O'HALLORAN v. Charlotte Hungerford Hospital
Decision Date | 15 May 2001 |
Parties | JAMES O'HALLORAN v. CHARLOTTE HUNGERFORD HOSPITAL ET AL. |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Landau, Spear and Daly, Js. Philip S. Walker, with whom, on the brief, was Maxwell Branson, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Jeffrey R. Babbin, for the appellees (defendants).
In this consolidated appeal, the plaintiff, James O'Halloran, appeals from the judgments of the trial courts dismissing related actions1 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In his appeal in the first case (O'Halloran I), the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly granted the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In his appeal in the second case (O'Halloran II), the plaintiff claims that the court improperly granted the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the prior pending action doctrine. We agree with the plaintiffs claims as to O'Halloran I and reverse the judgment of the trial court in that matter.
The following facts are necessary for our resolution of the plaintiffs claims. The plaintiff is a physician licensed in this state and an active member of the medical staff at the defendant Charlotte Hungerford Hospital (hospital). On January 12, 1999, the individual defendants2 recommended a change in the plaintiffs category of appointment at the hospital from active to consulting. Pursuant to the procedures set forth in the hospital's bylaws, the plaintiff gave formal notice of his intent to appeal and, on April 7, 1999, requested a hearing. The plaintiff retained his active appointment status and clinical privileges during the pendency of the administrative appeal. At the time that O'Halloran I was decided, the defendants claimed that the plaintiff had not exhausted his administrative remedies available under the bylaws of the hospital. The defendants thus filed a motion to dismiss O'Halloran I for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court concluded that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the O'Halloran I action on two grounds. First, the plaintiff had not exhausted his administrative remedies. Second, because the plaintiff had not yet been deprived of his appointment status or clinical privileges, he had not suffered any injury and, therefore, his claims were nonjusticiable. Accordingly, the court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Other facts will be discussed where relevant.
The plaintiff claims that the court improperly granted the defendants' motion to dismiss O'Halloran I for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Our standard of review of a ruling on a motion to dismiss is well established. (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Hyllen-Davey v. Plan & Zoning Commission, 57 Conn. App. 589, 592, 749 A.2d 682, cert. denied, 253 Conn. 926, 754 A.2d 796 (2000).
In our review of the plaintiffs claim, we must evaluate the allegations in the complaint. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Baldwin v. Jablecki, 52 Conn. App. 379, 381-82, 726 A.2d 1164 (1999).
The plaintiff first claims that the court improperly dismissed O'Halloran I on the ground that he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. More specifically, the plaintiff claims that he was not required to exhaust his administrative remedies because he was seeking remedies unavailable to him via the administrative process. We agree.
Pursuant to our standard of review, we take as true the following facts alleged in the complaint in O'Halloran I. Hyllen-Davey v. Plan & Zoning Commission, supra, 57 Conn. App. 592. The plaintiff is a physician licensed in this state, he maintains an office for the practice of medicine and is a member of the active medical staff of the hospital. In the years prior to the commencement of O'Halloran I, the individual defendants consistently and continuously treated the plaintiff differently than other similarly situated physicians at the hospital. The individual defendants acted in a concerted and calculated attempt to drive him from the active staff at the hospital. As a result of the individual defendants' actions, the plaintiff suffered damages in the form of lost opportunities to treat his own patients, to attract new patients and to obtain referral patients from other physicians.3
The following additional facts are necessary for our resolution of this claim. The court's conclusion to dismiss the action on the ground of exhaustion was based, in large part, on its categorization of the plaintiffs action as one that merely challenged the reappointment process of the defendants. In support of its conclusion, the court noted that the hospital's bylaws set forth fairly comprehensive procedures for the reappointment process and for the hearing and appellate procedures for adverse reappointment recommendations. A review of the plaintiffs complaint reveals, however, that he challenged allegedly tortious conduct on the part of the defendants unrelated to the reappointment process and that he sought compensation for financial damage caused by injury to his reputation and standing. The hospital's bylaws do not provide a means for the plaintiff to receive redress for the type of injury alleged.
"An adequate remedy at law is one which is specific and adapted to securing the relief sought conveniently, effectively and completely." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Bianco v. Darien, 157 Conn. 548, 554-55, 254 A.2d 898 (1969). Moreover, the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies does not apply in situations where pursuit of the administrative remedy would be useless. Maresca v. Ridgefield, 35 Conn. App. 769, 773, 647 A.2d 751 (1994). Here, the...
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...of fact in the federal action and the allegations in the second revised complaint, we disagree. See O'Halloran v. Charlotte Hungerford Hospital, 63 Conn. App. 460, 463, 776 A.2d 514 (2001) (construction of complaint question of law). On the basis of our review of the complaint in the federa......
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Bridgeport Harbour Place I v. Ganim
...of fact in the federal action and the allegations in the second revised complaint, we disagree. See O'Halloran v. Charlotte Hungerford Hospital, 63 Conn.App. 460, 463, 776 A.2d 514 (2001) (construction of complaint question of law). On the basis of our review of the complaint in the federal......
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Sempey v. Stamford Hosp., AC 39221
...the parties are bound by their pleadings." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) O'Halloran v. Charlotte Hungerford Hospital , 63 Conn. App. 460, 463, 776 A.2d 514 (2001).Despite our expansive reading of the original complaint, we cannot divine from it a claim of race discri......
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Amalgamated Industries, Inc. v. Historic Eastern Pequot Tribe, No. X03 CV 03 4000287 (CT 5/2/2005)
...exists because its claims are not contingent upon federal acknowledgment of the PEPs. Relying on O'Halloran v. Charlotte Hungerford Hospital, 63 Conn.App. 460, 465-66, 776 A.2d 514 (2001), it argues that the requirement that there be an "actual controversy" requires only a "colorable claim ......