Halpern v. Bristol Bd. of Educ.

• Decision Date: 15 March 1999
• Docket Number: No. Civ.A. 3:98CV243(CFD).,Civ.A. 3:98CV243(CFD).
• Citation: 52 F.Supp.2d 324
• Parties: Elinor HALPERN, Plaintiff, v. BRISTOL BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut

52 F.Supp.2d 324

Elinor HALPERN, Plaintiff, v. BRISTOL BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant.

No. Civ.A. 3:98CV243(CFD).

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

March 15, 1999.

Jon L. Schoenhorn, Law Offices of Jon L. Schoenhorn, Hartford, CT, for plaintiff.

Burton Kainen, Vaughn Finn, Shipman & Goodwin, Hartford, CT, for defendant.

RULING ON CROSS-MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

DRONEY, District Judge.

Introduction

The complaint in this action was filed on February 6, 1998, and seeks damages for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and breach of an employment contract.¹ It concerns the alleged unlawful termination of the plaintiff's employment on August 30, 1974. The plaintiff and defendant have each filed a motion for summary judgment. For the following reasons, the Court finds that the action is barred by the applicable statutes of limitations and, accordingly, the defendant's motion for summary judgment [Document # 7] is GRANTED and the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment [Document # 11] is DENIED.

Background²

On August 21, 1974, the defendant Bristol Board of Education (hereinafter "the Board"), conducted a hearing pursuant to Conn.Gen.Stat. § 10-151(b) to determine whether to terminate the teaching contract of the plaintiff, Elinor Halpern, after eight years of teaching in the Bristol school system.³ Conn.Gen.Stat. § 10-151 provides notice and hearing requirements for terminating the employment contracts of tenured teachers, such as the plaintiff. In 1974 the statute also provided that, beginning with the fourth year of a teacher's continuous employment, her contract for employment could only be terminated for one of six reasons. See Conn.Gen.Stat. § 10-151(b) (1974).⁴ On August 30, 1974, the plaintiff was notified that the Board had "voted to terminate [her] teaching contract immediately."⁵

Conn.Gen.Stat. § 10-151 also provided that "any teacher aggrieved by the decision of a board of education after a hearing as provided in subsection (b) of this section may appeal therefrom, within thirty days of such decision, to the court of common pleas for the county or judicial district in which the board is located." Conn.Gen. Stat. § 10-151(f). On September 27, 1974, the plaintiff filed a complaint in the Connecticut Court of Common Pleas,⁶ challenging the Board's decision to terminate her employment. The complaint alleged that the Board's actions violated the plaintiff's rights under Conn.Gen.Stat. § 10-151(b)⁷ and denied her due process of law.⁸ The complaint requested that the decision of the Board be reversed and the action of the Board be "declared invalid and of no effect."⁹ The Court dismissed the plaintiff's action and she then appealed to the Connecticut Supreme Court.

The Connecticut Supreme Court held that the Board violated the plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by failing to state the reasons for its decision to discharge her or the evidence upon which it relied in making that decision. See Lee v. Board of Education of the City of Bristol, 181 Conn. 69, 434 A.2d 333 (1980). The decision of the Court of Common Pleas was reversed and the plaintiff's case was remanded to the Board for further proceedings.

In November, 1980, the Board reconvened and considered the transcript of the 1974 hearing and the exhibits introduced at that time. The Board then reaffirmed the decision to terminate the plaintiff's employment and issued "findings and conclusions". Halpern I, 649 A.2d at 536. On December 4, 1980, the plaintiff appealed the decision of the Board to the Connecticut Superior Court. The complaint filed in that action again challenged the August 30, 1974, original decision of the Board to terminate the plaintiff's employment, as well as the findings and conclusions issued by the Board in 1980. The complaint alleged that the conduct of the Board violated Conn.Gen.Stat. § 10-151, and "the plaintiff's rights to due process of law, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and by Article One, § 8 of the Connecticut Constitution." In her prayer for relief the plaintiff requested:

judgment that the final decision of the Board of Education of Bristol be reversed and that the action of said Board in attempting to terminate the plaintiff's contract of employment and tenure status be declared invalid and of no effect; and that this matter be remanded to the Board for a determination of the amount of back wages and benefits owed to the plaintiff by the defendant.

