowed to represent himself and to waive his right to counsel. He explained that he wished to represent himself because he was dissatisfied with appointed counsel.¹ On May 13,...