Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chi.

Decision Date08 November 2017
Docket NumberNo. 16–658.,16–658.
Citation138 S.Ct. 13,199 L.Ed.2d 249
Parties Charmaine HAMER, Petitioner v. NEIGHBORHOOD HOUSING SERVICES OF CHICAGO, et al.
CourtU.S. Supreme Court

Jonathan A. Herstoff, New York, NY, on behalf of the Petitioner.

Damien G. Stewart, Washington, DC, on behalf of the Respondents.

Stephanie A. Maloney, Matthew J. Mezger, Ilan Wurman, Winston & Strawn LLP, Brian P. Brooks, Damien G. Stewart, Fannie Mae, Washington, DC, for Fannie Mae.

Jeff Nowak, Gwendolyn B. Morales, Franczek Radelet PC, Chicago, IL, for Neighborhood Housing Services of Chicago.

Justice GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents a question of time, specifically, time to file a notice of appeal from a district court's judgment. In Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 210–213, 127 S.Ct. 2360, 168 L.Ed.2d 96 (2007), this Court clarified that an appeal filing deadline prescribed by statute will be regarded as "jurisdictional," meaning that late filing of the appeal notice necessitates dismissal of the appeal. But a time limit prescribed only in a court-made rule, Bowles acknowledged, is not jurisdictional; it is, instead, a mandatory claim-processing rule subject to forfeiture if not properly raised by the appellee. Ibid. ; Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 456, 124 S.Ct. 906, 157 L.Ed.2d 867 (2004). Because the Court of Appeals held jurisdictional a time limit specified in a rule, not in a statute, 835 F.3d 761, 763 (C.A.7 2016), we vacate that court's judgment dismissing the appeal.

I
A

"Only Congress may determine a lower federal court's subject-matter jurisdiction." Kontrick, 540 U.S., at 452, 124 S.Ct. 906 (citing U.S. Const. Art. III, § 1 ); Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 370, 98 S.Ct. 2396, 57 L.Ed.2d 274 (1978) ("[I]t is axiomatic that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not create or withdraw federal jurisdiction."). Accordingly, a provision governing the time to appeal in a civil action qualifies as jurisdictional only if Congress sets the time. See Bowles, 551 U.S., at 211–212, 127 S.Ct. 2360 (noting "the jurisdictional distinction between court-promulgated rules and limits enacted by Congress"); Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 10, 61 S.Ct. 422, 85 L.Ed. 479 (1941) (noting "the inability of a court, by rule, to extend or restrict the jurisdiction conferred by a statute"). A time limit not prescribed by Congress ranks as a mandatory claim-processing rule, serving "to promote the orderly progress of litigation by requiring that the parties take certain procedural steps at certain specified times." Henderson v. Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 435, 131 S.Ct. 1197, 179 L.Ed.2d 159 (2011).

This Court and other forums have sometimes overlooked this distinction, "mischaracteriz[ing] claim-processing rules or elements of a cause of action as jurisdictional limitations, particularly when that characterization was not central to the case, and thus did not require close analysis." Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 161, 130 S.Ct. 1237, 176 L.Ed.2d 18 (2010). But prevailing precedent makes the distinction critical. Failure to comply with a jurisdictional time prescription, we have maintained, deprives a court of adjudicatory authority over the case, necessitating dismissal—a "drastic" result. Shinseki, 562 U.S., at 435, 131 S.Ct. 1197 ; Bowles, 551 U.S., at 213, 127 S.Ct. 2360 ("[W]hen an ‘appeal has not been prosecuted ... within the time limited by the acts of Congress, it must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.’ " (quoting United States v. Curry, 6 How. 106, 113, 12 L.Ed. 363 (1848) )). The jurisdictional defect is not subject to waiver or forfeiture1 and may be raised at any time in the court of first instance and on direct appeal. Kontrick, 540 U.S., at 455, 124 S.Ct. 906.2 In contrast to the ordinary operation of our adversarial system, courts are obliged to notice jurisdictional issues and raise them on their own initiative. Shinseki, 562 U.S., at 434, 131 S.Ct. 1197.

Mandatory claim-processing rules are less stern. If properly invoked, mandatory claim-processing rules must be enforced, but they may be waived or forfeited.

Manrique v. United States, 581 U.S. ––––, ––––, 137 S.Ct. 1266, 1271–1272, 197 L.Ed.2d 599 (2017). "[C]laim-processing rules ... [ensure] relief to a party properly raising them, but do not compel the same result if the party forfeits them." Eberhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 12, 19, 126 S.Ct. 403, 163 L.Ed.2d 14 (2005) (per curiam ).3

B

Petitioner Charmaine Hamer filed a complaint against respondents Neighborhood Housing Services of Chicago and Fannie Mae alleging employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. The District Court granted respondents' motion for summary judgment on September 10, 2015, and entered final judgment on September 14, 2015. In the absence of a time extension, Hamer's notice of appeal would have been due by October 14, 2015. Fed. Rule App. Proc. 4(a)(1)(A).

