Haman v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America

• Citation: 415 P.2d 305,91 Idaho 19
• Decision Date: 10 June 1966
• Docket Number: No. 9653,9653
• Parties: Jerry M. HAMAN, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. The PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE CO., of AMERICA, A Corporation, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Idaho

Page 305

415 P.2d 305

91 Idaho 19

Jerry M. HAMAN, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. The PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE CO., of AMERICA, A Corporation, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 9653.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

June 10, 1966.

Elam, Burke, Jeppesen & Evans, Boise, for appellant.

Rayborn, Rayborn & Rayborn, Twin Falls, for respondent.

McFADDEN, Chief Justice.

This appeal presents for review the issue as to the propriety of instructing a jury on the presumption against suicide, and arises from a judgment for the plaintiff in the amount of $6,000.00 based upon a life insurance policy with additional accidental death benefits, issued by the defendant, The Prudential Insurance Company of America, upon the life of plaintiff's deceased wife.

The policy involved was issued May 1, 1963, to Evelyn M. Haman, the wife of the plaintiff, who died as the result of a gunshot wound in the head on December 30, 1963. This policy in the face amount of $3,000.00, contained a provision for payment of an additional $3,000 in the event her death occurred as the result of an accident. The policy among other things provided:

'If, within two years from the date of issue, the Insured dies as a result of suicide, while sane or insane, this policy shall be void and the Company's liability shall be limited to the return of the amount of the premiums paid.'

Under the provisions for the accidental death benefit there is contained as an exception, the following:

'No accidental death Benefit shall be payable if the injury or death results (1) from suicide or any attempt thereat, whether the Insured is sane or insane. * * *'

Nowhere in the record does it appear that any attempt was made to distinguish between the burden of proof of the defendant company which asserted that it was not liable on the life policy by reason of the insured's suicide, and the burden of proof of the plaintiff to establish under the accidental death benefit provisions of the policy that insured's death occurred as a result of an accident. ¹ The court merely advised the jury by its instructions that the burden of proof was on the plaintiff to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the insured's death was the result of an accident.

Defendant, by appropriate assignments of error, challenges the trial court's instruction which advised the jury that the plaintiff in sustaining the burden of proof,

'* * * is entitled to the benefit of the rebuttal presumption that a person will not take his own life, as well as to the benefit of all other direct and circumstantial evidence, no matter by whom introduced, which you, as jurors weighing all of the evidence, believe contributes to plaintiff's sustaining such burden or proof.'

The trial court also instructed:

'Where sued herein the term 'presumption' and 'it is presumed' refer to the legal inference that a certain unknown fact is true or untrue because our knowledge of human motives and human nature, which influence human conduct lead us to accept that fact as true or untrue until such inference is rebutted or contradicted by other evidence.'

It is the contention of the defendant that under the law a presumption against suicide is a matter of procedure and merely shifts the burden of producing evidence to the defendant, and that when such evidence has been produced, the presumption no longer serves any useful purpose, and hence the jury should not be instructed as to such a presumption. Cited for this proposition are the following law review articles: Richardson and Breyfogle-Problems of Proof of Distinguishing Suicide from Accident, 56 Yale Law Journal, Feb. 1947, No. 3, p. 482; Morgan-Evidence-Presumptions-Burdens of Proof, 23 Oregon Law Review, June, 1944, No. 4, p. 269; Hartman-The Presumption against Suicide as Applied in the Trial of Insurance Cases, 19 Marquette Law Review, (1934) p. 20; White-Presumptions in Vilent Death Cases, or Quo Vadis Presumptions, 15 University of Miami Law Review, 1960, No. 1, pg. 1. In addition our attention is called to the statement of Professor George Bell contained in his work, Handbook of Evidence for the Idaho Lawyer, first ed. 1957, p. 239, wherein the presumption of due care is discussed.

To fully appreciate the import of the defendant's assertion of error and argument, a brief statement of the facts is in order. Mrs Evelyn Mae Haman, the insured, was, at about 8:30 p. m., December 30, 1963, found dead by her minor son, Freddie, in the yeard to the rear of the Haman residence. Lying next to her, or across her legs, was a .22 cal, rifle. Dr. Anderson, her physician was called, and upon arrival at the Hman residence, he examined Mrs. Haman, who had been removed in the meantime from the back yard to the davenport in the home. He pronounced her dead as the result of a gunshot wound in the head. The point of entrance of the wound was the right temporal area. There was a little blood around the wound and evidence of powder burns. There was no exit wound, but he noticed a nob behind the left ear. He could not say if the nob was the bullet or a fracture of the skull.

