Hamilton County Council v. State ex rel. Groff

• Decision Date: 28 September 1949
• Docket Number: 28558.
• Parties: HAMILTON COUNTY COUNCIL et al. v. STATE ex rel. GROFF.
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

87 N.E.2d 810

227 Ind. 608

HAMILTON COUNTY COUNCIL et al. v. STATE ex rel. GROFF.

No. 28558.

Supreme Court of Indiana

September 28, 1949

Campbell & Campbell, Noblesville, for appellants.

Bell & Bell, Indianapolis, for appellee.

GILKISON Chief Justice.

Appellee relator, filed his complaint in the trial court to mandate appellants as The Hamilton County Council to make appropriations and the Board of Commissioners of Hamilton County to pay him $450 additional salary, from August 16 1947 to December 31, 1947; $1,200 additional salary for 1948 and $4,800 salary for 1949. The claim is based upon an order of the nine township trustees of Hamilton County at a meeting held on May 5, 1947, increasing the salary of relator as County Superintendent of Hamilton County from $3,600 to $4,800 per year, beginning with August 16, 1947. On May 5, 1947 a copy of the order was filed with the county auditor to be presented to the county council. The county council failed to make the appropriation. Appellants' demurrer to the complaint was overruled and it then answered under the rules by admitting some of the allegations of the complaint and denying others. It then affirmatively alleged that the authority conferred upon township trustees by Acts 1933, Ch. 21, § 14, p. 88, § 49-1014, Burns', as amended by Acts 1939, Ch. 96, § 1, p. 506, § 49-1014, Burns' Supp., is limited and controlled by Acts 1937, Ch. 119, § 3, p. 646, § 64-309, Burns' 1943 Repl.

Upon the issues so joined the cause was tried by the court resulting in a finding and judgment for appellee and mandate against appellants as prayed in the complaint.

Errors assigned are (1) that the court erred in overrulng the demurrer to the complaint and (2) in overruling the motion for new trial.

By each assignment appellants question whether Chapter 96, p. 506, Acts 1939, § 49-1014, Burns' 1933 Supp., is the controlling law in this case or whether this statute must be construed in connection with other existing statutes and legal principles including the county reform acts, Acts 1899, Ch. 154 p. 343 to 365, and all acts amendatory thereof and supplemental thereto, and be controlled thereby.

Chapter 96, p. 506 of the Acts of 1939 is an amendment of Section 14 of Chapter 21, p. 114 of the Acts of 1933 and, of course, must be construed in connection with that law. Prior to this amendment Section 14 read thus: 'The salaries of the county superintendent as herein stipulated may be increased upon written request of a majority of the township trustees to the county council, who may increase such salary to an amount which in the judgment of the county council may seem proper.'

By Chapter 96, p. 506 of the Acts of 1939 it was amended to read thus: 'The salary of the county superintendent, as herein stipulated, may be increased by a majority of the township trustees to an amount which, in the judgment of a majority of the township trustees, may seem proper, and the county council shall appropriate and the board of county commissioners shall allow the necessary funds to pay such increase in the salary of the county superintendent.'

It is thus apparent that by the amendment of 1939 the legislature intended to take from the county council the duty of exercising any discretion in the matter of raising the salary of a county superintendent and to bestow that duty solely upon the township trustees of the county. It then went further and made it a mandatory duty of the council to make the appropriation to pay the salary as increased by the trustees, and a like mandatory duty of the board of county commissioners to allow the funds to pay such increase.

We agree with appellants that this amendment should be construed along with the other sections of the act of which it is a part and with other statutes relating to the general pattern of state government. However, it is a legislative duty to fix the salaries of state, county, city and township officers including that of the county superintendent of schools. Our legislature frequently has exercised the duty of fixing the salary of county superintendents of schools as shown by the two enactments noted above. See also Acts 1921, Ch. 54, § 2 p. 132; Acts 1911, Ch. 94, § 2 p. 157; Acts 1905, Ch. 163, § 2 p. 492; Acts 1899, Ch. 143, § 11, p. 245; Acts 1873, Ch. 25, § 5, p. 77.

The 1939 amendment heretofore quoted agrees with the other sections of the statute of which it is a part and all other statutes implementing the general pattern of state government, including the county reform law of 1899, quite as effectively as the section it amended or any previous statutory enactments fixing the salaries of county superintendents of schools, and is therefore valid. See Walsh, Treasurer et al. v. State ex rel. Soules, Auditor, 1895, 142 Ind. 357, 362, 41 N.E. 65, 33 L.R.A. 392; State ex rel. Fox v. Board of County Commissioners of Carroll County et al., 1931, 203 Ind. 23, 32, 178 N.E. 563; 59 C.J. Statutes § 647, p. 1096; 50 Am.Jur. Statutes § 468, p. 481.

Of course, the General Assembly of 1933 could not by any enactment limit the rights and duties of the General Assembly of 1939 or of any succeeding General Assembly. This is equally true of the General Assembly of 1899 that enacted the County Council law. One of the purposes of having the legislature meet biennially as provided by the Constitution, art. 4, § 9, is to bring the laws up to date--commensurate with the growth, progress and needs of the people of the state. This is frequently accomplished by making amendments to existing laws.

The amount of the increase or reduction in salary is for the legislature, and not...