Halstead v. United States

• Decision Date: 10 March 1982
• Docket Number: Civ. No. B 77-270,B 77-274 and B 77-303.
• Citation: 535 F. Supp. 782
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut
• Parties: Peter C. HALSTEAD, Administrator, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES of America, Jeppesen & Co. and Katherine H. Saloomey, Administratrix, Defendants. Katherine H. SALOOMEY, Administratrix, Plaintiff, v. JEPPESEN & CO., Defendant. Katherine H. SALOOMEY, Administratrix, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant.

535 F. Supp. 782

Peter C. HALSTEAD, Administrator, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES of America, Jeppesen & Co. and Katherine H. Saloomey, Administratrix, Defendants.

Katherine H. SALOOMEY, Administratrix, Plaintiff, v. JEPPESEN & CO., Defendant.

Katherine H. SALOOMEY, Administratrix, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant.

Civ. Nos. B 77-270, B 77-274 and B 77-303.

United States District Court, D. Connecticut.

March 10, 1982.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

James M. Kearns, Bridgeport, Conn., for plaintiff Halstead.

Robert Marzik, Stratford, Conn., for plaintiff Saloomey.

Raymond Beckwith, Suzanne Baldasare, Bridgeport, Conn., Floyd Dodson, for defendant Jeppesen.

James P. Piper, Washington, D. C., for Government.

Thomas H. Cotter, Bridgeport, Conn., for defendant Saloomey.

OPINION RESPECTING APPLICABLE LAW

EGINTON, District Judge.

These wrongful death actions arose out of the tragic crash of a small private plane, a Beech Sierra, into a mountain ridge near Martinsburg, West Virginia on August 31, 1975. Killed were the pilot of the plane, Willard Vernon Wahlund, his father, and his young son Erik. They are survived by Willard's wife Penny and their minor daughter.

Plaintiffs Katherine H. Saloomey and Peter C. Halstead are the administratrix and administrator of Willard's and Erik's respective estates. Plaintiff Saloomey alleges that the accident resulted from the negligence of federal air traffic controllers operating out of Dulles Airport in Virginia and from a defect in a navigational chart manufactured in Colorado by defendant Jeppesen & Co. (hereinafter "Jeppesen"). Jeppesen is incorporated in Colorado and has its principal place of business there. The maps were purchased from Jeppesen in Colorado by Wahlund's employer, Braniff Airlines, and were carried by him on the pilot's last trip. Plaintiff Halstead's complaint contends that the deaths were caused by the negligence of the controllers, by a defect in the Jeppesen navigational chart, and by the negligence of the pilot, Erik's father.

Both complaints involving Jeppesen set forth counts of negligence, breach of warranty and strict products liability. Jeppesen asserts that all three counts should be governed by the law of West Virginia, the site of the crash. At the time of the crash, August 31, 1975, the West Virginia Wrongful Death Act imposed a fixed monetary limit on recoverable damages. W.Va.Code § 55-7-6 (1965).¹ In 1976 this section was rewritten without any limitation, but the new version does not apply to deaths occurring prior to July 1, 1976. W.Va.Code § 55-7-6 (1976). Under the 1965 statute the distributees of the decedents were permitted to recover $10,000 for the wrongful death itself, $100,000 for financial and pecuniary losses sustained by the dependent distributees of the deceased, and special damages for funeral and medical expenses.

West Virginia law would thus limit plaintiff Saloomey's recovery to $110,000 plus funeral expenses. Plaintiff Halstead could recover no more than $10,000 plus funeral expenses, unless evidence of some financial or pecuniary loss sustained by any distributee of the unemancipated minor Erik Wahlund were introduced. Bond v. Huntington, 276 S.E.2d 539 (W.Va.1981); Salerno v. Manchin, 213 S.E.2d 805 (W.Va.1974); Adams v. Sparacio, 156 W.Va. 678, 196 S.E.2d 647 (1973). Finally, because West Virginia did not permit actions in strict products liability until 1979, Morningstar v. Black and Decker Manufacturing Co., 253 S.E.2d 666 (W.Va.1979) plaintiffs could recover only on negligence and breach of warranty counts under West Virginia law.

Plaintiffs assert that the law of the forum state, Connecticut, rather than that of West Virginia is more appropriate for the court to apply in the instant suit, since the estates involved herein are of individuals resident in Connecticut at death. In Connecticut, the measure of recovery in a wrongful death action is the value to the decedent of his life rather than the monetary loss to his next of kin or estate. Conn. Gen.Stat. § 52-555;²Feldman v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 524 F.2d 384 (2d Cir. 1975). The value to decedent of his life includes his lost earning capacity less income taxes and personal living expenses, plus the value of his capacity to carry on life's nonremunerative activities in a way he would have done had he lived.

