Hamer v. Nashawena Mills, Inc.

• Decision Date: 01 December 1943
• Citation: 52 N.E.2d 22,315 Mass. 160
• Parties: HAMER et al. v. NASHAWENA MILLS, Inc., et al.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

315 Mass. 160

52 N.E.2d 22

HAMER et al.

v.NASHAWENA MILLS, Inc., et al.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Bristol.

Dec. 1, 1943.

Report from Superior Court, Bristol County; Brogna, Judge.

Suit by Mary R. Hamer and others against Nashawena Mills, Inc., and others to enjoin enforcement of a contract requiring employees to become members of a particular union as a condition precedent to their continued employment by members of a textile manufacturers' association. A judge of the superior court reported his action in refusing to grant an injunction, and the trial judge to whom the suit was submitted upon an agreement of all the material facts reports the case to the Supreme Judicial Court without making a decision.

Bill ordered dismissed.

G. H. Young, of New Bedford, for plaintiff.

C. B. Rugg and W. F. Sullivan, Jr., both of Boston, and J. J. Phelan, Jr., of No. Andover, for defendant Nashawena Mills, Inc.

I. Katz, of New York City, and S. S. Grant, of Boston, for defendant England.

RONAN, Justice.

The plaintiffs are employees in the cloth room department of the Nashawena Mills, Inc., hereinafter called the employer. The employer is engaged in the manufacture and sale of cotton textile goods which are now produced principally for the United States. It and nine other companies, which manufacture similar goods, comprise an association known as the New Bedford Cotton Manufacturers' Association. This association represents the major portion of the textile industry in New Bedford, and its member plants employ approximately eleven thousand persons in their production and maintenance departments. The association has for years conducted collective bargainingwith the employees of the member plants through the New Bedford Textile Council. The association entered into a written contract in 1938 with the council which was then unaffiliated with any national organization. The council and its local unions later became associated with the United Textile Workers of America, a branch of the American Federation of Labor, and its contract with the manufacturers' association was revised and contained provisions that all employees who are members of any constitutent union of the council or of any union affiliated with the American Federation of Labor shall become and remain members in good standing of such unions; that employees who have entered the employment of the member plants since January 1, 1932, must become members of such unions within thirty days; and that all new employees must become members of the appropriate constituent union and must remain members in good standing during the term of the contract. This contract was terminated on January 31, 1943. Thereafter, the National Labor Relations Board directed that an election be held, and on April 14, 1943, as a result of said election, certified the Textile Workers Union of America, affiliated with the Congress of Industrial Organizations, more commonly referred to as the C. I. O., as the collective bargaining representative of all employees employed in the maintenance and production departments of the ten member plants. The Textile Workers Union of America is a voluntary, unincorporated association, the members of which are fairly represented by its director, the defendant England. This local union and the manufacturers' association entered into a written contract on June 19, 1943. Among other provisions, this contract provided that all employees shall, as a condition of continued employment in any member mill, be and remain members of the union in good standing; that employees who are not members of the union shall become members in thirty days; that present employees over fifty years of age who have been employed for at least ten years may, but are not required to, join the union; that present and new employees are not required to join the union if such employees cannot readily be replaced by the union; and that members of the union are to be given preference in hiring new employees. Employees of the defendant mills who are not members of the union have been solicited to join the local. The provisions of this contract have been fully explained to them. There is a shortage of mill operatives. Some of the plaintiffs have withdrawn from the present suit. The remaining plaintiffs are members of a rival union and do not desire to quit their employment or to join the defendant union. It is fairly inferable that, if a supply of labor becomes available, they will be discharged unless they join the defendant union which is ready to admit them to membership. A judge of the Superior Court reported his action in refusing to grant an injunction, and the trial judge to whom the suit was submitted upon an agreement of all the material facts, reported the case to this court without making a decision.

The issue presented is whether the portion of the contract between the manufacturers' association and the defendant union, providing for the employees becoming members of the union as a condition precedent to their continued employment, is valid and enforceable.

We need not pause to inquire as to what limitations recent legislation has imposed upon the common law right of an employer to deal directly with his employees and contract with them personally and, if he decided to hire any particular person, to agree upon the rate of pay, hours of labor, working conditions and the period, if any, of his employment, for we pass directly to the statutes that govern the rights of the parties in the present controversy. The principal aim and object of the National Labor Relations Act and of our State Labor Relations Law is the elimination of industrial conflicts and their consequent effect upon industry and trade, by encouraging collective bargaining and by protecting the full exercise by workers of their right of self-organization and to designate their representatives for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment. U.S.C. (1940 Ed.) Title 29, §§ 151-166, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-166; Chapter 150A, added to the General Laws by St.1938, c. 345, § 2. Both enactments brand as an unfair labor practice the discrimination by an employer in regard to hiring, tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment, in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization, but he is not precluded from making an agreement with a labor organization (which has not been established, maintained or assisted by the employer through an unfair labor practice)‘to require as a condition of employment membership therein,’ if the labor organization has been duly designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining. Section 4(3) of said; c. 150A. U.S.C. (1940 Ed.) Title 29, § 158(3), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(3). The representatives selected and designated for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes ‘shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment.’ Section 5(a) of said c. 150A, U.S.C. (1940 Ed.) Title 29, § 159(a), 29 U.S.C.A. § 159(a). The employer is required to negotiate with these representatives for the purpose of making a contract with them in reference to wages, hours and other conditions of employment. Section 4(5) of said c. 150A, U.S.C. (1940 Ed.) Title 29, § 158(5), 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(5). These statutory provisions permit the making of a closed shop contract under the conditions which have been mentioned and which the agreed facts in the instant case showed were observed by the manufacturers' association and the defendant union.

Under said c. 150A, the common law right of an employer to refuse to deal with representatives of his employees has been limited, Walton Lunch Co. v. Kearney, 236 Mass. 310, 313, 128 N.E. 429;Cornellier v. Haverhill Shoe Manufacturers' Association, 221 Mass. 554, 560, 109 N.E. 643, L.R.A.1916C, 218, although he is not now compelled to make a contract with them, National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 57 S.Ct. 615, 81 L.Ed. 893, 108 A.L.R. 1352;National Labor Relations Board v. Sands Manuf. Co., 306 U.S. 332, 59 S.Ct. 508, 83 L.Ed. 682, but if he agrees with them he...