Ham v. Parker
| Decision Date | 29 October 2014 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:13-0986-RMG-BM |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Carolina |
| Parties | Genell Ham, Plaintiff, v. Alan Parker, Robert Campbell, Randal Reagan, Mary Springs, Geraldine Abraham, and Linda Bradshaw, Defendants. |
This action has been filed by the Plaintiff against six (6) Defendants asserting four (4) federal causes of actions and two (2) state law causes of action. Plaintiff alleges that she was employed as an instructor at the Turbeville Correctional Institution (TCI), part of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (SCDC), until she was wrongfully terminated from her position on April 13, 2010. The Defendant Linda Bradshaw is alleged to be the Deputy Warden of TCI, while the remaining Defendants are all alleged to be part of the SCDC's school system, known as the Palmetto Unified District.
The Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56, Fed.R.Civ.P., on August 25, 2014. Plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to the Defendants' motion on September 8, 2014, following which the Defendants filed a reply memorandum on September 18, 2014.
The Defendants' motion is now before the Court for disposition.1
Plaintiff alleges in a Complaint that can accurately be described as "bare boned", that during her period of employment as an instructor at TCI, she was critical of "Defendants" sexual harassment of women and falsification of student roles to garner unmerited federal funds. Plaintiff alleges that the Defendant Robert Campbell, Interim Principle for TCI, made sexual comments and flirted with the Plaintiff, and on one occasion grabbed and hugged Plaintiff in a lewd and offensive manner. Plaintiff further alleges that the Defendant Alan Parker, the Principle at TCI, also made sexual comments and flirted with the Plaintiff, which Plaintiff rebuffed. Plaintiff alleges that she complained to the Defendants Bradshaw and Randal Reagan, Supervisor of the Palmetto United School District, but that Bradshaw told her there was "nothing wrong with such conduct", while Reagan instructed her to "ignore it".
Plaintiff also alleges that when she was verbally instructed to "pad her student roles", she said that she wanted these instructions in writing. Plaintiff alleges that the "Defendant" [unidentified] thereafter instructed his teachers to write the Plaintiff up every chance they had in order to get rid of her; that the Defendant Mary Springs, identified as an "Agent" of the School District, sent emails accusing Plaintiff of sharing information with correctional officers about "Defendant's rules violations" and falsely accused Plaintiff of yelling at her; and that the DefendantParker falsely accused Plaintiff of going through his papers.2 Plaintiff alleges that the "Defendants" then terminated her in retaliation for complaining about their unlawful conduct.
In her First Cause of Action, Plaintiff asserts a claim for discrimination on the basis of sex in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. In her Second Cause of Action, Plaintiff asserts a claim for unlawful retaliation in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. In her Third Cause of Action, Plaintiff asserts a claim for sex discrimination/retaliation under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In her Fourth Cause of Action, Plaintiff alleges a violation of her First Amendment right of free speech pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In her Fifth Cause of Action, Plaintiff asserts a state law claim of battery, apparently just against the Defendant Campbell, who she alleges "did grab and hug Plaintiff in a rude and offensive manner". In her Sixth Cause of Action, Plaintiff asserts a state law claim for defamation.
As noted, the Defendants have moved for summary judgment on all of Plaintiff's claims. Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56, Fed.R.Civ.P. The moving party has the burden of proving that judgment on the pleadings is appropriate. Temkin v. Frederick County Comm'rs, 945 F.2d 716, 718 (4th Cir. 1991). Once the moving party makes this showing, however, to avoid summary judgment the opposing party must respond to the motion with specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. Baberv. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 872, 874-75 (4th Cir. 1992).
As an initial matter, the undersigned is constrained to note that Plaintiff has failed to comply with discovery directives issued by the Court. By way of history, the Defendants filed an Answer on July 22, 2013, and a scheduling order was entered on July 23, 2013 setting forth a discovery deadline of January 17, 2014. On January 14, 2014 (three days before the discovery deadline), the Defendants filed a motion to compel discovery. In this motion, the Defendants asserted that Plaintiff had never filed her responses to Local Rule 26.03 Interrogatories, and had also failed to provide "formal written answers to Defendants' First Set of Interrogatories [or] responses to Defendants' First Request for Production of Documents". Defendants' further asserted in their motion that Plaintiff had not herself conducted any discovery in the case at all.
