Halliday v. Tiki, Civil No. 2015-85
Decision Date | 19 August 2016 |
Docket Number | Civil No. 2015-85 |
Parties | SHAMARAH HALLIDAY, Plaintiff, v. M/V KON TIKI II; CRUISE SHIP EXCURSIONS, INC.; and WARWICK HOLDINGS, INC, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Virgin Islands |
ATTORNEYS:
Ryan C. Meade, Esq.
Quintairo, Prieto, Wood & Boyer, P.A.
Kanaan Le'Roy Whilhite, Esq.
For M/V Kon Tiki II; Cruise Ship Excursions, Inc.; and Warwick Holdings, Inc.
Before the Court is the motion of the M/V Kon Tiki II; Cruise Ship Excursions, Inc.; and Warwick Holdings, Inc. to dismiss Count Two of the complaint for failure to state a claim.
On October 20, 2013, Shamara Halliday ("Halliday") was a passenger on the M/V Kon Tiki II (the "Kon Tiki"), a 90-foot motorized catamaran, in the Charlotte Amalie harbor. She leaned against a railing, which gave away. As a result, Halliday fell overboard and was injured.
Thereafter, Halliday filed a three count complaint in rem against the Kon Tiki. Count One asserts a negligence claim. Count Two asserts an unseaworthiness claim. Count Three asserts a maritime lien against the Kon Tiki.
Subsequently, Cruise Ship Excursions, Inc. filed a verified statement of interest in the Kon Tiki. In its filing, Cruise Ship Excursions, Inc. asserts that it "is the sole and exclusive operator of the vessel and uses the vessel on a near daily basis to run charters and tours." ECF No. 4. Warwick Holdings, Inc. also filed a verified statement of interest in the Kon Tiki. In its filing, Warwick Holdings, Inc. asserts that it "is the sole and exclusive owner of the vessel." ECF No. 5.
The Kon Tiki; Cruise Ship Excursions, Inc.; and Warwick Holdings, Inc. (collectively, the "defendants") then filed the instant motion to dismiss Count Two of the complaint for failure to state a claim.1
When reviewing a motion to dismiss brought pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court construes the complaint "in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 618 F.3d 300, 314 (3d Cir. 2010). The Court must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2004).
A complaint may be dismissed for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). "[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
The Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), set forth the "plausibility" standard for overcoming a motion to dismiss and refined this approach in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009). The plausibility standard requires the complaint to allege "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. A complaint satisfies the plausibility standard when the factual pleadings "allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). This standard requires showing "more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. A complaint which pleads facts "'merely consistent with' a defendant's liability . . . 'stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of "entitlement of relief." ' " Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
To determine the sufficiency of a complaint under the plausibility standard, the Court must take the following three steps2:
First, the court must "tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim." Second, the court should identify allegations that, "because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Finally, "where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.
Santiago v. Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 674, 679).
In their motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the defendants seek to dismiss Count Two of the complaint. As previously noted, Count Two asserts a claim for unseaworthiness.
Fasold v. Delaware River & Bay Auth., 117 F. App'x 836, 838 (3d Cir. 2004)(footnote omitted).
The doctrine of seaworthiness, imposing non-fault liability upon shipowners, developed in recognition of the inherently dangerous nature of the work of seamen. However, it extends only to seamen who are members of the crew and those performing the duties of crew members.
Garrett v. U.S. Lines, Inc., 574 F.2d 997, 1000 (9th Cir. 1978). Where an individual's relationship to a vessel is, "at most, that of a passenger . . . [,] the doctrine is inapplicable." Id.; accord Gibboney v. Wright, 517 F.2d 1054, 1059 (5th Cir. 1975); Simmons v. Catamaran Cruises, Inc., No. CIV. 78-186, 1980 WL 626234, at *2 (D.V.I. Jan. 22, 1980). Charterers3 may, however, bring a claim for unseaworthiness on the theory that absent an express provision to the contrary, the charter contract contains an implied warranty of seaworthiness.4 See Work v. Leathers, 97 U.S. 379, 380, 24 L. Ed. 1012 (1878)() .
In her complaint, Halliday alleges that she was "a Charterer of the M/V Kon Tiki II . . . ." ECF No. 1, at ¶ 18. She further alleges that she "was a passenger on a charter excursion . . . ."5 Id. at ¶ 8. She also alleges the legal conclusion that charter contracts contain an implied warranty of seaworthiness. Id. at ¶ 19. She does not, however, allege any facts indicating that she was party to a charter contract. Indeed, she does not allege any facts showing that she was party to any contract--for a charter or otherwise.
When plaintiffs allege legally significant relationships with defendants, courts have required plaintiffs to plead facts indicating that such relationships existed rather than permit the plaintiffs to merely allege the existence of such relationships. See, e.g., Day v. Taylor, 400 F.3d 1272, 1277 (11th Cir. 2005)() (internal citations and quotations omitted); Allianz Glob. Corp. & Specialty v. MSC "Moneterey", No. 13-CV-7563-RA, 2014 WL 4631891 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 16, 2014) (); see also JJ Water Works, Inc. v. San Juan Towing & Marine Servs., Inc., 59 F. Supp. 3d 380, 392 (D.P.R. 2014)() . The Court is satisfied that a similar rule applies here.
Accordingly, because Halliday has failed to plead facts indicating that she was party to a charter contract, the Court will dismiss Count Two for failure to state a claim.6
An appropriate Order follows.
S\_________
Curtis V. Gómez
1. In their motion, the defendants also seek to postpone engaging in discovery or filing an answer until after the Court resolves the instant motion. That request for relief is moot. The defendants have since filed an answer to the complaint, ECF No. 40, and have notified the Court that they served their responses and objections to Halliday's first request for admissions, see ECF No. 41.
2. Iqbal describes the process as a "two-pronged approach" but the Supreme Court took note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim before proceeding...
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