Halpern v. Colvin
| Decision Date | 04 February 2016 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. TDC 14-2538 |
| Parties | JUDITH HALPERN, Plaintiff, v. CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
Plaintiff pro se Judith Halpern seeks judicial review under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Defendant" or the "Commissioner") denying her applications for disability insurance benefits ("DIB") and Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. Before the Court are Plaintiff's letter motion, which the undersigned construes as a motion for summary judgment or for remand under the fourth sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)1 (ECF No. 18), and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 22).2 Plaintiff also seeks remand under the sixth sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for the Commissioner to consider additionalevidence. ECF Nos. 18, 19, 27. Defendant contends that the administrative record contains substantial evidence to support the Commissioner's decision that Plaintiff is not disabled. Under Standing Order 2014-01, this matter has been referred to the undersigned for pretrial management and for proposed findings of fact and recommendations under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and L.R. 301(5)(b)(ix). No hearing is necessary. L.R. 105(6). For the reasons that follow, it is RECOMMENDED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 22) be GRANTED, Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment or for remand under the fourth sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (ECF No. 18) be DENIED, Plaintiff's motion for remand under the sixth sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (ECF Nos. 18, 19, 27) be DENIED, and Defendant's final decision be AFFIRMED.
Plaintiff was born in 1972, has a college education, and previously worked as an HMS host, Montgomery College worker, office manager, and Target retail associate. R. at 30, 205. Plaintiff applied protectively for DIB and SSI on February 4, 2011, alleging disability beginning on August 24, 2009, due to dysmenorrhea, endometriosis, anxiety, depression, a learning disability, a colon polyp, and a fibroid. R. at 176-78, 201, 204. The Commissioner denied Plaintiff's applications initially and again on reconsideration, so Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ"). R. at 116-32. On September 24, 2012, ALJ Larry Banks held a hearing in Washington, D.C., at which Plaintiff pro se and a vocational expert ("VE") testified. R. at 70-115. At the hearing, Plaintiff amended her alleged onset date of disability to June 1, 2011. R. at 87, 199-200. Upon Plaintiff's request (R. at 261-66), a supplemental hearing was held on April 5, 2013, where Plaintiff pro se and the VE againtestified (R. at 36-69). On April 22, 2013, the ALJ issued a decision finding Plaintiff not disabled from the amended onset date of disability of June 1, 2011, through the date of the decision. R. at 19-35. Plaintiff sought review of this decision by the Appeals Council, contending that the ALJ discriminated against her on the basis of her gender and religious beliefs. R. at 18. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review on March 21, 2014. R. at 8-15. The ALJ's decision thus became the final decision of the Commissioner. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981, 416.1481; see also Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 106-07, 120 S. Ct. 2080, 2083 (2000).
On August 11, 2014, Plaintiff filed a complaint in this Court seeking review of the Commissioner's decision. ECF No. 1. On January 15, 2015, Defendant filed the administrative transcript of this case. ECF No. 11. On May 11, 2015, Plaintiff filed a letter construed as a motion for summary judgment and alternative motion for remand under the fourth sentence of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (ECF No. 18), which she supplemented on June 1, 2015 (ECF No. 19). She also sought remand under the sixth sentence of § 405(g) for the Commissioner to consider additional evidence. ECF Nos. 18, 19, 27. On June 16, 2015, Defendant filed her Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 22. On June 22, 2015, the case was referred to the undersigned for a report and recommendation for the disposition of the parties' motions. ECF No. 25. On June 29, 2015, Plaintiff filed her response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 27. The matter is now fully submitted.
On May 12, 2009, Bradford Kleinman, M.D., noted that Plaintiff was "currently being treated for significant [dysmenorrhea] and endometriosis," and the doctor opined that "[d]ue toher conditions she may require a few days off each month during her cycle for treatment." R. at 484.
