Hamidi v. Serv. Emps. Int'l Union Local 1000

• Decision Date: 22 May 2015
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 2:14-319 WBS KJN
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California
• Parties: KOUROSH KENNETH HAMIDI, et al.; and the class they seek to represent, Plaintiffs, v. SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION LOCAL 1000; and BETTY YEE, Controller State of California, Defendants.

KOUROSH KENNETH HAMIDI, et al.; and the class they seek to represent, Plaintiffs, v. SERVICE EMPLOYEES INTERNATIONAL UNION LOCAL 1000; and BETTY YEE, Controller State of California, Defendants.

Civ. No. 2:14-319 WBS KJN

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

May 22, 2015

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: MOTION FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION AND APPOINTMENT OF CLASS COUNSEL

Eighteen plaintiffs,¹ who are employees of the State of California, brought this putative class action lawsuit against defendants Service Employees International Union Local 1000("Local 1000") and the California State Controller.² More than a year has passed since plaintiffs filed this case, and no party has yet moved for dismissal or otherwise tested its merits. The instant motion asks the court instead to decide whether this case may be litigated as a class action.

Consequently, this Order addresses only plaintiffs' motion for class certification and appointment of class counsel pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. It expresses no views on whether plaintiffs have stated a claim upon which the requested relief can be granted or the ultimate merits of plaintiffs' lawsuit.

Local 1000 engages in collective bargaining with the state on behalf of plaintiffs and other public employees. (See Compl. ¶¶ 6, 8, 19 (Docket No. 1)); Cal. Gov't Code §§ 3513(a)-(c), 3520.5. Plaintiffs are not members of Local 1000. (Compl. ¶ 6.) However, plaintiffs must pay a "fair share fee" to compensate it for "fulfilling its duty to represent the employees in their employment relations with the state." Cal. Gov't Code § 3513(k) (defining "fair share fee"); see also 8 C.C.R. § 32990 (defining "agency fee"). The State Controller deducts fair share fees directly from a public employee's wages and remits them to Local 1000 on a monthly basis. See Cal. Gov't Code § 3515.7(b).

Plaintiffs challenge the opt out method by which defendants collect fees from non-union members to pay for the union's partisan political and ideological activities. (See Compl. ¶¶ 30-33.) On August 15, 2014, plaintiffs moved for class certification and appointment of class counsel. The class that plaintiffs seek to represent consists of:

all former, current, and future State of California employees employed in Bargaining Units 1, 3, 4, 11, 14, 15, 17, 20, and 21 who are, have been, or will be represented exclusively for purposes of collective bargaining by Local 1000, in three subclasses:

a. All individuals who pay compulsory fees to Local 1000 who are not members and who have, at one time or another, specifically objected to the use of their union fees for politics or other nonbargaining activities;

b. All individuals who pay compulsory fees to Local 1000 who are not members and who have never specifically objected to the use of their union fees for politics or other nonbargaining activities; and

c. All individuals who pay compulsory fees to Local 1000 who are not members and who have specifically objected to the use of their union fees for politics or other nonbargaining activities and for whom Local 1000 has, for whatever reason, refused to honor their objections.

(Compl. ¶ 9; Pls.' Mot. at 2.) Plaintiffs state that this class is intended to encompass all potential fee objectors. (Pls.' Mem. at 3.) Plaintiffs also explain that the subclasses included within their proposed definition are for determining the amount of damages only and that all members of the general class share the claims asserted in their Complaint.³ (Pls.' Reply at 32 &n.38 (Docket No. 51).)

I. Discussion

"For a class to be certified, a plaintiff must satisfy each prerequisite of Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and must also establish an appropriate ground for maintaining class actions under Rule 23(b)." Stearns v. Ticketmaster Corp., 655 F.3d 1013, 1019 (9th Cir. 2011); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. "The party seeking certification has the burden of affirmatively demonstrating that the class meets the requirements of [Rule 23]." Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 666 F.3d 581, 588 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011)).

A. Clarification of the Proposed Class

As a preliminary matter, plaintiffs acknowledge some confusion as to the scope of the class they seek to certify. (Pls.' Reply at 31-32.) Plaintiffs state that, because their claims pertain to periods and practices after June 2013, they have no objection to making this time limitation explicit. (Id. at 31; see Stipulation & Order ¶ 4.) The court will therefore modify the proposed class definition to include nonmembersrepresented by Local 1000 "from June 2013 onward."

