Hamid v. Lexus

Decision Date29 March 2012
Docket NumberNo. 01–10–00163–CV.,01–10–00163–CV.
Citation369 S.W.3d 291
PartiesMichel HAMID and Francis Hamid, Individually and on Behalf of the Estate of Megan Hamid, Deceased, Appellants, v. LEXUS, a Division of Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. and Toyota Motor Corporation, Appellees.
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

John Roger Griffith, Jose Oscar Lopez, Griffith & Garza, L.L.P., Pharr, TX, Larry W. Lawrence, Lawrence Law Firm, Austin, TX, Raymond Curtis Alexander, Law Office of Raymond Alexander, Houston, TX, for Appellants.

Kurt C. Kern, Cary Alan Slobin, Craig D. Dupen, Fred C. Huntsman, Bowman and Brooke LLP, Dallas, TX, for Appellees.

Panel consists of Justices RADACK, SHARP, and BROWN.

OPINION

HARVEY BROWN, Justice.

In this products liability case, Michel and Francis Hamid, individually and on behalf of the Estate of Megan Hamid, appeal a take-nothing judgment in favor of Lexus, a Division of Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. and Toyota Motor Corporation. The Hamids contend that the trial court committed reversible error by including a “no liability” rebuttable presumption instruction in the jury charge.1

We affirm.

Background

Megan Hamid died when she lost control of the 2002 Lexus ES300 she was driving. The accident occurred after 9:00 p.m. on an unlit section of Interstate 45 South. A dark blue vehicle had been abandoned on the left shoulder of the interstate, extending partially into Megan's lane of travel. When Megan steered violently to avoid the vehicle but failed to apply her brakes, she lost control. Her vehicle hit the barrier dividing the interstate, rolled numerous times, and came to rest in the northbound lanes of travel. Megan was severely injured and died the next day.

Megan's parents sued Lexus and Toyota on the basis that the ES300 was defectively designed because it was manufactured and sold without a Vehicle Stability Control device (VSC). According to their petition, a VSC (also known as “electronic stability control” or “ESC” device) is a safety technology that helps drivers maintain or regain control of their vehicle during emergency steering maneuvers. The Hamids claimed that the absence of the device rendered the ES300 defective and was a producing cause of Megan's death.

Lexus and Toyota (collectively Toyota) denied the allegations and asserted that, because the ES300 complied with the various mandatory government safety standards applicable to the vehicle at the time, they were entitled to a jury instruction on the statutory “presumption of safety” under section 82.008 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. SeeTex. Civ. Prac. & Rem Code Ann. § 82.008 (West 2011).

At trial, the Hamids introduced expert testimony that Toyota's decision not to include a VSC as standard equipment on the ES300 was a design defect that rendered the vehicle unreasonably dangerous. Their experts also testified that, had the ES300 been equipped with a VSC, Megan would have survived the accident. The VSC device compares the driver input or command with the vehicle's response. It “is designed to help the [car] do what the driver is telling the car to do.” Through sensors, the device detects the driver input and the vehicle's reaction. Based on that information, it then decides whether to take countermeasures to stabilize the vehicle and does so if the vehicle does not respond appropriately to the driver input. For instance, the device may engage brake pressure predominately to one wheel in order to arrest or stop a spinout. The VSC also “reduce[s] the engine power to help the vehicle come back more in line with where the driver has commanded it to go” and can control throttle output. The Hamids' experts testified that the device constituted a “very substantial improvement to vehicle handling when you are in an obstacle avoidance maneuver” and was “highly effective” in emergency avoidance situations and in controlling slips and slides during maneuvering.2

Toyota's expert witnesses agreed that a VSC is a safety feature that helps prevent the type of sliding involved in this accident, i.e. rear wheel sliding. They testified that, at the time in question, only two percent of the vehicles in the United States were equipped with a VSC, which was an “emerging technology.” They concluded that it was unnecessary and the ES300 was a reasonably safe vehicle without it. They also testified that, even if Megan's vehicle had been equipped with a VSC, it would not have prevented this accident “given the specifics of this crash scenario ... because there simply wasn't enough time for it.”

During the charge conference, the Hamids objected to the following jury question:

QUESTION NO. 1:

Was there a design defect in the 2002 Lexus ES300 at the time it left the possession of Toyota or Lexus?

