Halsne v. Liberty Mut. Group
Decision Date | 26 March 1999 |
Docket Number | No. C 99-3014-MWB.,C 99-3014-MWB. |
Citation | 40 F.Supp.2d 1087 |
Parties | Jim HALSNE, Plaintiff, v. LIBERTY MUTUAL GROUP, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Iowa |
Mindi M. Vervaecke of McGuire Law Firm, P.C., Mason City, IA, for plaintiff.
Patrick J. McNulty of Grefe & Sidney, P.L.C., Des Moines, IA, for defendant.
How far is the plaintiff the "master of the complaint"? Can he, for example, preclude federal removal jurisdiction by stipulating, after removal, that he will not seek or accept an amount in damages in excess of the jurisdictional amount in controversy? These are the questions posed by the present application for remand of this action to state court.
Plaintiff Jim Halsne filed this action on January 6, 1999, in Iowa District Court in and for Cerro Gordo County, asserting a claim of bad faith failure to pay medical bills he incurred as the result of a workers compensation injury. Defendant Liberty Mutual Group removed this action to this federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) on February 16, 1999. On February 19, 1999, Halsne filed an application for remand of this matter to state court, asserting an insufficient amount in controversy. Liberty Mutual filed a response to Halsne's application on February 24, 1999. The court heard oral arguments on the application for remand on March 24, 1999, and now enters its ruling.
In his application for remand, Halsne asserts that his unpaid medical bills amount to approximately $6,000. Thus, he contends that the amount in controversy in this action, exclusive of interest and costs, is estimated to be no more than $70,000. Although he contends that a plaintiff in state court may prevent removal by committing to accept less than the federal jurisdictional minimum, he stopped short of making such a commitment in his application for remand. Nevertheless, he seeks remand of this matter to state court for lack of federal subject matter jurisdiction, owing to insufficient amount in controversy.
In its response, Liberty Mutual points out that Halsne has omitted to mention that he seeks punitive damages on his badfaith claim, which Liberty Mutual contends makes it more likely that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. However, Liberty Mutual asserts that it has no resistance to a remand, if Halsne's assertion that his damages are less than $70,000 is taken as a binding certification or covenant not to seek or accept any award in excess of $70,000.
In McCorkindale v. American Home Assur. Co./A.I.C., 909 F.Supp. 646 (N.D.Iowa 1995), this court summarized the principles applicable to a motion to remand as follows: (1) the party seeking removal and opposing remand bears the burden of establishing federal subject matter jurisdiction; (2) a fundamental principle of removal jurisdiction is that whether subject matter jurisdiction exists is a question answered by looking to the complaint as it existed at the time the petition for removal was filed; (3) lack of subject matter jurisdiction requires remand to the state court under the terms of 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); (4) the court's removal jurisdiction must be strictly construed; therefore, (5) the district court is required to resolve all doubts about federal jurisdiction in favor of remand; and, finally, (6) in general, remand orders issued under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) are not reviewable by appeal or writ of mandamus. McCorkindale, 909 F.Supp. at 650.
Halsne contends that the very first principle mentioned above defeats removal here, because Liberty Mutual cannot bear its burden to prove that removal is permissible. He asserts that a limited financial demand in a pleading precludes removal, even when amendment is possible and even when state law treats the sum in a pleading as irrelevant, citing Barbers, Hairstyling for Men and Women, Inc. v. Bishop, 132 F.3d 1203, 1204 (7th Cir.1997). However, Rule 70(a) of the Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure prohibits the pleading of a specific amount in controversy,1 and Halsne's pleadings in fact contain no such limited financial demand. Therefore, Barbers is not determinative.
Rather, Halsne professed his willingness to stipulate that he will accept less than the federal jurisdictional amount, and in fact did so on the record during the oral arguments. Specifically, the following exchange occurred:
MR. McNULTY: I think it does, Your Honor. Just to be cautious, I guess I would like counsel to state that it's a stipulation but also binding insofar as any judgment obtained in state court in excess of that she's in effect saying that the case — any recovery's limited to the less than [$]75,000.
MS. VERVAECKE: Yes, I am willing to stipulate to that.
MR. McNULTY: The stipulation is then satisfactory, Your Honor.
Transcript of Oral Arguments, March 24, 1999, p. 2 ("real time" transcript). Thus, the question is whether such a stipulation is effective to defeat this court's subject matter jurisdiction on removal.
In McCorkindale, in addition to the general principles articulated above, this court considered the proper standards for determining the amount in controversy when a state court rule — such as Rule 70(a) of the Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure — prohibits the pleading of a specific amount in controversy: Instead of the "legal certainty" test, which might otherwise obtain,2 the defendant is required to prove by the preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional amount. McCorkindale, 909 F.Supp. at 651-53. This court also outlined the process for determining the amount in controversy in such cases: First, the court must determine whether the complaint is removable on its face; and second, if the complaint is not removable on its face, the court must provide the parties with the opportunity to satisfy the court as to the amount in controversy. Id. at 653-55. However, this court did not have reason to consider directly in McCorkindale whether the plaintiff could defeat removal jurisdiction by stipulating after removal that his or her damages do not exceed the jurisdictional minimum, when the plaintiff was forbidden from pleading any specific amount of damages in his or her state-court petition. Therefore, the McCorkindale decision may provide the framework for analysis of this application for remand, but it does not necessarily dictate the appropriate conclusion.
Turning to the first part of the applicable analysis, the court finds that the face of the complaint in question here provides little, if any, insight into the amount in controversy. Accord McCorkindale, 909 F.Supp. at 655 ( ). This problem is not lessened by a prayer for punitive damages, because when sufficient amount in controversy depends upon such a prayer, the court "`will scrutinize a claim for punitive damages more closely than a claim for actual damages to ensure Congress's limits on diversity jurisdiction are properly observed.'" Id. at 655 (quoting State of Mo. ex rel. Pemiscot County v. Western Sur. Co., 51 F.3d 170, 173 (8th Cir.1995)). Therefore, the court finds that the complaint is not removable on its face, and the court must take recourse to the second prong of the analysis, providing the parties with the opportunity to satisfy the court as to the amount in controversy. Id. In this case, this prong of the analysis brings the court to the proffered stipulation.
Generally, such a post-removal stipulation limiting the amount in controversy — like a post-removal amendment — would not defeat removal jurisdiction. See, e.g., St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co., 303 U.S. at 293, 58 S.Ct. 586. See also Barbers, 132 F.3d at 1205 ( ). However, this general rule has consistently been applied to cases in which the petition at the time of the removal expressly stated a claim in excess of the jurisdictional amount, and therefore, removal jurisdiction had already attached. See McCorkindale, 909 F.Supp. at 650-51; see also Chase v. Shop 'N Save Warehouse Foods, Inc., 110 F.3d 424, 429 (7th Cir. 1997) ( ). Here, the court concludes that whether or not removal jurisdiction has attached is the very question before the court. Compare id. at 652.
More helpful than cases involving attempts to defeat removal jurisdiction once that jurisdiction has already attached is a recent decision of the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Meritcare, Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 166 F.3d 214 (3d Cir. 1999). In that case, the plaintiffs pleaded only damages "exceeding $25,000," and the defendant's notice of removal stated that it had been advised that the plaintiffs' claim was for $250,000, but the notice did not indicate the amount in controversy as to each of the three named plaintiffs. Meritcare, 166 F.3d at 216 & 222. The court concluded that the bulk of damages on the bad-faith...
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