The court also notes that, as defined by plaintiffs, subclass (c) is a lesser-included group of subclass (a). The court will separate these subclasses by adding to the definition of subclass (a) the phrase "and whose objections were honored." The court retains the power to modify this definition, and it will be the duty of the parties' counsel to call to the court's attention any other necessary adjustments. See Cummings v. Connell, 316 F.3d 886, 896 (9th Cir. 2003).

B. Rule 23(a)

Rule 23(a) restricts class actions to cases where:

(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable;

(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class;

(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and

(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a). "The Rule's four requirements--numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequate representation--effectively limit the class claims to those fairly encompassed by the named plaintiff's claims." Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (quoting Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 156 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

A case's merits may be considered only "to the extent . . . that they are relevant to determining whether the Rule 23 prerequisites for class certification are satisfied." Amgen Inc. v. Conn. Ret. Plans & Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184, 1195 (2013);see also Ellis v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 657 F.3d 970, 983-84 & n.8 (9th Cir. 2011) ("The district court is required to examine the merits of the underlying claim in this context, only inasmuch as it must determine whether common questions exist; not to determine whether class members could actually prevail on the merits of their claims.").

1. Numerosity

"A proposed class of at least forty members presumptively satisfies the numerosity requirement." Avilez v. Pinkerton Gov't Servs., 286 F.R.D. 450, 456 (C.D. Cal. 2012); see also, e.g., Collins v. Cargill Meat Solutions Corp., 274 F.R.D. 294, 300 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (Wanger, J.). Subclasses (a) and (b) thus easily satisfy numerosity. (See Calderia Decl. ¶ 11.)

Local 1000 challenges only the numerosity of subclass (c), the "attempted objector" subclass. (Local 1000's Opp'n at 34-35 (Docket No. 39).) However, in light of plaintiffs' clarification that all general class members will assert the same two claims, (see Pls.' Reply at 32), the court concludes that numerosity is satisfied as to the general class and will proceed to the next requirement.

2. Commonality

Commonality requires a lawsuit to "depend upon a common contention" that is "capable of classwide resolution--which means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke." Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551. "What matters to class certification . . . is not the raising of common 'questions'--even in droves--but, rather the capacity of a classwideproceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the resolution of the litigation." Id. "To assess whether the putative class members share a common question . . . [the court] must identify the elements of the class members' case-in-chief." Stockwell v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 749 F.3d 1107, 1114 (9th Cir. 2014)

a. Facts Relevant to Commonality

The parties do not dispute application of the same opt out procedure to all nonmember public employees. By default, fair share fees deducted from public employees' wages reflect both a union's collective bargaining and non-collective bargaining expenditures. See Cal. Gov't Code §§ 3513(k); 3515.7. However, nonmembers may demand a return of the portion of the fee used "in aid of activities or causes of a partisan political or ideological nature only incidentally related to the terms and conditions of employment." Id. § 3515.8.

In late May or June 2013, Local 1000 sent nonmembers a Notice to Fair Share Fee Payers ("June 2013 Notice"). (Compl. Ex. A (Docket No. 1-1); Decl. of Brian Caldeira ("Calderia Decl.") ¶¶ 3, 6 (Docket No. 37).) All nonmembers faced the same opt out procedure, as explained in the notice, for raising an objection should they wish to avoid the fee associated with political or ideological expenditures. (Caldeira Decl. ¶ 7.) Local 1000 identified those individuals who objected for the State Controller. (Id. ¶ 8.) The State Controller then deducted either a full fee or a reduced fee from all nonmember public employees' wages pursuant state law. (See id. ¶ 11.)

b. Plaintiffs' First Claim Satisfies Commonality

Plaintiffs' first claim "advances the theory that a union is not permitted to seize from any ^potential objector' fees exceeding those which serve a compelling state interest--i.e., those for constitutionally-chargeable costs--absent their affirmative consent." (Pls.' Reply at 24; see Compl. ¶¶ 31-33.) Language from the Supreme Court's recent decision in Knox invites such a challenge, plaintiffs say. See Knox v. Serv. Empl. Int'l Union, Local 1000, 132 S. Ct. 2277, 2289-91 (2012). The court therefore understands this claim, like the claim in Knox, to allege the opt out procedure does not comply with Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1, AFT, AFL-CIO v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986).

Before Knox reached the...