Hamilton Bank of Johnson City v. Williamson County Regional Planning Com'n, No. 82-5388

CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit)
Writing for the CourtBefore KEITH, KENNEDY and WELLFORD; CORNELIA G. KENNEDY; WELLFORD
Citation729 F.2d 402
PartiesHAMILTON BANK OF JOHNSON CITY, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. WILLIAMSON COUNTY REGIONAL PLANNING COMMISSION, et al., Defendants-Appellees.
Decision Date07 March 1984
Docket NumberNo. 82-5388

Page 402

729 F.2d 402
HAMILTON BANK OF JOHNSON CITY, Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
WILLIAMSON COUNTY REGIONAL PLANNING COMMISSION, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 82-5388.
United States Court of Appeals,
Sixth Circuit.
Argued Aug. 4, 1983.
Decided March 7, 1984.

Page 403

G.T. Nebel, argued, Bass, Berry & Sims, Nashville, Tenn., for plaintiff-appellant.

Robert L. Estes, Thomas M. Donnell, Jr., M. Milton Sweeney, argued, Stewart, Estes & Donnell, Nashville, Tenn., for defendants-appellees.

Before KEITH, KENNEDY and WELLFORD, Circuit Judges.

CORNELIA G. KENNEDY, Circuit Judge.

Hamilton Bank of Johnson City appeals from a judgment that as a matter of law it is not entitled to damages for a temporary taking of its property under the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Hamilton's claims arise from appellee Williamson County Regional Planning Commission's refusal to allow Hamilton to complete construction of a residential subdivision.

I

Hamilton is the successor in interest of the developers of a tract of land in Williamson County, Tennessee. In 1973, Williamson County changed its zoning ordinances to permit cluster residential developments. Under cluster development houses may be built on smaller lots than would otherwise be allowed, upon the condition that sufficient land within the development be left as "open space." In 1973 the planning commission approved a preliminary plat for a proposed cluster development covering 676 acres, to be known as Temple Hills Country Club Estates. A notation on the approved plat indicated that the total number of allowable dwelling units on the tract was 736. However, lot lines were only drawn in for 469 units; the areas in which the remaining 267 units were to be placed were left blank and bore the notation "this parcel not to be developed until approved by the planning commission." The planning commission minutes reflect that the plat was approved after considerable discussion of whether the plat complied with density requirements. The plat was apparently in compliance under one interpretation of the zoning regulations, but not under an alternate interpretation. There was also some disagreement over the method to be used in calculating slopes in order to determine whether the development would violate the requirement that lots not be placed on slopes greater than 25%. The total number of units approved by the planning commission is in dispute. Hamilton introduced at trial a letter signed by six members (a majority) of the 1973 planning commission stating that 736 units had been approved.

Development of the project began. The developers dedicated an easement of open space to the county covering about 245 acres, most of which was to be used as a golf course, they built roads, and they installed sufficient utility lines to accommodate the entire development. Before construction was actually commenced on any particular section, a final plat for that section was submitted for approval by the planning commission. Between 1973 and 1979, the commission approved final plats for several sections. The preliminary plat was also reapproved several times between 1973 and 1979. A witness for Hamilton testified that the developers spent three to five million dollars for improvements to the property during this time.

In 1977, the zoning regulations were changed. The planning commission continued to apply the 1973 regulations to Temple Hills, however, since the project had originally been approved under those standards. This policy changed in 1979, when the planning commission decided to consider plats submitted for renewal under the regulations then in effect rather than those in effect when initial approval had been given. On August 16, 1979, the plat was renewed under the 1979 regulations.

In October 1980, the plat was again submitted to the planning commission for approval. This time the plat was disapproved, for two reasons: non-compliance with density requirements, and lots placed on slopes greater than 25%. In November 1980, Hamilton through foreclosure acquired the property that had not yet been developed and sold. Hamilton submitted a

Page 404

preliminary plat, which apparently included plans for development of the 258 remaining undeveloped acres by building 476 dwelling units to bring the development's total to 688. The planning commission disapproved this plat on June 18, 1981, listing eight objections.

