Halloran v. United States

Decision Date06 February 2020
Docket NumberNo. 18-CV-1559 (KMK),No. 13-CR-297 (KMK),13-CR-297 (KMK),18-CV-1559 (KMK)
PartiesDANIEL J. HALLORAN, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.
CourtU.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

DANIEL J. HALLORAN, Petitioner,
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent.

No. 13-CR-297 (KMK)
No. 18-CV-1559 (KMK)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

February 6, 2020


OPINION & ORDER

Appearances:

Jonathan I. Edelstein, Esq.
Edelstein & Grossman
New York, NY
Counsel for Petitioner

Jamie E. Bagliebter, Esq.
Office of the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York
New York, NY
Counsel for Respondent

KENNETH M. KARAS, United States District Judge:

In July 2014, Daniel J. Halloran ("Halloran" or "Petitioner") was convicted at trial of bribery and related corruption offenses and, in March 2015, was sentenced to 120 months' imprisonment. Halloran, who is counseled, has filed a Petition, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence (the "Petition"). (See Mot. Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct Sentence by a Person in Federal Custody ("Pet.") (Dkt. No. 541); Mem. of Law in Supp. of Def.'s Pet. to Vacate his Conviction Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ("Pet'r's Mem.") (Dkt. No. 542).)1 Petitioner has also filed a Motion for Discovery Under Rule 6 of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings (the "Discovery Motion") seeking additional

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documents and records from both the Government and third parties. (Dkt. No. 559).) For the reasons stated herein, both the Petition and the Discovery Motion are denied.

I. Factual History

On April 18, 2013, a grand jury returned Indictment S1 13-CR-297 ("Indictment"), (Dkt. No. 42), charging Petitioner with two counts of wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 1346, 1349; two counts of bribery, in violation of the Travel Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1952; and one count of conspiracy to commit both substantive offenses, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. (See Indictment ¶¶ 57-65, 68-69.) Several co-defendants were also charged with these and other offenses. (Id.)

The evidence adduced at trial established that Halloran, a member of the New York City Council from 2010 to 2013, was involved in two related bribery schemes. See United States v. Halloran, 821 F.3d 321, 325 (2d Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 1118 (2017).

In the first scheme, the "Discretionary Funds Scheme," Halloran accepted bribes in exchange for his agreement to divert public funds to the bribe-payers. Id. In August and September 2012, Halloran met Moses Stern ("Stern") and a person purportedly named "Raj"—both of whom posed as real estate developers but who were actuality working with the FBI (Raj as an undercover agent and Stern as a cooperating witness). Id. at 326. Stern offered Halloran a bribe in exchange for a city-funded contract. Id. Halloran was to use his authority over "member items"—pools of public money that City Council members may allocate to charitable organizations—to direct funding to an entity controlled by Stern. Id. Stern paid Halloran $7,500 in cash as a down payment. Id. at 341. At later meetings, the three discussed possible charitable conduits for the money, and they ultimately agreed that Halloran would allocate funds to a charity under his control that would allow Raj and Stern to extract the money through a "no-

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show job." Id. at 326. On October 23, 2012, Halloran sent letters written on City Council letterhead to three local charities under his control stating that, in connection with acquiring a "community facility" for those charities, Halloran would allocate some $80,000 in discretionary funding. Id. at 326-27. On November 15, 2012, Halloran sent a second letter, also written on City Council letterhead, to Raj's company, requesting its assistance with the fraudulent community facility project and reiterating that Halloran would allocate up to $80,000 in discretionary funding. Id. at 327; (see also Trial Tr. ("Tr.") 600.) After receiving the second letter, Raj paid Halloran $15,000 in cash. Halloran, 821 F.3d at 327.

In the second scheme, the "Wilson-Pakula Scheme," Halloran worked with Stern, Raj, and others to bribe Republican party officials to help Malcom Smith ("Smith"), a Democrat, obtain the Republican Party's nomination for New York City mayor. Id. To compete for the nomination, Smith would require an authorization, known as a "Wilson-Pakula,"2 from a Republican Party executive committee. Id.; see also N.Y. Elec. Law § 6-120(3). In practice, this required securing the votes of at least three of the Republican Party chairs representing the five boroughs of New York City. Halloran, 821 F.3d at 327. Pursuant to Halloran's instructions, Raj paid bribes to two such leaders, those of Queens and the Bronx. Id. at 329.