The Superior Court rendered judgment in favor of the Board and the plaintiff again appealed to the Connecticut Supreme Court.¹⁰

The Connecticut Supreme Court held that the plaintiff was not entitled to a new termination hearing. However, because the procedure that the Board had employed following remand in Lee did not allow the plaintiff meaningful participation in the "remediation of her constitutional rights," see Halpern v. Board of Education of the City of Bristol, 231 Conn. 308, 649 A.2d 534 (1994) (Halpern I), the judgment of the Connecticut Superior Court was reversed and vacated and the Superior Court was instructed to remand the matter to the Board for further proceedings. The Connecticut Supreme Court also ordered that the Plaintiff be permitted to file exceptions and present briefs and oral argument "concerning the propriety of the termination" of the plaintiff. 649 A.2d at 538.¹¹

Following remand, the Board again met to consider the transcript from the 1974 termination hearing, the exhibits introduced at that time, and the termination of the plaintiff's employment. The Board then submitted a draft of its findings and conclusions to counsel for the plaintiff and invited a written response. On May 8, 1995, the Board heard argument from counsel for the plaintiff and voted unanimously to uphold the termination of the plaintiff's employment.

On June 20, 1995, the plaintiff filed her third complaint in the Connecticut Superior Court. The complaint again challenged the August 30, 1974, decision of the Board, as well as the 1995 findings and conclusions of the Board. The plaintiff alleged that the decision and the manner in which the May 8, 1995, Board meeting was conducted violated Conn.Gen.Stat. § 10-151, the plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights, her due process rights under Article One, § 8 of the Connecticut Constitution, and the mandate of the Connecticut Supreme Court in Halpern I. In her prayer for relief, the plaintiff requested that,

the final decision of the Board of Education of Bristol be reversed and that the action of said Board in attempting to terminate plaintiff's contract of employment and tenure status be declared invalid and of no effect, and that this matter be remanded to the Board.

In addition, the plaintiff requested reinstatement to her teaching position.¹² The Connecticut Superior Court dismissed the action and, on appeal to the Connecticut Supreme Court, that decision was affirmed and the state court litigation over the termination of the plaintiff's employment contract was concluded. See Halpern v. Board of Education of the City of Bristol, 243 Conn. 435, 703 A.2d 1144 (1997), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S.Ct. 1842, 140 L.Ed.2d 1092 (1998) ("Halpern II").

On February 6, 1998, the plaintiff filed her complaint in this court, alleging that the Bristol Board of Education violated her Fourteenth Amendment due process rights and breached her employment contract. She is seeking damages for her loss of salary and benefits, compensatory damages, and attorney's fees.

The Board has moved for summary judgment on the complaint, arguing: (1) the action is barred by the applicable statutes of limitations; (2) the action is barred by the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel; and (3) assuming the action is not so barred, the Board is entitled to judgment based upon the merits of the plaintiff's claims. The plaintiff opposed the defendant's motion and cross-moved for summary judgment.

With respect to the defendant's argument that this action is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, the plaintiff argues that her action did not accrue until the May, 1995, Board vote or until she exhausted all her state appeals of the 1974 Board decision and it became clear that she would not be reinstated as a teacher. Additionally, the plaintiff claims that the actions of the defendant constitutes a continuing violation of her constitutional rights. Because the Court finds that the plaintiff's action is barred by the statutes of limitations, it need not address the other bases for summary judgment raised by the Board.

Discussion

A. Summary Judgment Standard

In a motion for summary judgment, the burden is on the moving party to establish that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Rule 56(c), Fed.R.Civ.P.; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A court must grant summary judgment "`if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact....'" Miner v. City of Glens Falls, 999 F.2d 655, 661 (2d Cir.1993) (citation omitted). A dispute regarding a material fact is genuine "`if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'" Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520, 523 (2d Cir.) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 965, 113 S.Ct. 440, 121 L.Ed.2d 359 (1992). After discovery, if the nonmoving party "has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of [its] case with respect to which [it] has the burden of proof," then summary judgment is appropriate. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). "The non-movant must do more than present evidence that is merely...