Hamblen v. Dugger
| Decision Date | 10 July 1989 |
| Docket Number | No. 89-567-Civ-J-12.,89-567-Civ-J-12. |
| Citation | 719 F. Supp. 1051 |
| Parties | James William HAMBLEN, Petitioner, v. Richard L. DUGGER, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Billy H. Nolas, Julie D. Naylor, Martin J. McClain, and Francisco Rivera, Office of the Capital Collateral Representative, Tallahassee, Fla., for petitioner.
Carolyn M. Snurkowski, Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept. of Legal Affairs, Tallahassee, Fla., for respondent.
ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND DENYING MOTION FOR STAY OF EXECUTION
This cause is before the Court on a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus By a Person in State Custody ("petition") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982), and a Motion for Stay of Execution, filed in the name of JAMES WILLIAM HAMBLEN ("petitioner"), a death-row inmate at Florida State Prison. The petition has been filed by the Office of the Capital Collateral Representative on behalf of petitioner. The petition seeks relief with respect to the death sentence on the conviction. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will deny the petition and the motion for stay of execution.
Petitioner seeks relief from the death sentence based on the following grounds: (1) the trial judge erred in failing to conduct an adequate hearing, as required by Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975), prior to allowing petitioner to waive appointed counsel and waive an advisory sentencing jury, in violation of petitioner's rights under the sixth and fourteenth amendments; (2) the trial judge erred in allowing petitioner to waive counsel in the penalty phase, in violation of petitioner's rights under the eighth and fourteenth amendments; (3) the Supreme Court of Florida erred when it eliminated one aggravating factor but failed to remand the case for resentencing, pursuant to Elledge v. State, 346 So.2d 998 (Fla.1977), in violation of petitioner's rights under the fifth, eighth and fourteenth amendments; (4) the trial court improperly applied a presumption of death during the sentencing phase, in violation of petitioner's rights under the eighth and fourteenth amendments; (5) the sentencing court erred by considering victim impact information, in violation of petitioner's rights under the eighth and fourteenth amendments; and (6) petitioner was denied effective assistance of counsel on direct appeal because of the failure to appeal the allegedly improper waiver of counsel, waiver of sentencing jury, failure to urge remand, presumption of death, and consideration of victim impact information. The Court will address each of the grounds enumerated above, after the background to this proceeding is set forth.1
Petitioner was indicted, convicted and sentenced to death for the crime of murder in the first degree for a murder which occurred on April 24, 1984. The Florida Supreme Court set forth a succinct and accurate statement of the facts constituting the crime for which petitioner was convicted:
Hamblen v. Florida, 527 So.2d 800, 801 (Fla.1988). The Court adopts this description for present purposes.
Duval County Sheriff's officers responded to the silent alarm and saw petitioner inside the store. The officers believed that petitioner was the proprietor or an employee at first, but became suspicious when he would not open the locked door. When petitioner came out of the store, the officers told him that they were responding to the silent alarm. Petitioner said that he knew why the officers were there and that he had killed a woman inside. Petitioner was arrested and the officers found a .38 caliber automatic pistol on petitioner, the partially clothed body of Ms. Edwards in a dressing room, and other physical evidence which corroborated petitioner's story. An autopsy confirmed that Ms. Edwards died from a single bullet wound to the head from a .38 caliber weapon held at close range. Hamblen, 527 So.2d at 801.
After his arrest, petitioner was advised of his rights and was taken to the Police Memorial Building, Homicide Office, and then to the Duval County jail. The arresting officer noted that petitioner was extremely calm, did not appear to be intoxicated or upset, and appeared to be "just normal." A.A. VIII:125. At the Homicide Office, petitioner waived his rights and made a statement in which he related the details leading up to his arrest for the murder of Ms. Edwards. A.A. I:56. The interviewing officer described petitioner's appearance as "very calm, collected, very coherent, very cooperative," not under the influence of any type of intoxicating substance, and apparently not suffering from any physical or emotional conditions. A.A. VIII:169-170.
Petitioner was charged by indictment on May 10, 1984, with the crime of first-degree murder for the shooting death of Ms. Edwards. The public defenders office, which was appointed to represent petitioner, entered a plea of not guilty on petitioner's behalf. A psychiatric evaluation of petitioner was obtained, the results of which are discussed in the next section of this order. At a hearing on July 10, 1984, petitioner expressed his desire to "dispense with the services of the Public Defender." A.A. IV:21. After the trial judge determined that petitioner's decision to proceed pro se was made knowingly, voluntarily, and competently, the trial judge allowed petitioner to waive appointed counsel, but ordered that public defenders be available in case petitioner had any questions. A.A. IV:32. At the hearing on July 10, 1989, petitioner executed a Waiver of Right to Counsel form and then withdrew his plea of not guilty and entered a plea of guilty. A.A. IV:34. On August 3, 1984, petitioner waived his right to have a jury impaneled for sentencing proceedings and he waived his right to counsel at the sentencing proceedings. A.A. I:61-64. On September 7 and 11, 1984, the trial judge conducted the penalty phase. On September 21, 1984, after reviewing the record, the trial judge imposed a sentence of death.
Petitioner did not take an appeal from the sentence and made it clear that he did not want the case appealed. Hamblen, 527 So.2d at 802 n. 2. The public defenders office was appointed as appellate counsel and prosecuted the appeal of petitioner's sentence of death. The Supreme Court of Florida held that one of the three aggravating factors found by the trial judge was not applicable, but that the elimination of that one aggravating circumstance would not have resulted in petitioner's receiving a life sentence. Id. at 805. On June 2, 1988, the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed petitioner's death sentence.
The Governor of Florida signed a death warrant on May 1, 1989, to cause petitioner's sentence of death to be executed between July 11 and 18, 1989. Petitioner's execution is set for 7:00 a.m. on Wednesday, July 12, 1989. On June 6, 1989, the Office of the Capital Collateral Representative filed in the Supreme Court of Florida, a Petition for Extraordinary Relief, for a Writ of Habeas Corpus, Request for a Stay of Execution, and Application for Stay of Execution Pending Disposition of Petition for Writ of Certiorari. The petition for a writ of habeas corpus and application for stay of execution were argued in the Florida Supreme Court on Wednesday, July 5, 1989. On July 6, 1989, the petition for writ of habeas corpus and application for stay were denied. On July 10, 1989, the petition was filed in this Court, respondent filed a response in opposition, and the Court held a nonevidentiary hearing thereon.
On June 19, 1984, in response to petitioner's motion, the trial court appointed Dr. Elizabeth A. McMahon, a clinical psychologist, to examine petitioner and assist in the preparation of the defense of insanity. Petitioner also underwent a psychiatric evaluation by Dr. Ernest Miller.
On July 6, 1984, Dr. Miller wrote petitioner's counsel with the results of his examination. Dr. Miller concluded that "the patient merits adjudication of competence for trial and does not meet the criteria for involuntary hospitalization" under Florida Law. A.A. I:67-68. Dr. Miller concluded further that "the patient was not insane at the time of the alleged crime but was able to understand the nature, quality and wrongfulness of his acts." A.A. I:68.
Dr. McMahon's confidential report, based on an examination on June 30, 1984, was prepared on August 1, 1984, and had similar conclusions: "Hamblen is presently competent to stand trial" and, despite a severe personality disorder, "he was sane within the purview of the M'Naughten Rule at the time of the alleged offenses." A.A. I:73-74. Dr. McMahon summarized her analysis by writing: "Although legally sane, Mr....
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