Hamilton then brought this action against the planning commission under five theories: (1) taking without just compensation; (2) violation of procedural due process; (3) violation of substantive due process; (4) denial of equal protection; and (5) estoppel under state law from not allowing the project to proceed.

After a trial, the District Court granted the planning commission's motion for a directed verdict on the substantive due process and equal protection claims. The case was submitted to the jury on the remaining theories. The jury returned a verdict with answers to special interrogatories to the effect that Hamilton had not been denied procedural due process, but had been denied economically viable use of its property in violation of the just compensation clause of the fifth amendment, and that the planning commission was estopped under state law from requiring Hamilton to comply with the present zoning regulations as opposed to the 1973 regulations. The jury assessed damages against the planning commission in the amount of $350,000 for the temporary taking of Hamilton's property for the period from the disapproval of the plat to the time of trial.

The District Court issued a permanent injunction which required the planning commission to apply the 1973 regulations to Temple Hills consistently with its prior decisions, to approve the plat submitted in 1981, and to comply with ten specific requirements governing its future actions toward Temple Hills.

The District Court then granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of the planning commission on the taking issue. The court found the evidence sufficient to support the verdict that there had been a taking, but held that judgment on the taking issue would be inconsistent with the jury's finding that the planning commission was estopped from applying current regulations. The court reasoned that:

Any damages which plaintiff suffered resulted from an attempt by the local government to apply regulations in a manner impermissible under state law. Because the state law itself prevents continued application of those regulations, there can be no taking of property prohibited by the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

The District Court also modified its permanent injunction to merely enjoin the planning commission from applying post-1973 regulations to Temple Hills, and denied Hamilton's motion for attorney fees.

Hamilton appeals from the judgment notwithstanding the verdict and asks this Court to order judgment based on the jury's damage award. Alternatively, Hamilton argues that the directed verdict on the substantive due process and equal protection claims was in error and requests a remand for trial on those issues. Hamilton also argues that it is entitled to its attorney fees.

II

This Court has held that:

On a motion for judgment n.o.v. as on a motion for a directed verdict, the district court must determine whether there was sufficient evidence presented to raise a material issue of fact for the jury.... Furthermore, the standard remains the same when the trial court's decision is reviewed on appeal.

O'Neill v. Kiledjian, 511 F.2d 511, 513 (6th Cir.1975). We must view the evidence in the light most favorable to Hamilton, drawing from that evidence all reasonable inferences in Hamilton's favor. Pike v. Benchmaster Mfg. Co., 696 F.2d 38, 40 (6th Cir.1982); National Polymer Prods. v. Borg-Warner Corp., 660 F.2d 171, 178 (6th Cir.1981). The District Court's judgment on the taking issue must, therefore, be reversed if the evidence supports an award for a taking of Hamilton's property without

Page 405

just compensation within the meaning of the fifth amendment. We thus turn to that question.

The Supreme Court has not set forth a clear standard by which to determine whether particular conduct amounts to a "taking" under the fifth amendment." 1 Resolving this question generally requires an ad hoc, factual inquiry. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 3171, 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 174-175, 100 S.Ct. 383, 389-390, 62 L.Ed.2d 332 (1979); Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 2659, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978).

A taking does not require an actual physical occupation of the property or formal condemnation proceedings. Amen v. City of Dearborn, 718 F.2d 789 (6th Cir.1983). The Supreme Court established in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 43 S.Ct. 158, 67 L.Ed. 322 (1922), that governmental regulation affecting an owner's use of his property may constitute a taking. 2 In Pennsylvania Coal, a statute prohibited mining coal in such a way as to cause a residence to subside, where the owner of the underground mining rights was not the owner of the surface habitation rights. The Court employed a practical economic analysis to determine that application of the statute effected a taking, saying: "What makes the right to mine coal valuable is that it can be exercised with profit. To make it commercially impracticable to mine certain coal has very nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes as appropriating or destroying it." 260 U.S. at 414, 43 S.Ct. at 160.

