Hallmark Personnel Agency, Inc. v. Jones
| Decision Date | 24 April 1967 |
| Citation | 207 Va. 968,154 S.E.2d 5 |
| Court | Virginia Supreme Court |
| Parties | HALLMARK PERSONNEL AGENCY, INC. v. Ruby M. JONES. |
Thomas J. Harlan, Jr., Norfolk (Doumar, Pincus, Anderson & Knight, Norfolk, Va., on brief), for appellant.
John F. Rixey, Norfolk (Rixey & Rixey, Norfolk, on brief), for appellee.
Before EGGLESTON, C.J., and SPRATLEY, BUCHANAN, SNEAD, I'ANSON and GORDON, JJ.
Hallmark Personnel Agency, Inc., filed its bill in the court below against Ruby M. Jones praying for an injunction to enforce a restrictive covenant in a written contract of employment entered into between the parties on October 2, 1964. The bill alleged that one of the provisions of the contract was that the defendant would not engage 'in any capacity with any other person or firm in a similar business' to that of Hallmark 'within a radius of thirty-five (35) miles from the City of Norfolk for a period of eighteen (18) months following the termination of her employment;' that the defendant had terminated her employment with the plaintiff on August 23, 1965; that in violation of the terms of her agreement she had accepted employment with Universal Employment Agency, a concern which is engaged in a business in the City of Norfolk similar to that conducted by the plaintiff, to which she was imparting confidential information acquired by her while in the employ of the plaintiff; and that such breach by the defendant of the terms of her agreement had caused the plaintiff to suffer 'irreparable harm, injury and detriment.'
The prayer of the bill was that the defendant be enjoined from continuing her employment with Universal in violation of the terms of her agreement; that she 'be further enjoined from entering into any other contract with any other employment agency within a thirty-five (35) mile radius of the City of Norfolk for a period of eighteen (18) months from the date of the termination of her employment' with the plaintiff; and that the defendant 'be required to respond in damages by way of general equitable relief for any pecuniary detriment caused by way of her wilful breach of her employment contract.'
The defendant filed an answer admitting her execution of the contract of employment with Hallmark containing the restrictive covenant and the termination of that employment. She alleged that the provisions of the restrictive covenant are 'invalid and of no force and effect' in that they are 'unreasonable, harsh, oppressive, against sound public policy and prohibitive of the legitimate efforts of the defendant to earn a livelihood.' In a cross-bill she prayed judgment against the plaintiff Hallmark for $750 with interest, being the amount due her for services rendered prior to the termination of her employment.
After the trial court had heard the evidence ore tenus it entered a decree holding that the restrictive covenant in the contract 'is unreasonable and should not be enforced' and dismissing the bill of complaint. The decree further recited that such disposition of the cause was without prejudice to the defendant's claim for compensation under her cross-bill. From this decree the plaintiff has appealed, claiming that the holding of the trial court that the restrictive covenant is unreasonable and should not be enforced is contrary to the law and the evidence.
The evidence shows that Hallmark conducts an employment agency business at 207 Granby Street in the City of Norfolk; that on October 2, 1964 it entered into a written contract with the defendant which contained the restrictive covenant as alleged in the bill of complaint; and that on August 23, 1965 the defendant quit her employment with Hallmark and went to work for Universal Employment Agency which conducts a similar...
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...only to decide actual controversies injuriously affecting the rights of some party to the litigation.” Hallmark Pers. Agency, Inc. v. Jones, 207 Va. 968, 971, 154 S.E.2d 5, 7 (1967). In the appeals now before the Court, Charlottesville Area Fitness Club Operators Association, Atlantic Coast......
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...an actual controversy which require a determination of issues affecting the rights of a party to the litigation. Hallmark v. Jones, 207 Va. 968, 970-71, 154 S.E.2d 5, 6-7 (1967). In this case, once the determination is made that error occurred in the admission of the evidence, no discussion......
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Bristol Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Welch
...some party to the litigation.’ ” Baldwin v. Commonwealth, 43 Va.App. 415, 421, 598 S.E.2d 754, 757 (2004) (quoting Hallmark v. Jones, 207 Va. 968, 971, 154 S.E.2d 5, 7 (1967) ). The issues presented must be “live” at all stages of review. Id. “ ‘Courts are not constituted ... to render advi......
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...some party to the litigation.’ ” Baldwin v. Commonwealth, 43 Va.App. 415, 421, 598 S.E.2d 754, 757 (2004) (quoting Hallmark v. Jones, 207 Va. 968, 971, 154 S.E.2d 5, 7 (1967)). Thus, any action by this Court would constitute issuing an improper advisory opinion. “As a general rule, ‘moot qu......