O'Halloran v. Metro. Transp. Auth.

• Decision Date: 22 August 2017
• Citation: 154 A.D.3d 83,60 N.Y.S.3d 128
• Parties: Margaret O'HALLORAN, Plaintiff–Respondent, v. METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, et al., Defendants–Appellants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

154 A.D.3d 83
60 N.Y.S.3d 128

Margaret O'HALLORAN, Plaintiff–Respondent,
v.
METROPOLITAN TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY, et al., Defendants–Appellants.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department, New York.

Aug. 22, 2017.

60 N.Y.S.3d 129

Steve S. Efron, New York, for appellants.

The Kurland Group, New York (Erica T. Kagan of counsel), for respondent.

ROLANDO T. ACOSTA, P.J., PETER TOM, ROSALYN H. RICHTER, SALLIE MANZANET–DANIELS, and MARCY L. KAHN, JJ.

ACOSTA, P.J.

154 A.D.3d 84

The narrow issue on appeal is whether the motion court providently permitted plaintiff to amend her complaint to include belated claims of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation on the ground that those claims related back to the original pleading, which timely alleged, inter alia, discrimination on the basis of gender. We hold that it did, because the original pleading gave defendants notice of the occurrences plaintiff seeks to prove pursuant to her amended complaint (see CPLR 203[f] ), and defendants will not suffer undue prejudice as a result of the delay (see CPLR 3025 [b] ). Therefore, we affirm.

Plaintiff, a lesbian, has been employed by the three organizational defendants—Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA), New York City Transit Authority (N.Y.CTA), and MTA Bus Company (MTA Bus)—in various capacities since 1987. Beginning in November 2008, plaintiff served as Assistant Chief Facilities Officer for Business Planning and Administration for NYCTA. She reported to NYCTA's

60 N.Y.S.3d 130

Chief Facilities Officer, and, until 2012, received excellent annual reviews and had never been subject to disciplinary action. In 2011, NYCTA's Chief of Staff denied plaintiff an interview for the position of Chief Facilities Officer and Vice President, although similarly situated male colleagues were granted interviews. In January 2012, defendant George Menduina was promoted to Chief Facilities Officer at NYCTA and Vice President for Facilities at

154 A.D.3d 85

MTA Bus. Plaintiff alleges that upon his promotion, Menduina and others began to subject her to discrimination.¹

Plaintiff filed the original complaint in this action on November 25, 2013, asserting causes of action for, among other things, discrimination on the basis of sex and disability and retaliation in violation of the New York State and New York City Human Rights Laws ( Executive Law § 290 et seq. [the State HRL]; Administrative Code of City of N.Y. § 8–101 et seq. [the City HRL] ). After her deposition, plaintiff moved pursuant to CPLR 3025 for leave to amend her complaint to add claims that defendants also discriminated against her because of her sexual orientation.² Plaintiff conceded that the sexual orientation claims were asserted after the statute of limitations had run (see CPLR 214[2] ), but argued that the relation-back doctrine ( CPLR 203[f] ) rendered them timely because those claims were "based on the same allegations as the original pleading." She also argued that defendants would not be prejudiced by the proposed amendment, because discovery had not been completed.

Defendants opposed the motion, contending that the original complaint did not provide them with "notice of the facts underlying" plaintiff's sexual orientation claims. Defendants noted that the original complaint did not allege that plaintiff is a lesbian or that their actions were motivated by her sexual orientation.

The motion court granted the motion, reasoning that defendants "faile[d] to overcome the heavy presumption of validity in favor of permitting the amendment" and that defendants "will not be prejudiced or surprised from the delay ... because the

154 A.D.3d 86

facts within the complaint remain the same." The court concluded that "[t]he amended claims are premised upon the same subject matter alleged in the original complaint." Defendants appealed.

"It is well established that leave to amend a pleading [pursuant to CPLR 3025(b) ] is freely given ‘absent prejudice or surprise resulting directly from the delay’ " ( Anoun v. City of New York, 85 A.D.3d 694, 694, 926 N.Y.S.2d 98 [1st Dept.2011], quoting Fahey v. County of Ontario, 44 N.Y.2d 934, 935, 408 N.Y.S.2d 314, 380 N.E.2d 146 [1978] ). "A party opposing

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leave to amend ‘must overcome a heavy presumption of validity in favor of [permitting amendment]’ " ( McGhee v. Odell, 96 A.D.3d 449, 450, 946 N.Y.S.2d 134 [1st Dept.2012], quoting Otis El. Co. v. 1166 Ave. of Ams. Condominium, 166 A.D.2d 307, 564 N.Y.S.2d 119 [1990] ).