Mr. and Mrs. Haman had been married since 1945; four children were born of the marriage, who at the time of her death renaged in age from less than one year to sixteen years. She was interested in her family, and her children's welfare. There was no discord in her marriage or family life. On the day of the tragedy, she had followed the normal routine of her daily life. In the evening she had been watching television with members of her family. About 7:40 p. m., she called a niece to arrange for her to stay with the baby the next evening, New Year's Eve, while the other members of the family went out for dinner. There was testimony that she took a roast out of the freezer for the next day's meal. While so engaged, plaintiff and Mrs. Haman heard a dog bark outside, and Mrs. Haman then inquired if there were any 'bird shot' for the .22 cal. rifle to scare off the dog, and was advised there were no 'bird shot' shells. Freddie, the 14 year old son, volunteered to scare the dog away, but since he had his shoes removed, Mrs. Haman said she would do it. She went to the kitchen, obtained the rifle, loaded it with a .22 cal. lead bullet her son had obtained for her, and walked outside alone.

When Mrs. Haman failed to return shortly, her son went out looking for her, and found her lying on the ground with the gun alongside her. A strange dog was there, and the boy grabbed the gun and attempted to shoot at the dog, but the gun didn't fire; he then pulled the bolt open, closed it and again attempted to shoot at the dog, but still the gun wouldn't fire, and he then threw the gun at the dog. He then went into the house and told his father about his mother. He stated that the condition of the ground and sidewalk was very slick, although at least one other witness disputed this statement.

Later the sheriff came to the Haman residence and in the course of investigating the tragedy, examined the premises. He described the entrance of the fatal wound as being in the right temple, just in the hair line in front of the ear, with very deep powder burns entirely around the wound, and a lump about the left ear. He also examined the .22 cal. rifle. He stated that in his opinion death resulted from self destruction. The county coroner, who was also a member of the Twin Falls city police department, accompanied the sheriff to the Haman residence and corroborated the testimony of the sheriff. He, too, was of the opinion that death was a result of suicide, as evidenced by the certificate of death he signed, which recited 'bullet wound in head' by 'suicide' as the cause of death. There was no inquest held, nor autopsy performed. (I.C. §§ 19-4301, 19-4301A, 19-4301B).

Mrs. Haman's physician testified that he had treated Mrs. Haman for nervous spells, headaches, and that he had found symptoms of uncers. Within two years prior to her death he had prescribed tranquilizers. Within the month prior to her death she had complained of weight loss, nervousness and worrying, and the doctor prescribed vitamins, tranquilizers and sleeping pills. The record indicated that Mrs. Haman on occasion used alcohol to help her sleep. The actual amount of alcohol she had used was in some question, and the record reflects that she stopped the use of alcohol about two weeks prior to her death. Even though there is some evidence of nervousness and tension, the doctor testified that her most serious illnesses were her pregnancies. The record discloses no dramatic change in her life or mental outlook, in her relationship with her family, or in the family's financial stability.

No one saw Mrs. Haman at the time the fatal shot was fired, and there was no evidence that there was any third person involved. It is thus obvious that under the circumstances death resulted from either an accidental shooting, or as a result of suicide. Of these two alternatives, the jury by its unanimous verdict in favor of the plaintiff, held that death was the result of an accidental shooting.

Presented for determination by the defendant's contentions and this record, is not only the issue of whether an instruction should have been given to the jury of the presumption against suicide, but also whether such a presumption carries any evidentiary weight in opposition to the defendant's case, consisting of testimony, circumstantial evidence, and the opinions expressed by the sheriff and the coroner. In further support of this position, the defendant points to the provisions of I.C. § 39-263:

'Any certificate filed in accordance with the provisions of this act (Vital Statistics Act of 1949) and the regulations prescribed by the board, or any copy of such records or part thereof, duly certified by the state registar, shall be prima facie evidence of the facts recited therein.'

This provision has reference to the death certificate required to be filed; the trial court instructed the jury in the terms of this...