Halliday v. United States, No. 101

• Court: United States Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: BYRNES
• Citation: 315 U.S. 94,62 S.Ct. 438,86 L.Ed. 711
• Parties: HALLIDAY v. UNITED STATES
• Docket Number: No. 101
• Decision Date: 19 January 1942

315 U.S. 94 62 S.Ct. 438 86 L.Ed. 711 HALLIDAY

v.

UNITED STATES.

No. 101. Argued Jan. 5, 1942. Decided Jan. 19, 1942.

Messrs. Warren E. Miller, of Washington, D.C., and R. K. Wise, of Columbia, S.C., for petitioner.

Mr. Wilbur C. Pickett, of Washington, D.C., for respondent.

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Mr. Justice BYRNES delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is a suit brought by the petitioner through his Committee on a $10,000 War Risk Insurance policy. The complaint alleged that petitioner had become permanently and totally disabled by April 2, 1919, the date on which he was honorably discharged by the Army. The insurance contract was in effect on that date and remained in effect until October 31, 1920. At the close of all the evidence the government's motion for a directed verdict was denied. The jury returned a verdict for petitioner and found that he had become permanently and totally disabled by April 2, 1919. The government moved for a new trial, the motion was denied, and judgment was entered on the verdict. On appeal the Circuit Court of Appeals reversed. 116 F.2d 812. It held that there was insufficient evidence to go to the jury and it remanded the case to the District Court with directions to set aside the verdict and to enter judgment in favor of the government.

Petitioner sought certiorari on two grounds: that the Circuit Court of Appeals had erred in holding that there was insufficient evidence for the jury; and that, even if the evidence was insufficient, under Rule 50(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c,¹ the Circuit Court was without

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power to direct entry of judgment for the government without a new trial. We granted certiorari, as we had in Berry v. United States² and Conway v. O'Brien,³ because of the importance of the question concerning Rule 50(b). However, as in those cases, we do not reach that problem since we are of the opinion that the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict.

The insurance contract, the Act of Congress which authorized it,⁴ and the regulations issued pursuant to that Act⁵ obliged petitioner to prove that he was permanently and totally disabled on or before October 31, 1920, the date of expiration of the contract. We think there was evidence from which, if believed, the jury could have drawn this conclusion.

Period prior to October 31, 1920. Petitioner appeared to his friends and neighbors as a normal and healthy young man before his induction into the Army on June 23, 1918. In August he sailed for France, and in September he injured his back and was admitted to a camp hospital. From that time until his discharge, he was examined on several occasions by Army physicians. Their reports reveal that he was 'very nervous' and that he gave 'impressions of neurasthenia'.

While much of the testimony was not specific as to time, several of the witnesses described the appearance and

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behavior of the petitioner immediately following his discharge in April, 1919. The jury was clearly warranted in regarding their testimony as applicable to the period during which the insurance policy remained in force.

Dr. J. N. Land, a general practitioner who had been 'the family physician of the Halliday family' and who had known petitioner from infancy, testified that from 1919 on, petitioner was the victim of psychoneurosis and hypochrondria. These ills caused him to talk about himself constantly, to imagine the existence of symptoms, and to become very unfriendly and suspicious. The witness 'would not have advised him to do any work since he has been out of the Army,' and was of the opinion that work 'would have been harmful to him' and would have resulted in 'a complete collapse'. At the time of his discharge from the Army, the doctor 'didn't hold any hope for his recovery'. The Circuit Court of Appeals considered this testimony of 'little probative force', chiefly because of Dr. Land's admission that he had not examined petitioner professionally until about 1932. But the doctor testified that he had seen petitioner 'on the streets or in a drugstore' 'at least two or three times a year, possibly more * * * all the...