On October 8, 2015, before the October 14 deadline for filing Hamer's notice of appeal, her attorneys made two motions.4 First, they sought to withdraw as counsel because of their disagreement with Hamer on pursuit of an appeal. Second, they sought a two-month extension of the notice of appeal filing date, so that Hamer would have adequate time to engage new counsel for her appeal. App. to Pet. for Cert. 57–59. The District Court granted both motions on the same day and ordered extension of the deadline for Hamer's notice of appeal from October 14 to December 14, 2015. Id., at 60. Respondents did not move for reconsideration or otherwise raise any objection to the length of the extension.

In the docketing statement respondents filed in the Court of Appeals, they stated: "The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, in that on December 11, 2015, [Hamer] filed a timely Notice of Appeal from a final judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois that disposed of all of [Hamer's] claims against [respondents]." Id., at 63. Respondents' statement later reiterated: "On December 11, 2015, [Hamer] timely filed a Notice of Appeal...." Id., at 64. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals, on its own initiative, questioned the timeliness of the appeal and instructed respondents to brief the issue. 835 F.3d, at 762. Respondents did so and, for the first time, asserted that the appeal was untimely, citing the relevant Rule confining extensions to 30 days. Id., at 762–763 (citing Fed. Rule App. Proc. 4(a)(5)(C) ). Concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to reach the merits, the Court of Appeals dismissed Hamer's appeal. 835 F.3d, at 763.5 We granted certiorari.

580 U.S. ––––, 137 S.Ct. 1203, 197 L.Ed.2d 245 (2017).

II
A

Section 2107 of Title 28 of the U.S. Code, as enacted in 1948, allowed extensions of the time to file a notice of appeal, not exceeding 30 days, "upon a showing of excusable neglect based on failure of a party to learn of the entry of the judgment." Act of June 25, 1948, § 2107, 62 Stat. 963.6 Nothing in the statute provided for extension of the time to file a notice of appeal when, as in this case, the judgment loser did receive notice of the entry of judgment. In 1991, Congress broadened the class of persons who could gain extensions to include all prospective appellants who showed "excusable neglect or good cause." § 12, 105 Stat. 1627. In addition, Congress retained a time prescription covering appellants who lacked notice of the entry of judgment: "[A] party entitled to notice of the entry of a judgment ... [who] did not receive such notice from the clerk or any party within 21 days of [the judgment's] entry" qualifies for a 14–day extension,7 if "no party would be prejudiced [thereby]." § 2107(c). In full, § 2107(c) now provides:

"(c) The district court may, upon motion filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the time otherwise set for bringing appeal, extend the time for appeal upon a showing of excusable neglect or good cause. In addition, if the district court finds—
"(1) that a party entitled to notice of the entry of a judgment or order did not receive such notice from the clerk or any party within 21 days of its entry, and
"(2) that no party would be prejudiced,
"the district court may, upon motion filed within 180 days after entry of the judgment or order or within 14 days after receipt of such notice, whichever is earlier, reopen the time for appeal for a period of 14 days from the date of entry of the order reopening the time for appeal."

In short, current § 2107(c), like the provision as initially enacted, specifies the length of an extension for cases in which the appellant lacked notice of the entry of judgment.8 For other cases, the statute does not say how long an extension may run.

But Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(5)(C) does prescribe a limit: "No extension [of time for filing a notice of appeal] may exceed 30 days after the prescribed time [for filing a notice of appeal] or 14 days after the date [of] the order granting the [extension] motion ..., whichever is later." Unlike § 2107(c), we note, Rule 4(a)(5)(C) limits extensions of time to file a notice of appeal in all circumstances, not just in cases in which the prospective appellant lacked notice of the entry of judgment.

B

Although Rule 4(a)(5)(C)'s limit on extensions of time appears nowhere in the text of § 2107(c), respondents now contend that Rule 4(a)(5)(C) has a "statutory basis" because § 2107(c) once limited extensions (to the extent it did authorize them) to 30 days. Brief for Respondents 17. No matter, respondents submit, that Congress struck the 30–day limit in 1991 and replaced it with a 14–day limit governing, as the 30–day limit did, only lack-of-notice cases; deleting the 30–day prescription, respondents...

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