On July 29, 2014, following trial, a jury found Halloran guilty of all five counts with which he was charged. Id. at 330. At sentencing, the Court imposed a sentence of 120 months' imprisonment followed by two years of supervised release. Id.

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Halloran filed a direct appeal. On April 28, 2016, the Second Circuit affirmed. Id. at 343. On February 21, 2017, the Supreme Court denied certiorari. See Halloran v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 1118 (2017). The instant Petition and related Discovery Motion followed.

II. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

A prisoner in federal custody may move to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence only "upon the ground that the sentence was imposed in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States, or that the court was without jurisdiction to impose such sentence, or that the sentence was in excess of the maximum authorized by law, or is otherwise subject to collateral attack." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).3 "Because collateral challenges are in tension with society's strong interest in the finality of criminal convictions, the courts have established rules that make it more difficult for a defendant to upset a conviction by collateral, as opposed to direct, attack." Yick Man Mui v. United States, 614 F.3d 50, 53 (2d Cir. 2010) (citation and quotation marks omitted). To prevail on a collateral attack of a final judgment under § 2255, a petitioner must demonstrate the existence of a "constitutional error . . . or an error of law or fact that constitutes a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice." United States v. Bokun, 73 F.3d 8, 12 (2d Cir. 1995) (citation and quotation marks omitted); accord Cuoco v. United States, 208 F.3d 27, 30 (2d Cir. 2000); Rodriguez v. United States, No. 11-CV-2957,

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2013 WL 6171618, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 25, 2013), aff'd, 679 F. App'x 41 (2d Cir. 2017).

In ruling on a § 2255 petition, the district court is required to hold a hearing "[u]nless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b). Nor is a hearing required where the petitioner's allegations are "vague, conclusory, or palpably incredible." Gonzalez v. United States, 722 F.3d 118, 130-31 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 495 (1962)). To justify a hearing, the petition "must set forth specific facts supported by competent evidence, raising detailed and controverted issues of fact that, if proved at a hearing, would entitle [the petitioner] to relief." Id. at 131.

B. Analysis

Petitioner argues that (1) the evidence was insufficient, and the jury instructions erroneous, as to each of his offenses of conviction in light of the Supreme Court's subsequent decision in McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2355 (2016); (2) the Government committed a reversible Brady or Giglio violation; and (3) the "integrity of the trial was compromised by prosecutorial misconduct." (Pet. 4, 6, 8.) The Court addresses each argument to the extent necessary.

1. McDonnell Claim

Petitioner argues that his convictions must be overturned, or in the alternative that he is entitled to a new trial, because the evidence was insufficient, and the jury instructions were overbroad and thus erroneous, as to each of the offenses of conviction in light of McDonnell. (Pet'r's Mem. 12-26; Reply Mem. Of Law In Further Supp. Of Def.'s Pet. To Vacate His Conviction Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ("Pet'r's Reply") (Dkt. No. 561) 1-12.)

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a. Holding in McDonnell

The Court begins by reviewing the Supreme Court's decision in McDonnell. There, Robert McDonnell ("McDonnell"), the former Governor of Virginia, was charged, as relevant here, with honest services wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343.4 McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2365. The Government's theory of the case was that McDonnell accepted bribes from a businessman in exchange for arranging certain meetings and hosting certain events to promote the businessman's product. Id. at 2361, 2364-66. Critically, "[t]he parties agreed that they would define honest services fraud with reference to the federal bribery statute," which requires proof that McDonnell had "committed or agreed to commit an 'official act'" in exchange for bribes. Id. at 2365 (citation omitted).5 That statute, in turn, defines "official act" as "any decision or action on any question, matter, cause, suit, proceeding or controversy, which may at

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any time be pending, or which may by law be brought before any public official, in such official's official capacity, or in such official's place of trust or profit." 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(3). In accordance with the parties' agreement, the District Court instructed the jury that it must find that McDonnell agreed "to accept a thing of value in exchange for official action." McDonnell, 136 S. Ct. at 2366. However, the District Court also instructed the jury—at the request of the Government and over McDonnell's objections—that the term "official act" encompassed "acts that a public official customarily performs," including acts "in furtherance of longer-term goals" or "in a series of steps to exercise influence or achieve an end." Id.

On appeal, the Supreme Court rejected the District Court's interpretation of "official act." Instead, it held:

The "question, matter, cause, suit,
...

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