A “design defect” is a condition of the 2002 Lexus ES300 that renders it unreasonably dangerous as designed, taking into consideration the utility of the 2002 Lexus ES300 and the risk involved in its use. For a design defect to exist there must have been a safer alternative design.

“Safer alternative design” means a product design other than the one actually used that in reasonable probability—

(1) would have prevented or significantly reduced the risk of the occurrence in question without substantially impairing the product's utility; and

(2) was economically and technologically feasible at the time the 2002 Lexus ES300 left the control of Toyota by the application of existing or reasonably achievable scientific knowledge.

You are entitled to presume that Toyota is not liable for any injury to the Plaintiffs if the evidence establishes that the 2002 Lexus ES300 complied with mandatory safety standards or regulations adopted and promulgated by the federal government, or an agency of the federal government, that were applicable to the 2002 Lexus ES300 at the time of its manufacture and that governed the product risk that allegedly caused harm.

Plaintiffs may rebut the presumption by establishing that the mandatory federal safety standards or regulations applicable to the product were inadequate to protect the public from unreasonable risk of injury or damage.

Answer “Yes” or “No.”

This instruction was based on section 82.008(a) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which provides a statutory presumption of no liability in certain circumstances:

(a) In a products liability action brought against a product manufacturer or seller, there is a rebuttable presumption that the product manufacturer or seller is not liable for any injury to a claimant caused by some aspect of the formulation, labeling, or design of a product if the product manufacturer or seller establishes that the product's formula, labeling, or design complied with mandatory safety standards or regulations adopted and promulgated by the federal government, or an agency of the federal government, that were applicable to the product at the time of manufacture and that governed the product risk that allegedly caused harm.

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 82.008(a).

The Hamids objected to this question on the basis that the defendants were not entitled to the section 82.008(a) presumption because there were no Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSSs) that applied to a VSC. They submitted their own question that did not include the presumption instruction. The trial court overruled the objection and denied the Hamids' proposed question.

The jury answered “no” to Question No. 1, and the trial court entered a take-nothing judgment against the Hamids. The Hamids appealed.

Standards for Reviewing Charge Error

The trial court “shall submit the questions, instructions and definitions in the form provided by Rule 277, which are raised by the written pleadings and the evidence.” Tex.R. Civ. P. 278. Whether the charge submits the controlling issue in the case, in terms of theories of recovery or defense, is a question of law which is reviewed de novo. Braudrick v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 250 S.W.3d 471, 475 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2008, no pet.).

The decision of whether to submit a particular instruction is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Shupe v. Lingafelter, 192 S.W.3d 577, 579 (Tex.2006). A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner without reference to any guiding rules or principles. Walker v. Gutierrez, 111 S.W.3d 56, 62 (Tex.2003). The essential inquiry is whether the instruction or definition aids the jury in answering the questions. Lee v. Lee, 47 S.W.3d 767, 789 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied); see also Sterling Trust Co. v. Adderley, 168 S.W.3d 835, 842–43 (Tex.2005). A court is given wide latitude to determine the sufficiency of explanatory instructions and definitions. Plainsman Trading Co. v. Crews, 898 S.W.2d 786, 791 (Tex.1995).

An instruction is proper if it assists the jury, is supported by the pleadings or evidence, and accurately states the law. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Williams, 85 S.W.3d 162, 166 (Tex.2002). A jury instruction is improper if it comments on the weight of the evidence or “nudge [s] or “tilt[s] the jury. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc. v. Johnson, 106 S.W.3d 718, 724 (Tex.2003); see Torres v. Caterpillar, Inc., 928 S.W.2d 233, 241 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1996, writ denied). It can be error for a trial court to give the jury an instruction even when it is a substantially correct statement of the law. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Camacho, 228 S.W.3d 453, 460 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2007, pet. denied).

Preservation of Charge Error

To preserve charge error for review, a party must “point out distinctly the objectionable matter and the grounds of the objection.” Tex.R. Civ. P. 274. “Any complaint as to a question, definition, or instruction, on account of any defect, omission, or fault in pleading, is waived unless specifically included in the objections.” Id. An objection does not satisfy rule 274 unless “the defect relied upon by the objecting party and the grounds of the...

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