Hamilton Plaintiffs v. Williams Plaintiffs
| Decision Date | 14 July 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 97-30486,97-30486 |
| Citation | 147 F.3d 367 |
| Parties | HAMILTON PLAINTIFFS, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. WILLIAMS PLAINTIFFS, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. Charles C. FOTI, Jr., Sheriff; City of New Orleans; State of Louisiana; Richard Stalder, Secretary; Mike Foster, Governor, State of Louisiana; Sixty-Four (64) Louisiana Sheriffs, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Ayesha Khan, National Prison Project, Washington, DC, for Hamilton Plaintiffs.
Keith Baker Nordyke, June E. Denlinger, Nordyke & Denlinger, Baton Rouge, LA, for Williams Plaintiffs.
T. Allen Usry, Usry & Weeks, Metairie, LA, for Foti and Sixty-Four Louisiana Sheriffs.
Annabelle H. Walker, New Orleans, LA, for City of New Orleans.
Patricia Nalley Bowers, Bowers & Bowers, New Orleans, LA, for State of Louisiana, Stalder and Foster.
Shannan Sweeney Rieger, Richard A. Curry, McGlinchey, Stafford & Lang, Baton Rouge, LA, William Lester Kline, LA Dept. of Public Safety, Baton Rouge, LA, for Stalder and Foster.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana.
Before POLITZ, Chief Judge, and REYNALDO G. GARZA and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
The Hamilton plaintiffs appeal the district court's order vacating and rescinding consent decrees setting inmate populations and guard-to-prisoner ratios at parish correctional facilities. For the reasons assigned, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
For nearly three decades federal courts have been required to address problems in the operation of the Louisiana prison system. In 1969 a class action, Hamilton v. Schiro, 1 was filed in the Eastern District of Louisiana challenging conditions in the New Orleans Parish Prison. In April 1970, the trial court found that the prison conditions were unconstitutional and issued a remedial decree, including a prisoner population cap. Over the years, as new jails were built in Orleans Parish, the plaintiff class was expanded to include prisoners in the other facilities and population caps were set for same.
In 1971, four inmates in the Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola filed suit in the Middle District of Louisiana, claiming that their conditions of confinement were unconstitutional. This action, Williams v. Edwards, 2 was treated as a de facto class action for both the inmates at Angola and the inmates housed in facilities operated by the State of Louisiana Department of Corrections. 3 In April 1975, the district court adopted a Special Master's report and found that the conditions of confinement violated the Constitution resulting in injunctive relief, including a prisoner population cap. This Thereafter, the DOC sought, pursuant to court order, the development of a comprehensive plan for bringing the state prison system into full compliance. Incident to that plan, the DOC secured the cooperation of the Louisiana parishes and cities to house inmates sentenced to state confinement to help alleviate overcrowded conditions in the state prison facilities. As state prisoner numbers increased in local jails, federal actions were filed, complaining of overcrowding. To avoid the spectre of inconsistent decrees, in Hamilton v. Morial, 4 we ordered that all federal litigation then pending or subsequently filed against state, parish or local prison facilities, relating directly or indirectly to inmate population issues, be consolidated in the Middle District of Louisiana. Thereafter, officials in charge of the many Louisiana state, parish, and city facilities entered into stipulations and consent decrees specifying, inter alia, population limits and officer-to-prisoner ratios. Since 1981, these facilities continuously have been under the judicial oversight of Judge Frank J. Polozola of the Middle District of Louisiana, and the population caps and officer-to-prisoner ratios have been revised as conditions warranted.
cap ultimately was imposed on all relevant facilities.