The taking clause was more explicitly held applicable to zoning regulation in Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 100 S.Ct. 2138, 65 L.Ed.2d 106 (1980). The Court there held that:

The application of a general zoning law to particular property effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance...

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  • Kinzli v. City of Santa Cruz, No. C-80-2863-MHP.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. Northern District of California
    • 29 Octubre 1985
    ...according to the same framework applied to permanent irreversible `takings.'" Hamilton Bank v. Williamson City Regional Planning Comm., 729 F.2d 402, 407 (6th Cir.1984), cert. granted, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 80, 83 L.Ed.2d 28 (1984) (quoting San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Dieg......
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    • United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. Central District of California
    • 5 Julio 1985
    ...447 U.S. 255, 100 S.Ct. 2138, 65 L.Ed.2d 106 (1980); e.g. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City v. Williamson County Regional Planning Commission, 729 F.2d 402, 406 (6th Cir.1984) rev'd ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 3108, 87 L.Ed.2d 126 (1985); cf. Martino v. Santa Clara Water District, 703 F.2d 1141 (9t......
  • Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, No. 84-4
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • 28 Junio 1985
    ...the time respondent filed its § 1983 action, Page 174 because respondent failed to apply for variances from the regulations. Pp. 197-200. 729 F.2d 402 (CA6, 1984) reversed and remanded. Robert L. Estes, Delhi, N.Y., for petitioners. Edwin S. Kneedler, Washington, D.C., for U.S. as amicus cu......
  • Richardson v. City and County of Honolulu, Civ. No. 90-00856 DAE.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Court (Hawaii)
    • 13 Marzo 1991
    ...an actual physical occupation of property or formal condemnation proceedings. Hamilton Bank v. Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n, 729 F.2d 402, 405 (6th Cir.1984), cert. granted, 469 U.S. 815, 105 S.Ct. 80, 83 L.Ed.2d 28 (1984), rev'd on other grounds, 473 U.S. 172, 105 S.Ct. 3108,......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
10 cases
  • Kinzli v. City of Santa Cruz, No. C-80-2863-MHP.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. Northern District of California
    • 29 Octubre 1985
    ...according to the same framework applied to permanent irreversible `takings.'" Hamilton Bank v. Williamson City Regional Planning Comm., 729 F.2d 402, 407 (6th Cir.1984), cert. granted, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 80, 83 L.Ed.2d 28 (1984) (quoting San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Dieg......
  • LITTON INTERN. DEV. CORP. v. City of Simi Valley, No. CV 82-6648-ER(Tx).
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. Central District of California
    • 5 Julio 1985
    ...447 U.S. 255, 100 S.Ct. 2138, 65 L.Ed.2d 106 (1980); e.g. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City v. Williamson County Regional Planning Commission, 729 F.2d 402, 406 (6th Cir.1984) rev'd ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 3108, 87 L.Ed.2d 126 (1985); cf. Martino v. Santa Clara Water District, 703 F.2d 1141 (9t......
  • Williamson County Regional Planning Commission v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, No. 84-4
    • United States
    • United States Supreme Court
    • 28 Junio 1985
    ...the time respondent filed its § 1983 action, Page 174 because respondent failed to apply for variances from the regulations. Pp. 197-200. 729 F.2d 402 (CA6, 1984) reversed and remanded. Robert L. Estes, Delhi, N.Y., for petitioners. Edwin S. Kneedler, Washington, D.C., for U.S. as amicus cu......
  • Richardson v. City and County of Honolulu, Civ. No. 90-00856 DAE.
    • United States
    • United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Court (Hawaii)
    • 13 Marzo 1991
    ...an actual physical occupation of property or formal condemnation proceedings. Hamilton Bank v. Williamson County Regional Planning Comm'n, 729 F.2d 402, 405 (6th Cir.1984), cert. granted, 469 U.S. 815, 105 S.Ct. 80, 83 L.Ed.2d 28 (1984), rev'd on other grounds, 473 U.S. 172, 105 S.Ct. 3108,......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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