On April 27, 2011, a state agency consultant, L. Robbins, M.D., assessed Plaintiff's physical residual functional capacity ("RFC"). R. at 373-81. Dr. Robbins opined that Plaintiff could (1) lift and/or carry 50 pounds occasionally and 25 pounds frequently; (2) stand and/or walk for a total of about six hours in an eight-hour workday; (3) sit for about six hours in an eight-hour workday; and (4) perform unlimited pushing and/or pulling with the upper extremities. R. at 374. Plaintiff had no postural, manipulative, visual, communicative, or environmental limitations. R. at 375-77.
On August 18, 2011, another state agency medical consultant, Fulvio Franyutti, M.D., also assessed Plaintiff's physical RFC. R. at 430-38. Dr. Franyutti opined that Plaintiff could (1) lift and/or carry 50 pounds occasionally and 25 pounds frequently; (2) stand and/or walk for a total of about six hours in an eight-hour workday; (3) sit for about six hours in an eight-hour workday; and (4) perform unlimited pushing and/or pulling with the upper extremities. R. at 431. Plaintiff occasionally could climb and crawl and frequently could balance, stoop, kneel, and crouch. R. at 432. Although she had no manipulative, visual, or communicative limitations, Plaintiff was to avoid concentrated exposure to hazards and extreme cold and heat. R. at 433-34.
The VE testified at the September 2012 hearing that a hypothetical individual with Plaintiff's age, education, and work experience could not perform Plaintiff's past work if the individual had the RFC to perform light work3 but (1) could not stand any longer than fifteen totwenty minutes and could not sit any longer than twenty to thirty minutes before alternating positions; (2) could not lift over fifteen pounds and push or pull over twenty-five pounds; (3) needed to avoid working around dangerous machinery or unprotected heights; (4) needed to avoid temperature extremes; and (5) was limited to performing unskilled4 tasks with simple instructions because of issues with focus and concentration. R. at 105-06. Relying in part on the Dictionary of Occupational Titles5 ("DOT"), the VE testified that the individual could perform the light, unskilled jobs of machine tender (DOT 775.685-010), grading and sorting worker (DOT 649.687-010), or packer and packaging worker (DOT 222.687-022), however. R. at 107-08. Such an individual with this RFC but instead limited to performing sedentary work6 could perform the sedentary, unskilled jobs of security worker,7 quality-control worker (DOT 737.687-026), or small-parts inserter (DOT 734.687-034). R. at 108-09. According to the VE, histestimony was consistent with the DOT, with the exception of his testimony regarding the sit/stand option, which was based on his experience as a VE. R. at 109-10.
The VE testified at the April 2013 hearing that a hypothetical individual with Plaintiff's age, education, and work experience could not perform Plaintiff's past work if the individual's RFC involved a twenty- to thirty-minute sit/stand option; no climbing of ropes, ladders, or scaffolds; only occasional stooping; avoiding concentrated exposure to extreme temperatures and exposure to dangerous machinery and unprotected heights; no above-the-shoulder lifting or constant reaching with the upper extremities; and only work involving simple instructions and no complex tasks. R. at 64-65. The individual could perform, however, the light, unskilled jobs of grading and sorting worker (DOT 649.687-010), inspector (DOT 741.687-010), or information clerk (DOT 237.367-010). R. at 66. The individual also could perform the sedentary jobs of security worker (DOT 379.367-010), quality-control worker (DOT 737.687-026), or finish machine tender (DOT 681.685-030). R. at 66-68. A person who would be "off task" 20% of the workday because of pain and side effects of medication could perform no work, however. R. at 68.
On April 22, 2013, the ALJ found that Plaintiff (1) had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the amended alleged onset date of disability of June 1, 2011; and (2) had an impairment or a combination of impairments considered to be "severe" on the basis of the requirements in the Code of Federal Regulations; but (3) did not have an impairment or a combination of impairments meeting or equaling one of the impairments set forth in 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1; and (4) was unable to perform her past relevant work; but (5) couldperform other work in the national economy. R. at 25-31. The ALJ thus found that she was not disabled from the amended alleged onset date of disability of June 1, 2011, through the date of the decision. R. at 31.
The Social Security Act defines a disability as the inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment that can be expected to result in death or that has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505, 416.905. A claimant has a disability when the claimant is "not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience,...
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