The relation-back doctrine, now codified in CPLR 203(f), provides that "[a] claim asserted in an amended pleading is deemed to have been interposed at the time the claims in the original pleading were interposed, unless the original pleading does not give notice of the transactions [or] occurrences ... to be proved pursuant to the amended pleading" ( CPLR 203 [f] ; see also Giambrone v. Kings Harbor Multicare Ctr., 104 A.D.3d 546, 548, 961 N.Y.S.2d 157 [1st Dept.2013] [making clear that the "salient inquiry" in deciding whether an otherwise untimely claim in an amended pleading relates back to a timely commenced action "is not whether defendant had notice of the claim, but whether, as the statute provides, the original pleading gives ‘notice of the transactions [or] occurrences ... to be proved pursuant to the amended pleading’ "] [emphasis added] ). The doctrine is "[a]imed at liberalizing the strict, formalistic pleading requirements of the [nineteenth] century, while at the same time respecting the important policies inherent in statutory repose," and "enables a plaintiff to correct a pleading error--by adding either a new claim or a new party--after the statutory limitations period has expired" ( Buran v. Coupal, 87 N.Y.2d 173, 177, 638 N.Y.S.2d 405, 661 N.E.2d 978 [1995] [citations omitted] ). It is within courts' "sound judicial discretion to identify cases that justify relaxation of limitations strictures ... to facilitate decisions on the merits if the correction will not cause undue prejudice to the plaintiff's adversary" ( id. at 178, 638 N.Y.S.2d 405, 661 N.E.2d 978 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted] ).

The Court of Appeals has recognized that a more relaxed standard applies where a plaintiff seeks to use the relation-back doctrine by adding a new claim against a defendant who is already a party to litigation as opposed to adding a new defendant ( Buran, 87 N.Y.2d at 178, 638 N.Y.S.2d 405, 661 N.E.2d 978 ["allowing the relation back of

154 A.D.3d 87

amendments adding new defendants implicates more seriously the( ) policy concerns (underlying statutes of limitation) than simply the relation back of new causes of action since, in the latter situation, the defendant is already before the court"]; see also Duffy v. Horton Mem. Hosp., 66 N.Y.2d 473, 477, 497 N.Y.S.2d 890, 488 N.E.2d 820 [1985] ["[A]n amendment which merely adds a new theory of recovery or defense arising out of a transaction or occurrence already in litigation clearly does not conflict with the( ) policies" underlying statutes of limitation—i.e., repose and the conservation of judicial resources—because " (a) party is likely to have collected and preserved available evidence relating to the entire transaction or occurrence and the defendant's sense of security has already been disturbed by the pending action"] ). Thus, although the Court of Appeals has adopted a three-part test for determining whether to apply relation back to an amended pleading that adds a new defendant, no such test applies where a plaintiff simply seeks the relation back of a new claim (see buran, 87 n.y.2D AT 178, 638 n.y.s.2D 405, 661 n.e.2D 978). in otHer words, where, as here, a proposed amended complaint contains an untimely claim against a defendant who is already a party to the litigation, the relevant considerations are simply (1) whether the original complaint gave the defendant notice of the transactions or occurrences at issue and (2) whether there

60 N.Y.S.3d 132

would be undue prejudice to the defendant if the amendment and relation back are permitted (see CPLR 203[f] ; CPLR 3025 [b] ; see Buran, 87 N.Y.2d at 178, 638 N.Y.S.2d 405, 661 N.E.2d 978 ; Caffaro v. Trayna, 35 N.Y.2d 245, 251, 360 N.Y.S.2d 847, 319 N.E.2d 174 [1974] ).

In accordance with these principles, we hold that the motion court providently exercised its discretion when it permitted plaintiff to amend her complaint to add her otherwise untimely claims of sexual orientation discrimination. All of plaintiff's claims are based on the same occurrences—namely the underlying employment actions taken against her—and the original complaint put defendants on notice of those occurrences. To be sure, plaintiff's original complaint did not allege the specific facts that she is a lesbian, that defendants were aware of her sexual orientation, that defendants discriminated against her on that basis, or that another lesbian colleague was demoted...