Hamad v. Gates

• Decision Date: 07 October 2013
• Docket Number: Nos. 12–35395,12–35489.,s. 12–35395
• Parties: Adel Hassan HAMAD, Plaintiff–Appellant–Cross–Appellee, v. Robert M. GATES, in his individual capacity; Donald H. Rumsfeld, in his individual capacity; Paul Wolfowitz, in his individual capacity; Gordon R. England, in his individual capacity; James M. McGarrah, in his individual capacity; Richard Bowman Myers, in his individual capacity; Peter Pace, in his individual capacity; Michael Glenn Mullen, in his individual capacity, aka Mike Mullen; James T. Hill, in his individual capacity; Bantz J. Craddock, in his individual capacity; Geoffrey D. Miller, in his individual capacity; Jay Hood, in his individual capacity; Harry B. Harris, Jr., in his individual capacity; Mark H. Buzby, in his individual capacity; Adolph McQueen, in his individual capacity; Nelson Cannon, in his individual capacity; Michael Bumgarner, in his individual capacity, aka Mike Bumgarner; Wade Dennis, in his individual capacity; Bruce Vargo, in his individual capacity; Estaban Rodriguez, in his individual capacity, aka Stephen Rodriguez, aka Steve Rodriguez; Daniel K. McNeill, in his individual capacity; Gregory J. Ihde, in his individual capacity; John Does 1–100, in their individual capacities; United States of America, Defendants–Appellees–Cross–Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

732 F.3d 990

Adel Hassan HAMAD, Plaintiff–Appellant–Cross–Appellee,

v.Robert M. GATES, in his individual capacity; Donald H. Rumsfeld, in his individual capacity; Paul Wolfowitz, in his individual capacity; Gordon R. England, in his individual capacity; James M. McGarrah, in his individual capacity; Richard Bowman Myers, in his individual capacity; Peter Pace, in his individual capacity; Michael Glenn Mullen, in his individual capacity, aka Mike Mullen; James T. Hill, in his individual capacity; Bantz J. Craddock, in his individual capacity; Geoffrey D. Miller, in his individual capacity; Jay Hood, in his individual capacity; Harry B. Harris, Jr., in his individual capacity; Mark H. Buzby, in his individual capacity; Adolph McQueen, in his individual capacity; Nelson Cannon, in his individual capacity; Michael Bumgarner, in his individual capacity, aka Mike Bumgarner; Wade Dennis, in his individual capacity; Bruce Vargo, in his individual capacity; Estaban Rodriguez, in his individual capacity, aka Stephen Rodriguez, aka Steve Rodriguez; Daniel K. McNeill, in his individual capacity; Gregory J. Ihde, in his individual capacity; John Does 1–100, in their individual capacities; United States of America, Defendants–Appellees–Cross–Appellants.

Nos. 12–35395, 12–35489.

United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted June 3, 2013.

Filed Oct. 7, 2013.

Recognized as Unconstitutional

28 U.S.C.A. § 2241(e)(1)

Gwynne Skinner (argued), Williamette University College of Law, Salem, OR; Paul Hoffman (argued), Schonbrun De Simone Seplow Harris Hoffman & Harrison LLP, Venice, CA, for Plaintiff–Appellant/Cross–Appellee.

Stuart F. Delery, Acting Assistant Attorney General; Jenny Durkan, United States Attorney; Robert M. Loeb and Sydney Foster (argued), Attorneys, Appellate Staff, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Washington D.C., for Defendant–Appellees/Cross–Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, Marsha J. Pechman, Chief District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. 2:10–cv–00591–MJP.

Before: ARTHUR L. ALARCÓN, M. MARGARET McKEOWN, and SANDRA S. IKUTA, Circuit Judges.

OPINION

IKUTA, Circuit Judge:

Adel Hassan Hamad was detained at Guantanamo Bay as an enemy combatant. He seeks damages for his detention and his treatment from former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and numerous other military and civilian officials. We conclude, however, that 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(2) deprived the district court of subject-matter jurisdiction over Hamad's claims.

I

Hamad, a citizen of Sudan, alleges that he was detained in Pakistan in 2002 by Pakistani security forces acting under the direction of an “unknown American official.” According to Hamad, he was transferred to United States military custody and detained, first at Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan, and then at Guantanamo Bay.

In July 2004, the Department of Defense established Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) to determine whether foreign nationals held at Guantanamo Bay qualified for detention as “enemy combatants.” Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 733, 128 S.Ct. 2229, 171 L.Ed.2d 41 (2008); Memorandum from Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz re Order Establishing Combatant Status Review Tribunal § a (July 7, 2004), available at http:// www. defense. gov/ news/ Jul 2004/ d 20040707 review. pdf (Wolfowitz Memo.). The Department of Defense defined the term “enemycombatant” as “ ‘an individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or al Qaeda forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners.’ ” Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 570 n. 1, 126 S.Ct. 2749, 165 L.Ed.2d 723 (2006) (quoting Wolfowitz Memo. at 1). A CSRT determined in March 2005 that Hamad was an enemy combatant. The United States has not rescinded this designation.