Defendant vigorously opposes the application of Connecticut law and contends that if the court determines that West Virginia law is not applicable, then the Wrongful Death Act of Colorado rather than that of Connecticut should govern the claims of both plaintiffs. Colorado law permits recovery in a wrongful death action to the extent of the survivors' pecuniary losses. Pierce v. Conners, 20 Colo. 178, 37 P. 721 (1894). However, if a deceased is not survived by a widow, widower or minor children, or a dependent mother or father, then damages recoverable are limited to $45,000. Colo.Rev.Stat. § 13-21-203.³ In all cases, the Act excludes any award of exemplary or punitive damages. Mangus v. Miller, 35 Colo.App. 335, 535 P.2d 219 cert. dismissed, 189 Colo. 481, 569 P.2d 1390 (1975).

Both Colorado and Connecticut, unlike West Virginia as of the date of the crash, recognize actions in strict products liability as defined by § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965).⁴ Rossignol v. Danbury School of Aeronautics, Inc., 154 Conn. 549, 227 A.2d 418 (1967); Garthwait v. Burgio, 153 Conn. 284, 216 A.2d 189 (1965); Hiigel v. General Motors Corp., 190 Colo. 57, 544 P.2d 983 (1975); Bradford v. Bendix-Westinghouse Auto Air Brake Co., 33 Colo.App. 99, 517 P.2d 406 (1973). However, Jeppesen argues that even if the law of Colorado or Connecticut rather than that of West Virginia applies, plaintiffs may not maintain an action in strict products liability because the Jeppesen navigational chart is a service and not a product.

CHOICE OF LAW FOR STRICT LIABILITY AND NEGLIGENCE COUNTS

Since jurisdiction is premised on diversity of citizenship, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1), this court must apply Connecticut conflict of law rules to determine what law governs the case. Klaxon v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., 313 U.S. 487, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 85 L.Ed. 1477 (1941). The counts of negligence and strict products liability clearly sound in tort. In such actions the Connecticut courts have traditionally followed the rule of lex loci delicti: the law of the state where the tort was committed governs the substantive elements of the cause of action. Gibson v. Fullin, 172 Conn. 407, 374 A.2d 1061 (1977); Landers v. Landers, 153 Conn. 303, 216 A.2d 183 (1966). Defendant urges that because Connecticut deems a tort to have been committed in the state where the injury occurred, Patch v. Stanley Works, 448 F.2d 483, 491 (2d Cir. 1971); Landers v. Landers, supra, the negligence law of West Virginia, the state in which the wrongful death is alleged to have occurred, controls even though Jeppesen prepared the allegedly defective design in Colorado.

The conflicts rule of lex loci delicti has been severely criticized by courts and commentators alike and has been abandoned by the highest courts of many states in favor of the principle of applying the law of the jurisdiction which has the most significant relationship to the controversy or which may be considered the "center of gravity." Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145 (1971)⁵ (Comment Subsection 2); Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 240 N.Y. S.2d 743, 191 N.E.2d 279 (1963); Griffith v. United Airlines, 416 Pa. 1, 203 A.2d 796 (1964); Dworak v. Olson Construction Co., 191 Colo. 161, 551 P.2d 198 (1976); Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 222 A.2d 205 (1966).

The Connecticut Supreme Court, in its recent application of lex loci delicti in Gibson v. Fullin, supra, recognized the growing acceptance in other jurisdictions of the most significant relationship test of § 145 of the Restatement, but declined to follow the trend, absent more compelling circumstances than were presented in that case. "... The developing rule is still very much in a transitional stage, and the present case presents no compelling reason to abandon the traditional rule." 172 Conn. at 411. From this language, it appears that the Supreme Court would abandon lex loci delicti in favor of the Restatement Second rule in appropriate circumstances.

Judge Burns, in Defourneaux v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 503 F.Supp. 2 (D.Conn.1980), suggested in dictum that in a case where neither party had any meaningful relationship with the state whose law would govern under the old rule, Connecticut would apply the new approach. 503 F.Supp. at 4. The instant case presents just such a fact situation. Plaintiffs' decedents were citizens and domiciliaries of Connecticut and defendant Jeppesen is a Colorado corporation with its principal place of business in Colorado. The navigational charts which are the subject of the negligence and strict products liability claims were manufactured and distributed in Colorado. The complaints in this action do not allege any acts of negligence on the part of Jeppesen in West Virginia.

In the absence of any meaningful contact between the litigation and the state of West Virginia other than, by pure fortuity, the site of the crash, it would be offensive to traditional notions of justice and normal expectations to apply West Virginia law to adjudicate plaintiffs' wrongful death claims. West Virginia law, if applied, would preclude plaintiffs' actions in strict products liability and would limit damages recoverable by Saloomey and Halstead to $110,000 and $10,000 respectively, regardless of the actual pecuniary losses suffered by decedents' distributees. To thus limit the rights of nonresidents of West Virginia by applying restrictions which West Virginia has itself subsequently eliminated would appear arbitrary, inequitable and without rational justification.

Thus it is the conviction of this court that the Supreme Court...