Hambey v. Hill, 270A23
Decision Date | 18 May 1971 |
Docket Number | No. 1,No. 270A23,270A23,1 |
Parties | Hulitte HAMBEY, Administrator of the Estate of Eva L. Hambey, Deceased, Appellant (Plaintiff Below), v. Mary E. HILL, Appellee (Defendant Below) |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
John S. Gonas, South Bend, for appellant.
Richard F. Joyce, Kizer & Neu, Plymouth, for appellee.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS. This appeal involves a wrongful death action by Hulitte Hambey, Administrator of the Estate of Eva L. Hambey, Deceased, against appellee, Mary E. Hill, arising out of a collision between automobiles driven by appellee and the decedent, Mrs. Hambey.
The collision occurred on a country road in Starke County, Indiana, on October 2, 1965, and there were no witnesses to the collision other than the drivers of the automobiles. A police officer arrived at the scene of the accident shortly thereafter, and as a result of his investigation Mrs. Hill was charged with failing to yield the right of way.
On December 4, 1965, Mrs. Hill was arrested and brought before the local justice of the peace, and upon arraignment entered a plea of not guilty. The proceedings before the justice of the peace are revealed by the transcript as follows:
'* * * this 4th day of December, 1965. Costs none.
'Comes now the defendant, and being arraigned upon the above affidavit for plea, says she is not guilty as charged therein.
'* * *.
'December 6, 1965, Comes now the defendant and changes her plea to guilty as charged therein.
'TRIAL BY COURT
'Defendant states location is not properly stated on one road.
'And the evidence being heard, and the Court being advised, finds the defendant guilty as charged and assesses a fine against her in the sum of one dollar, and costs.
'It is therefore considered and adjudged by the Court that the defendant for the offense by her above committed, do make her fine to the State of Indiana, in the sum of one dollar, and that she pay the cost herein taxed at $18.25 and accruing costs, and that said defendant stand committed until the said fine and costs are paid or replevied.'
The civil trial was to the court. Appellant-Hambey called only two witnesses. The police officer was not called nor subpoenaed. The first witness called for the plaintiff was the opposing party, Mrs. Hill. On direct examination, appellant's counsel attempted to introduce into evidence the transcript of the justice of the peace proceedings, which was objected to, and the trial court sustained the objection on the ground that no plea of guilty had been entered by Mrs. Hill.
Having failed to obtain anything other than repeated statements denying fault in any manner from Mrs. Hill, appellant then moved the court for a continuance for the purpose of calling the police officer who investigated the accident. The court's response was:
Appellant's counsel gave no further reason for a continuance and finished his examination of Mrs. Hill.
The second witness was the appellant, who testified concerning the loss of his wife's services and the automobile she was riding in the day of her death. Appellant then rested and Mrs. Hill moved for judgment, which the trial court granted on the day of the trial, i.e., October 2, 1969. Appellant filed a Motion for New Trial on October 17, 1969.
The original Motion for New Trial was supplemented on October 23, 1969, on November 13, and again on November 21, 1969. 1
Although appellant has listed ten specifications of error, he argues only two. The remaining eight alleged errors are thus waived. Rule AP. 8.3(A)(7).
ISSUES Two questions are presented for review:
I. Did the trial court commit reversible error in sustaining the objection to the introduction of the transcript from the justice of the peace court?
II. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in overruling the Motion for Continuance?
Appellant argues that proof of his cause of action was substantially prejudiced by the exclusion of the transcript in that Mrs. Hill was charged with negligence and the transcript should have been admitted as evidence tending to prove her negligence.
As to the second question, appellant asserts that he should have been granted a continuance after being taken by surprise at defendant's denial of liability.
Appellee-Hill's position is that the exclusion of the transcript was proper since there was no proper foundation laid for its introduction and that she pleaded not guilty in the justice of the peace proceedings. Further, she points out that even if the transcript had been admitted, it would not have had a material effect upon the case.
As to the issue of continuance, Mrs. Hill contends that since no reason was given for the absence of the police officer, the court was within its discretion to deny the motion.
The general rule seems to be well settled that records of proceedings in criminal actions are not admissible in civil actions as proof of the facts upon which a party was convicted. This is particularly true where the civil action is for damages occasioned by the offense of which the party stands convicted. Montgomery v. Crum (1928), 199 Ind. 660, 161 N.E. 251. There is an exception, however, which has been recognized by our Indiana courts. In Dimmick v. Follis (1953), 123 Ind.App. 701, 111 N.E.2d 486, 488, the court said:
(Emphasis supplied).
As we read the Dimmick case, not only must the record show a plea of guilty, but it should also be clear that the judgment entered in the case was based upon the plea of guilty.
Our research yields a similar case in Ohio which exemplifies the need for certainty in the record that a plea of guilty was entered and judgment based thereon. In Wilcox v. Gregory (1960), 112 Ohio App. 516, 176 N.E.2d 523, 526, the court said:
The Court of Appeals of Ohio responded to the transcript of the criminal docket with these words:
'If the record of a court shows without question that an accused pleaded guilty in a criminal prosecution, there may arise an exception to the general rule that a judgment in a criminal case cannot be received in a civil action, * * *.' (Emphasis supplied.)
The transcript of the justice of the peace proceedings presently before us is a blend of incongruous legal jargon. It first appears that on December 4, 1965 Mrs. Hill enters a plea of not guilty. On December 6, the day of trial, she changes her plea to guilty as charged. Then there is a trial by the court...
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