Attached to Defendants' motion were copies of Defendants discovery requests, as well as emails dating back to September 2013 setting forth Defendants' attempts to obtain discovery responses from Plaintiff's counsel. One of these emails indicated that, in addition to written discovery, Plaintiff's deposition had been noticed for January 16, 2014, but that the Defendants had not heard from Plaintiff's counsel regarding Plaintiff's deposition, and further stating therein . While Plaintiff's counsel apparently did not respond to this email, he did send an email to defense counsel on December 18, 2013 requesting a thirty day extension to answer Defendants' discovery requests, stating therein that he had had the flu. Defense counsel responded to this email by advising Plaintiffthat, since a thirty day extension would take the parties beyond the discovery deadline set forth in the scheduling order, Plaintiff would need to file a motion (which Defendants would not oppose) to extend the discovery deadline. However, no motion was ever filed. See generally, Defendants' Motion to Compel, with attached exhibits.
Following the expiration of the deadline for completing discovery in this case, the Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's case for lack of prosecution pursuant to Rule 41(b), Fed.R.Civ.P., arguing therein that (despite repeated requests) Plaintiff had still never filed Local Rule 26.03 Interrogatories, had never responded to Defendants' discovery requests, as well as that Plaintiff had failed to appear for her scheduled deposition. With respect to Plaintiff's scheduled deposition, a transcript was prepared after Plaintiff did not appear, which reflected that defense counsel called Plaintiff's counsel, and was told by Plaintiff's counsel "that he simply forgot about the deposition and did not even know if he had notified his client that there was a deposition today", although on January 18, 2014 (the day after expiration of the discovery period in this case), defense counsel received an email from Plaintiff's counsel apologizing for allowing Plaintiff's deposition to "fall between the cracks", and stating that he would "get discovery done next week, god willing". See generally, Defendants' Motion to dismiss, with attached exhibits.
Plaintiff's counsel filed a document styled "response to motion" on January 29, 2014, in which he stated, inter alia, that Plaintiff's "deposition can proceed at the convenience of Defense counsel". In a subsequent filing of February 4, 2014, Plaintiff submitted copies of Plaintiff's responses to Defendants' Interrogatories and Requests to Produce; however, these responses were incomplete, with several reflecting that Plaintiff was still in the process of obtaining further information and/or documents. Some responses also contained the notation "see attached"; however,there were no attachments to the responses filed with the Court. See generally, Plaintiff's Responsive Filings. The Defendants filed a reply memorandum on February 7, 2014, noting again that the discovery period in this case had expired, and that a motion to dismiss had now been filed. Further, with respect to Plaintiff's purported answers to interrogatories filed with the Court, Defendants' counsel represented to the Court that Plaintiff's counsel had told defense counsel that these answers were only a "first draft". Defendants also noted that Plaintiff had named an expert witness, even though the deadline for Plaintiff to have named an expert witness expired October 17, 2013. See Court Docket No. 9. Further, Plaintiff's return to Defendants' Request to Produce included no medical reports, no tape recordings, or any expert reports, and Defendants asserted that as of the date of the filing of Defendants' reply (February 7, 2014), "none of these items have been produced . . . .". See generally Defendants' Reply Memorandum, with attached exhibits.
In a Report and Recommendation entered February 11, 2014, the undersigned recommended that if Plaintiff's counsel indicated a willingness to continue with the prosecution of this case, to comply with the rules of this Court, and to pay Defendants' fees and costs incurred as a result of Plaintiff's conduct, the Defendant's motion to dismiss should be denied and the case allowed to proceed with an amended scheduling order. See Court Docket No. 19. This recommendation was adopted by Order of the...
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