In March 1994, the State and the Sheriffs executed an agreement entitled "Basic Jail Guidelines" in their effort to ensure that the prison system in Louisiana would operate consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States and of the State of Louisiana. On September 26, 1996, a Petition for Order Approving Settlement for Purpose of Terminating Consent Decrees was filed in the court a quo by class counsel for the Williams plaintiffs and counsel for the Governor and the Secretary of the DOC, seeking a final resolution of the litigation between them. The Petition Agreement stated that the Williams parties had agreed to the "dismissal of all consent decrees" for all state, parish, and city facilities housing DOC inmates, except the Louisiana State Penitentiary at Angola and specified juvenile detention facilities, effective April 1, 1997, and they requested the court's aid in effectuating their agreement. Included with the Petition Agreement was a letter from counsel for the Sheriffs, requesting that all consent decrees pertaining to parish facilities be vacated effective April 1, 1997. Following a hearing on September 26, 1996, the court approved the settlement and entered three orders consistent therewith. For ease of review, copies of these three orders are attached hereto as Exhibits B (state), C (parish), and D (city).
On October 23, 1996, the Hamilton plaintiffs filed a Motion to Reconsider and Vacate Orders of September 26th. The Hamilton plaintiffs contended that the issuance of the September 26th orders violated their fundamental rights to due process because they were not included in the negotiations resulting in the Petition Agreement and Sheriffs' Order, were not given notice of their filing, were not signatories thereto, and were not present when they were presented to and approved by the court. The Hamilton plaintiffs informed the court that they did not consent to the dismissal of the population cap consent decrees affecting the facilities covered by the Hamilton litigation, and did not authorize counsel for the plaintiffs to act as their counsel or to represent their interest. The State responded by moving dismissal of the Hamilton plaintiffs' motion because they were not parties to the suit in which the orders were entered.
The Hamilton plaintiffs responded, contending that they were parties and asking, in the alternative, that they be allowed to intervene. Judge Polozola denied both the State's motion to dismiss and the Hamilton plaintiffs' motion to reconsider. The Hamilton plaintiffs appealed this order and Sheriff Charles C. Foti of Orleans Parish moved to dismiss the appeal. We granted that motion.
Before addressing the merits of this appeal, we must first determine the threshold issue of our appellate jurisdiction, on our own motion, if necessary. The Sheriffs contend that this appeal involves a non-appealable interlocutory order of the district court. We cannot accept that contention.
The relevant statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) provides that the courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from "[i]nterlocutory orders of the district courts ... granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court." Consent decrees are "injunctions" within the meaning of section 1292(a)(1). 6 It is clear that the Hamilton plaintiffs challenge the order vacating the consent decrees affecting the Orleans Parish facilities. The parties dispute, however, whether the September 26, 1996 order or the April 1, 1997 order is the relevant, dispositive order. That relevant dispute aside for the moment, the challenged order explicitly dissolved injunctive relief by vacating the population cap consent decrees for the parish facilities. Accordingly, the order clearly is appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).
A close review of the record in this appeal, aided by the briefs and oral arguments of counsel, leads inexorably to the conclusion that the September 26th order is the dispositive order herein. It states, "IT IS ORDERED that each and every consent decree entered by this court pertaining to inmate population and guard-to-prisoner ratio at any facility operated by or under the authority of any Sheriff, appearing hereinbelow ... are hereby VACATED, RESCINDED and are without further effect as of April 1, 1997." 7 It cannot be gainsaid that this order vacates and rescinds the consent decrees effective April 1st; it is self-executing and does not merely await the entry of another order to be issued on April 1st. 8
The Hamilton plaintiffs did not timely appeal the September 26th order. The requirements of Rule 4 are both clear and mandatory. 9 An appellant has 30 days from the entry of a final judgment in which to appeal. On October 23, 1996, 27 days after the entry of the order vacating the population caps, the Hamilton plaintiffs filed a Motion to Reconsider and Vacate Orders of September 26th. This motion did not toll the time for filing a notice of appeal. 10 The Hamilton plaintiffs did not file a notice of appeal until December 20, 1996, almost three months after the entry of the September 26th orders. Thus, their appeal was untimely. 11
Although the Hamilton plaintiffs filed a notice of...
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