In addition to establishing the CSRT procedure, the Department of Defense established Administrative Review Boards (ARBs) to “determine annually if enemy combatants detained ... [at] Guantanamo Bay, Cuba should be released, transferred or continue to be detained” based on an assessment of various factors, including the continued threat posed by each detainee. Memorandum from Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England re Revised Implementation of Administrative Review Procedures § 1, Enclosure 3 § 1 (July 14, 2006), available at http:// www. defense. gov/ news/ Aug 2006/ d20060809arbproceduresmemo.pdf (England Memo.); see also Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 821, 128 S.Ct. 2229 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (describing the ARB process). ARBs were required to issue recommendations as to whether to (1) “[r]elease the enemy combatant without limitations” to another country; (2) “[t]ransfer the enemy combatant to ... [another country] with conditions agreed upon between that [country] and the United States”; or (3) “[c]ontinue to detain the enemy combatant.” See England Memo., Enclosure 3 § 1.

In November 2005, an ARB panel determined that Hamad continued to be a threat to the United States and its allies, but also decided that he was eligible to be transferred to Sudan. As a result, in 2007, after the United States concluded negotiations with Sudan, Hamad was transferred to that country. ¹

In April 2010, Hamad filed an action for money damages in a federal district court in Washington State against twentytwo United States military and civilian government officials, including former United States Secretary of Defense Robert Gates,² and one hundred unnamed federal officials, all in their individual capacities. In his complaint, Hamad raised six claims under state common law and the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350. These six claims alleged violations of customary international law and the Geneva Conventions, including (1) prolonged arbitrary detention, (2) cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment, (3) torture, (4) targeting of a civilian, (5) denial of due process, and (6) forced disappearance. In addition to these six claims, Hamad's seventh claim alleged a violation of his Fifth Amendment due process rights. Hamad's claims are premised on his allegations that he was wrongfully detained and subjected to torture and other forms of cruel treatment. He contends that the CSRT erred in determining that he was an enemy combatant, and that the United States government detained him unlawfully for over two years after the ARB decided to transfer him.

The district court dismissed all defendants other than Gates for lack of personal jurisdiction. With respect to Hamad's six international law claims against Gates, the district court granted the government's motion to substitute itself for Gates under the Westfall Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1). Because the district court concluded that the government had not waived its sovereign immunity for these international law claims, see id. §§ 2679(b)(1), 2680(k), it dismissed them. With respect to Hamad's sole remaining claim, a Fifth Amendment claim against Gates, the district court held that it had subject matter jurisdiction over this claim, but dismissed it because the complaint did not plausibly allege that Gates was personally involved in violating Hamad's rights. Hamad timely appealed and the government cross appealed.

II

This appeal requires us to address a key threshold question: whether the district court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of this action, given the jurisdiction-stripping provisions in 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e). This section provides:

(1) No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the United States who has been determined by the United States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination.

(2) Except as provided in paragraphs (2) and (3) of section 1005(e) of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (10 U.S.C. 801 note), no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider any other action against the United States or its agents relating to any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of confinement of an alien who is or was detained by the United States and has been determined by the United States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination.

28 U.S.C. § 2241(e).

“The existence of subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law that we review de novo.” Marin Gen. Hosp. v. Modesto & Empire Traction Co., 581 F.3d 941, 944 (9th Cir.2009).

A

Looking to the plain language of § 2241(e)(2), it is clear that this provision applies to Hamad's claims, and that, as a result, “no court, justice, or judge” has authority to hear Hamad's action. Under § 2241(e)(2), courts lack jurisdiction over an action that meets the following five requirements: (1) the action is against the “United States or its agents”; (2) the action relates to “any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of confinement of an alien who is or was detained by the United States”; (3) the action relates to an alien who was “determined by the United States to have been properly detained as an enemy combatant” or an alien awaiting such a determination; (4) the action is an action “other” than an application for a writ of habeas corpus, which is covered in § 2241(e)(1); and (5) the action does not qualify for an exception under § 1005(e)(2) or (3) of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005(DTA), which provide the D.C. Circuit jurisdiction over a narrow class of challenges by enemy combatants, see Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub.L. No. 109–148, div. A, title X, § 1005(e), 119 Stat. 2680, 2740–44.

Hamad's action meets each of these requirements. It is “against the United States or its agents” and relates to aspects of Hamad's “detention” and “treatment” (the first and second requirements), because Hamad is seeking damages from United States...